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INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays it is uncommon to open a new book on child development 
and find no mention of the ~ork of Jean Piaget. In his fifty years 
of academic life Piaget has published a phenomenal number of books 
and articles, has provided the impetus for even more research and has 
contributed a unique theory of child development to a field already 
crowded with ideas. An understanding of Piaget's work is essential 
to anyone interested in the development of the child; this thesis 
attempts to explain and extend the theory of moral development which 
has been proposed by this truly remarkable academic. 
The major emphasis in this thesis is on moral development. An 
attempt is made to qualify Piaget's theory of moral development in 
several ways. The methodological weaknesses and obscurities which 
typify Piaget's approach will be discussed since these limit the 
validity of his findings. A review of the replication work deriving 
from Piaget's study will be made since they further test the validity 
of his scheme and suggest many modifications to his original state-
ments. Other theories of moral development will be outlined since 
Piaget emphasizes a single aspect of conscience (the cognitive ability 
to distinguish right and wrong) and ignores other equally important 
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features (such as guilt or behaviour). 
The stress placed by Piaget on the cognitive aspects of moral 
development derives from his overriding interest in the development 
of the child's acquisition and organization of knowledge; Piaget 
regards morality as one particular area of knowledge which the child 
must assimilate. He suggests that the process of development is 
basically the same for moral knowledge and for other areas of 
cognitive growth. Piaget has elaborated a complex theory of in-
tellectual development which is often closely related to his theory 
of moral development and he implies that the factors which contribute 
to the child's organization and understanding of the world necessarily 
affect his moral knowledge as well. A complete understanding of 
Piaget's theory of moral development is therefore dependent upon some 
insight into his more general cognitive theory. An account of this 
theory will be given here for two reasons: first, a fairly straight 
forward explanation of Piaget's theory of cognitive development is 
lackin~ (although this is less true with the recent publication of 
the several short books noted in the first Bibliography); and second, 
this account should illuminate Piaget's ideas on moral development. 
Jean Piaget is a very remarkable man. -He has no formal quali-
fications in psycholoe;y and yet he has contributed one of the most 
important and provocative theories of child development in a field 
dominated by psychologists. He was born on August 9, 1896, at 
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Neuchatel in Switzerland and was obviously a precocious child. He 
took a very early interest in serious study and between the ages of 
seven and ten years he was successively enSrossed in the study of 
mechanics, birds, fossils and sea shells. He published his first 
paper when he was ten years old - a brief note on an albino sparrow 
which he had seen in a park - and from this time he assisted the 
director of the local natural history museum in the evenings; from 
the age of fifteen years he began to publish articles on the mollusks 
of Switzerland, the field in which he had helped at the museum. 
Piaget notes (1952) that these early publications led to some amusing 
experiences, such as his having to decline meetings with foreign 
colleagues and his being offered the position of curator of the 
natural history museum in Geneva. 
Piaget received his baccalaureate degree in 1915 and his doctorate 
in the natural sciences three years later when he was twenty-one. Even 
before his University days he had begun to form the idea that the 
problems of epistemology (the genesis and development of knowledge) 
could be given a biological explanation; he realized that this was a 
field which had been little developed and, in fact, it was to occupy 
him for the whole of his academic life. Piaget is a biologist by 
training; he has no formal qualifications in psychology although he 
read widely in the fields of philosophy, religion, sociology and 
psychology in the years prior to and during his University attendance. 
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It was in this period that he developed several ideas which were 
elaborated only much later on. 
First, as we have already noted, he thought that the problem 
of knowledge (which had up until then been discussed only by 
philosophers) could be given a biological explanation; however, he 
saw the need to bridge the gap between philosophy and biology. Only 
gradually did developmental psychology come to fill this need. 
Second, Piaget believed that both external actions and internal 
thought processes would admit logical organization. In his later 
work this found expression in the idea that thought is essentially 
internalized action and in the use of symbol~c logic to describe 
the organization of both. 
Finally, Piaget had already thought about the forms of 
equilibrium which characterized totalities. Even at this time 
(when he was only ninetooN Piaget believed that reciproea1 
preservation of parts and whole was the most stable form of 
equilibrium; this process of reciprocal preservation is, in essence, 
Piaget's theory of equilibration. 
These adolescent musings had their roots in biology; during 
the preparation of his doctoral dissertation, Piaget felt the need 
to move into the field of psychology in order to verify his beliefs. 
He was disillusioned by his first year in a psychological laboratory 
and, in fact, spent the following year studying mollusks so that he 
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could apply his mind to concentrate on concrete problems and avoid 
stagnation (1952, p. 244). He spent the years 1919-1921 at the 
Sorbonne and during this period he worked in Binet's laboratory 
under Dr. Simon on the standardization of Burt's reasoning tests. 
Although he undertook this task without enthusiasm it was to spark 
off an interest in the child's thinking which has occupied him 
ever since. 
In his work at the Binet clinic Piaget became intrigued by the 
ways in which the children reached their conclusions, especially 
when these were false; he noticed that apparently simple reasoning 
tasks presented, for the child under 11 or 12 years of age, 
difficulties unsuspected by the adult. Piaget realized that some 
reorientation was needed and that the child's thought should be 
considered in isolation and not in comparison with that of the adult. 
As a result of his investigations Piaget published three articles, 
the last one of which was read by C1aparede who not only accepted it 
for publication but also offered Piaget the job of Director of Studies 
at the Institut J.J. Rousseau in Geneva. Piaget accepted the job for 
a trial period and has been there ever since; he has had the 
opportunity to develop his ideas through a variety of experiments and, 
latterly, in collaboration with many eminent workers in the field of 
developmental psychology. 
Piaget's first five books, which reported the results of his 
work during the period 1921-1925, received much attention and are 
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still probably the best known of his publications. This fact is 
noted with some dismay by Piaget since he reGarded them as ten-
tative explorations of the field although they were accepted as 
final statements. In fact, the vast amount of research which has 
appeared subsequently from Geneva has represented the exten~ion of 
this original work in three main directions. First, the cognitive 
processes of the child were investigated in relation to the concepts 
of space, time, probability and movement and, the area which perhaps 
more than any other has made the Genevan psychologists famous, the 
conservation experiments were developed. Second, there is a series 
of experiments in perception which rely on more rigorous experimental 
control and represent a step away from the clinical approach which 
typified the first set of investigations. Finally, Piaget has 
recently returned to his 'first love' - genetic epistemology; each 
year three distinguished scholars are invited to Geneva to discuss 
epistemological problems; the results are presented at a symposium 
composed of these three plus eight or nine other academics and their 
discussions are published in a series of monographs. This return 
to the epistemological problems was long overdue since Piaget had 
only intended spending three or four years on the study of cognitive 
processes in infants and children before attacking the problem of 
thought in general. 
In all this concern with the child's intellectual development 
Piaget's fifth book, The Moral Judgement of the Child (1932), 
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appears as something of an anomaly; Piaget's previous books and 
his subsequent researches represented attempts to understand the 
workings of the child's mind while the field of morality is 
generally thought of as involving the child's emotions or be-
haviour. However, Piaget was interested in moral development as 
a special aspect of the child's cognitive development; he was' 
trying to establish what the child knew of the rules of behaviour 
and how the child's attitudes to these rules changed through time. 
Piaget's emphasis has been on the child's cognitive development 
and he published only the single volume in the field of morality. 
Certain of Piaget's findings from his investigations of cognitive 
development can be applied to his theory of moral development; 
in fact, several ideas expressed in The Moral Judgement of the Child 
anticipate more recent developments in Piaget's cognitive theory •. 
It was mentioned above that Piaget's 'famous five' books were 
widely read; they were also widely criticized on both theoretical 
and methodological grounds. Piaget's early clinical approach to 
the investigation of the child's behaviour denied the use of 
standardized questioning procedures; also he reports his sampling 
and results in only very sporadic fashion. The clinical approach 
was adopted as the most sensitive during the initial exploratory 
studies; more recently, standardized procedures have been developed 
and applied. The inadequacies in the sampling techniques and 
reporting derive from Piaget's biological training and his 
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suspicion of psychological statistics. }!aier says that 'Piaget 
proceeds with the assumption that a detailed investigation of 
any small sample of a species will yield basic information inherent 
to all members of that species,' (}laier, 1965, p. 82). Many of 
Piaget's theoretical statements derive from his studies of his own 
three children (hardly a representative sample by any standardsl); 
his six stages of sensori-motor development were evolved from the 
detailed diaries kept by himself and his wife recording the 
behaviour of their children. The trends reported in The Moral 
Judgement of the Child derive from the questioning of at least 
fourteen samples, the 1arcest of which was about a hundred children. 
In relation to his earliest work, Piaget notes that statistics had 
little significance since the children were asked different questions. 
More recently Piaget has improved the sample size, standardization 
of procedures and reporting of data, and the many replication studies 
carried out by other workers have corrected these inadequacies as a 
matter of course. 
The replication studies go to great lengths to show the need 
to modify Piaget's age-stage correlations to allow for such factors 
as the child's intelligence, social class, sex, nationality and 
religion; most of these factors were ignored by Piaget although he 
did give cursory acknowledgement to others as potentially important 
influences on the chi1d's moral development. However, Piaget did 
indicate one area which he thought to be of crucial importance to 
9 
the child's development - this is precisely the area which has so 
far lacked any thorough investigation, namely the nature of the 
parent-child relationship. Piaget discusses some aspects of this 
relationship (especially heteronomous and autonomous control of 
the child) which he believed to be crucial to the child's rate of 
moral development and he implies several other dimensions (such as 
parental strictness and a democratic atmosphere in the home) which 
appear to link in with these. 
A broad aim of this thesis is to seek some evidence of 
correlations between parental attitudes in several areas and the 
child's rate of moral growth. Piaget's discussion of the heteronomy-
autonomy continuum is developed to sueeest the dimensions along which 
varying parental attitudes might affect the child's development. 
From an investigation of moral development in the child using 
Piaget's story-situation approach (and during which the effects of 
such variables as the child's sex, social class, and intelligence 
were considered), it was possible to isolate exceptional groups of 
morally mature younger children and morally immature older children; 
the parents of these groups of children formed the basis of the 
investigation of the relationship between parental attitudes and the 
child's rate of moral development. 
Before these aims could be realized, however, several 
theoretical problems needed clarification. A proper understanding 
of Piaget's theory of moral development is impossible without some 
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knowledge of his theory of cognitive development. This latter 
theory is extremely complicated and difficult to follow at first 
and there are many ways in which it can be approached; Chapter 1 
of this thesis presents two of the more useful approaches. First 
is a chronological account of Piaget's stages of child development; 
this is the most straightforward approach to Piaget although many 
of the more important aspects of the theory become falsely relegated 
to a secondary position. For this reason another approach is included 
which attempts to explain and interrelate the major terms of Piaget's 
technical vocabulary; this approach overlaps the first to some extent 
b ut repetition and restatement are the only ways in which Piaget's 
theory can be fully understood. 
Piaget's theory of moral development is discussed in Chapter 2 
where his eleven moral dimensions are isolated and his suggestions 
regarding the educational implications of his work are noted. This 
chapter also includes the major methodological criticisms of Piaget's 
work in general •. These are perhaps played down in comparison with 
other studies; however, Piaget's theoretical elaborations have for 
the most part stood the tests of time and replication even though 
they were based in poorly controlled samples and unstandardized 
procedures. It is amazing that any theory built on such shaky 
foundations should prove so durable; this fact can only reflect 
on the unusual qualities of original thought possessed by Piaget. 
The modifications suggested to Piaget's original thesis on 
moral development are noted in Chapter 3. It is fair to say that 
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Piaget was interested more in the order of the stages of moral 
development than in the child's rate of development between stages; 
he notes differential rates of development without attempting to 
explain them in other than a very cursory fashion. The many re-
plication studies of Piaget's work have indicated the need to allow 
for such factors as intelligence, socio-economic class, respondent's 
sex and explicit training (as in religious teaching) which have been 
shown to influence the child's rate of progress through Piaget's 
scheme; as we have already noted, they fail to give thorough con-
sideration to the nature of the parent-child relationship as a 
factor influencing the child's development. An important distinction 
is made between the developmental and the non-developmental dimensions 
of Piaget's scheme; only responses to the former display trends which 
show a consistent increase in maturity with age. Finally, consider-
ation is given in this chapter to equilibration as an explanation of 
change between levels of maturity in judgement. 
In Chapter 4, theories of moral development are discussed 
which contrast with that of Piaget whose emphasis on the cognitive 
aspects of morality meant that he ignored other equally important 
features. In particular, attention is given to Freud's work on 
the development of the superego and to the attempts of the learning 
theorists to explain conscience as a conditioned response. Also, 
with the cognitive approach to moral development, Kohlberg's re-
cently formulated theory is compared with that of Piaget. It is 
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suggested that Kohlberg's theory will in future have the major 
contribution to make to the academic and practical aspects of 
moral development and moral education. 
The first four chapters comprise the theoretical section 
of this thesis; the practical aspects are discussed in the next 
three chapters. The first field-work exercises were undertaken 
with a sample of children in an effort to extend Piaget's in-
vestigation of the moral dimension of objective responsibility. 
Six tests were specially constructed after the fashion of Piaget, 
two each in the areas of clumsiness, stealing and lies. The 
details of sample and technique are reported in Chapter 5; the 
results are reported in Chapter 6. 
The second part of the field-work involved the parents of 
the children in the two groups of exceptions noted above, plus 
appropriate controls. Responses to a forty-two item attitude 
scale were correlated with the child's rate of moral development. 
The scale used tested attitudes in six broad areas - democracy, 
autonomy, overprotection, strictness, verbalization and acceleration. 
Certain correlations were established which suggested a partial 
explanation for the different rates of development of children in 
the two groups of exceptions. The sample, technique and results 
of the investigation of the parents are reported in Chapter 7. 
The final chapter is a reappraisal of the scope and findings 
of the present study and an indication of the major directions 
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which future research might be expected to take in relation to 
Piaget's general theory of cognitive development and his more 
specific theory of moral development. As a whole, it is hoped 
that this thesis will give the reader a better understanding of 
Piaget's theory of cognitive development and a better perspective 
on his theory of moral development; this perspective is achieved 
in three ways: by a comparison with Piaget's theory of cognitive 
development; by an indication of the modifications suggested by 
the replication studies; and finally, by comparison with alternative 
theories of moral development. 
Piaget is a difficult author but his is an extremely important 
contribution to the field of developmental psychology; the insight 
which Piaget's work affords into the crucial area of child development 
is well worth the effort involved in grasping his ideas. 
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SECTION A 
PIAGETtS THEORY OF 
Iv!ORAL DEVELOPl-1ENT IN PERSPECTIVE 
... 
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Jean Piaget has spent the past fifty years investigating 
many aspects of child development. The number of studies made 
by him and his associates is phenomenal; Flavell notes that 
Piaget had twenty articles published before he was twenty-one, 
and lists a hundred and thirty six works, in some of which 
Piaget was co-author, published between 1921 and 1961 (Flavell, 
1963, p. 2 and pp. 454-60). There appears to be no abatement 
in this flow of original work more recently; nor are there any 
signs of declining interest in Piaget from other workers in 
the field of child development - the position is quite the 
reverse, in fact, with replication studies and interpretations 
of Piaget's ideas being pUblished at seemingly shorter intervals. 
This immense amount of original research and validation 
work is one very practical reason for an acquaintance with 
Piaget's ideas. Moreover, Piaget is important from a theoretical 
point of view; his was a new approach to child development con-
trasting markedly with the very early ideas that a child's 
personality was determined at birth, and with ideas such as 
Freud's in which great emphasis is laid upon the first few 
years of childhood. Piaget's work suggests a much more gradual 
development over a far longer period of time; indeed, this may 
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continue into early adulthood, and, although he has studied 
this period most carefully, Piaget does not lay so much stress 
on the importance of the pre-school years. 
Piaget's work also stands in contrast to those psychologists 
following a stimulus-response approach to developmental psychology; 
Piaget claims that this approach considers the child as a passive 
agent on which experience stamps-in future behaviour patterns, 
whereas his own theory emphasizes the active part which the child 
must take during development. 
In this section an attempt will be made to putPiaget's 
ideas on moral development in perspective relative to his more 
general theory of cognitive development and to other theories 
of moral development. Piaget was not interested in morality 
per se; rather, he studied the development of different types 
of moral judgement as evidence of certain universal trends in 
children and as an indication of a unilinear progression to be 
found in areas other than moral development. He has attempted 
to synthesize his ideas from a variety of particular stUdies 
into a comprehensive epistemology, trying to produce a theory 
of development generally applicable to the child in the many 
separate areas of his life. 
Naturally this synthesis could only await the passage of 
time to allow enough of Piaget's own basic work plus sub-
stantial validation studies to be carried out. Recently such 
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a general theory has been formulated and these important ideas 
are discussed in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 explains the major ideas 
contained in The Moral Judgement of the Child before relating 
them to Piaget's general theory. Chapter 3 outlines the 
replication literature deriving from Piaget's work on moral 
development, while Chapter 4 considers some alternative 
approaches to the problems of moral development. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PIAGET'S THEORY OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
Piaget's style of writing is very difficult to follow; 
two or three readings are commonly needed before any clear 
understanding of his ideas is obtained. The books which 
attempt to interpret Piagetts work - notably Flavell (1963). 
Baldwin (1967) and Maier (1965) - are also difficult to 
follow and perhaps the best method of understanding them is 
to try to rephrase their ideas. l 
Piaget believes that in all areas of development the 
child proceeds in a unitary direction through a fixed number 
of stages which occur in a constant order. This presupposes 
a qualitative difference between one stage and the next, 
although an earlier stage forms the basis for the next stage 
and is closely bound up with the new experiences in it. There 
are distinct organizational differences between childhood and 
adult behaviour in all areas of human functioning. and all 
development reflects a change from the simple to the ever 
increasingly complex. All mature aspects ot behaviour have 
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their roots in infant actions and evolve through all the 
subsequent stages of development. 
Previous developmental acquisitions are kept as active 
ingredients through life and earlier behaviour may find 
expression in new situations. All developmental trends are 
interrelated and interdependent; developmental maturity is 
the final and total integration of all these trends. In fact, 
Piaget suggests that a consideration of the seeking of states 
of equilibrium, of which the final integration is the most 
stable, may be seen as a common element in the study of child 
development by the differing fields of physiology, psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, etc. (Piaget, 1960a, pp. 3-11). 
2. The Functional Invariants Of Piaget's Scheme 
In his theory of cognitive development, Piaget proposes 
a sequence of stages which reflect the increasing complexity 
of the child's system of thought. Although certain qualitative 
changes may be seen across the stages outlined by Piaget, 
there are also certain aspects of the child's development 
which are common to all of the stages. 
In Piaget's theory the term structure refers to the 
child's activities as they approach systematic organizations. 
To the extent that the child's behaviour and thought show a 
greater organizational complexity (approaching in their later 
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forms aspects of logical groups) their structure shows the 
qualitative changes which form the basis of Piaget's develop-
mental ideas. 
In addition to any and all more or less complex structures 
are the functional invariants which also form a very important 
part of Piaget,s scheme of development. According to Piaget, 
the child's mind is constantly active, trying to organize the 
events in his life into a more easily understood and better 
balanced unit. The static aspect of organization is reflected 
in the structures which characterize particular modes of 
thought; the dynamic aspect of organization is adaptation 
which includes the processes by which the child reorganizes 
his existing beliefs to cope more efficiently with his 
environment. It is during these processes that the structure 
of his thought changes. 
The two sub-features of adaptation are assimilation and 
accommodation, which operate simultaneously in the child's 
activity. Whenever the child can incorporate an event into 
his system of beliefs without having to change the system at 
all, then his behaviour is said to display ass1milation.2 
However, whenever the child's system of beliefs must be 
modified in order that a new experience be understood then 
the process of accommodation has been invoked. 
For example, the infant 'knows' his world by virtue of 
21 
the actions which he can perform on it; toys, say, which 
constitute a major part of his world, acquire their meaning 
through the activities in which the child can involve them. 
Typical structural elements of the infant's world are the 
sucking, banging and dropping schemas. 3 Unfamiliar eleme*ts 
acquire familiarity through being incorporated into these 
schemas. Given a new toy the infant will explore it by 
rubbing it along his cot, shaking it, sucking it, banging it 
etc.; in short, he attempts to understand the toy by trying 
to assimilate it into his existing sc~ema8. 
On occasion, however, the infant may encounter an object 
which does not completely fit into his existing system, and 
under such circumstances the child must adjust his beliefs to 
allow for the anomoly; he must accommodate to the new situation 
in an effort to bring it into his - now slightly modified -
system of beliefs. 
For example, a balloon may be assimilated into the child'. 
thought to the extent that it is round and red, like the ball 
with which he is already familiar. However, the balloon rises 
when it is pushed away, in contrast to all other objects which 
the child knows and this behaviour requires some accommodation 
of the child's beliefs if it is to be accepted into his system 
of thought (Richmond, 1970, p. 71). 
Here we can see Piaget's four types ot assimilation in 
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in operation. In the first place, the individual schemas 
derive from the infant's exercise of his originally reflex 
actions; this exercise of schemas for their own sakes is 
contained in the idea of functional assimilation. The 
infant repeats the behaviours of which he is capable over 
and over again, involving an increasing variety of objects 
in the outside world; in this way there develops a 
generalizing assimilation which implies the extension of 
existing schemas to a wider range ot objects. Gradually, 
the infant begins to distinguish between the various objects 
with which he comes into contact and this aspect of his 
behaviour Piaget terms recognitory assimilation. This 
development implies Piaget's final type of assimilation -
reciprocal assimilation. This concept draws attention to 
the fact that individual schemas of assimilation (e.g. visual 
and manipulatory) which form theoretically distinct areas ot 
development do, in fact, become inseparably cooperational. 
Their joint operation (looking in order to grasp, say) arises 
from the function of recip~ocal assimilation by which in-
4 dividual schemas combine into a sin,le system. 
The close involvement of assimilation and accommodation 
is also illustrated here. In the original exercise of his 
motor schemas the infant learns to control his behaviour, 
he accommodates slightly to his environment. This 
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accommodation is more marked during the operation of the 
generalizing and recognitory assimilations as the infant 
makes greater efforts to incorporate more objects into his 
schemas and then to distinguish among them. 
3. Criteria For stages 
The twin features of assimilation and accommodation 
interact to produce adaptation which allows the child a 
better understanding of the world. The failure of an 
existing structure to explain (i.e. incorporate) a new 
situation leads to an imbalance which, according to Piaget, 
the system cannot tolerate. 5 It is through the accommod-
ation of the system to the unfamiliar situation that balance 
is restored. 
Adaptation leads to new--atates of equilibrium; and to 
the extent that it represents a more inclusive picture of 
the world, each new equilibrium level ie more stable than 
the last. This in essence is Piaget's idea of eguilibration 
to which we shall return later on. The reorganization in-
volved in the seeking of new~uilibrium state. leads to a 
restructuring of the child's system of beliefs and thought. 
Certain of the changes produced are more important than 
others; the new structures which result from the more 
critical adjustments form the content of the stages ot 
development which Piaget has isolated. Piaget propose. 
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several general criteria for the establishment of stages in 
development; the particular differences in content between 
stages will be apparent in the later discussion of Piaget's 
theory of cognitive development. 
The recognition of a distinct chronology is the first 
of Piaget's criteria - stages appear in a constant order of 
succession. The average age for the appearance of a 
particular stage may vary but the order of stages is fixed. 
Inhelder states that the age of realization of any stage is 
always influenced by the 'environment' - a term which she 
interprets in a loose way to include the particular group of 
objects being studied, the opportunities for certain types of 
learning and the nature of the social interaction obtaining 
in the test situation. 
Secondly, Piaget says that a further step towards the 
establishment of a programme of stages occurs when one can 
see an integration in the transition trom a lower stage to 
a higher one. Inhelder.elaborates this and says that the 
inferior becomes part ot the superior - earlier modes ot 
thought are not abandoned altogether but are incorporated 
into the newer levels. 
Thirdly, any stage shows broad similarity with others 
since each is characterized by an aspect of achievement with 
respect to those going before and an aspect of preparation 
with respect to the stages coming atter. 
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Fourthly, all preparations leading to a stage, and all 
achievements of this stage, are attributable to the existence 
of a general (or total) structure, or a structured whole. 
This concept refers to a consistency in behaviour rather than 
insights which might be interpreted, as evidence of a superior 
stage but which are, in fact, isolated and untypical of the 
subject's actual level of achievement. Only when responses 
are consistently 'superior' can the achievement of the later 
stage be assumed, although the earlier 'flash-in-the-pan' is 
an essential part of the preparation. 
Finally, Piaget sees each stage as a separate equilibrium 
level; the increasing stability of successive levels is 
dependent on the degree of integration and the proximity to 
the total structure discussed above. 
Inhelder sums up Piaget's ideas on stages with the 
statement that they are structured wholes which follow one 
another in a constant order according to a law of integration 
(Inhelder, 1956, p. 85). Piaget proposes that this conception 
of stages can be applied to areas other than cognitive 
development in the general field of child development, although 
he does not expect any age correlations between stages in the 
differing specializations to appear; more useful, he feals, 
might be the consideration of any particular convergences when 
they do occur, and, perhaps most important, attention might 
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fruitfully be given to any correspondence in the mechanism of 
change from one stage to the next. 
Against his own criterion of total structures as an 
implication of stages, Piaget contrasts other theories which 
emphasize dominant traits, with the criticism that these 
models of development do not eahibit the features which he 
advocates and to this extent are not acceptable. He points 
out that Freud· speaks of an oral stage where the child already 
makes use of his anus, and of an anal stage where the child 
still makes use of his mouth; in similar fashion Wallon out-
lines an emotional stage at a time when the infant is exer-
cising all sorts of sensori-motor functions and of a subsequent 
sensori-motor stage during which emotions are by no means 
absent. Piaget questions the criterion of dominance - is it 
statistical frequency (which may be difficult to establish)? 
Or is it arrived at from clinical impressions, which run the 
risk of being subjective? Dominance may be defined only in 
terms of relative importance from the point of view of 
frequency; or it may imply a tendency towards the integration 
of the other characteristics under the dominant one (which, 
says Piaget, approaches his own concept of structured whole.). 
A link between the sets of ideas on stages outlined above 
can be found in the concept of equilibrium. Piage t maintains 
tha t stage. I . 
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••• cannot be considered as a product of subjective 
cuts arbitrarily made by the research worker in a 
rigorously continuous development. If stages do 
exist objectively, they can only consist of successive 
steps or levels of equilibrium, separated by a phase 
of transition or crisis, and each characterized by a 
momentary stability. • •• The 'total structures' are 
'equilibrium forms' and the 'dominant characteristics' 
are linked to a certain property of equilibrium, 
existing at least momentarily (Piaget, 1960a, pp. 12-13). 
The concept of equilibrium forms an important part of 
Piaget's general theory, although its implications have not 
6 yet been fully explored. The concept is provoking increasing 
discussion, however, and it may prove to be one of the more 
enduring of Piaget's contributions to child development theory 
and research. This being so, it now seems useful and 
necessary to develop an explanation of the concept in more 
detail. 
4. Equilibration As , Theory Of Development 
Piaget proposes his ideas on equilibrium as an alternative 
theory of development to the two more commonly accepted theories 
of maturation and learning.? According to maturation theory, 
development is an unfolding of the biological process of growth; 
characteristics of later stages can be largely predicted from a 
knowledge of preceding stages, and development is not tied to 
the environment but is linked more to a time schedule. 
Learning theory has been criticized by Piaget at greater 
length. This theory points to the accumulation of learned 
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experiences as the driving force in development; these items 
are relatively independent of one another and of the chrono-
logical age of the child. Piaget thinks that learning theory 
is passive since it implies that the child has hab~ts imposed 
on him by life experiences. In contrast, Piaget believes the 
child to be active in constantly acquiring new actions and 
reorganizing them into operational groupings. 
Piaget stresses the activity involved in development, while 
others have considered the child's part to be solely receptive. 
In the development of the conservation ot quantity, say, (see 
the water test, p. below) the learning theorist might point 
to experiences which the child meets accidentally in his 
environment, or which he is taught by his parents. Piaget 
thinks that such experiences are unlikely and he tries to show 
how the cognitive functions of the child become organized into 
coherent systems of thought - how they develop from more simple 
structures rather than being picked up iA perhaps random iashion. 
Piaget does not abandon these other theories altogether; 
rather, he incorporates them, along with his own ideas on 
equ1libratiQ~, into a different theory of development. Piaget 
hypothesizes tour groups of factors which contribute to an 
explanation of the process of development. 
First he notes certain maturational forces, although his 
account of these is not very clear. Presumably he is implying 
29 
that a certain neurological maturity must be reached before 
some aspects of. development can appear. For example, a baby 
needs a certain muscular development and a certain amount of 
practice to allow the refinement of its original spasmodic 
muscular contractions in co-ordination with visual stimuli in 
order consciously to grasp an object. Piaget also implies a 
physical maturation of the brain which allows the higher 
mental processes to develop. 
Second, there are the opportunities for varied experience 
with the environment. This group of factors may be considered 
in terms of the 'richness' ot the child's life and the extent 
to which his interaction with objects in his world is stimUlated 
or restricted. 
Third, the action ot the social environment must be con-
sidered. Included here are the spontaneous, perhaps unique, 
experiences which might account for otherwise inexplicable 
personality developments in later life; in their extreme torm 
these may be the traumatic experiences which the psychiatrist 
may have to uncover to effect the cure ot his patient. There 
is also a whole set ot intluences which are not unique but are 
brought to bear consciously and consistently on the child. The 
sorts of experience included here are the implicit and explicit 
teaching given the child by his parents, his teachers, his 
friends etc. Important considerations in this respect are the 
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content of the teaching (what is taught) as well as its quality 
(the way in which the lesson is demonstrated). 
Finally, there is Piaget's own process of equilibration 
which is set in motion whenever the child's system of beliefs 
develops far enough to contain self-contradictions and which 
results in the reorganization of the child's thinking to a 
more stable level at which the inconsistencies can be reconciled 
and more clearly understood. In his explanation of equilibration 
Piaget assumes that the individual gradually acquires ~ of the 
elements of operational (i.e. systematic) thinking; at some point 
these partial, unorganized ideas lead to a conflict and the 
resolution of this conflict is the process of equilibration. 
Through this process, and independent of any further 
learning, the child is able to restructure his beliefs into a 
more coherent, harmonious and balanced system. This state of 
affairs is, however, temporary; each precarious state of balance 
contains the seeds of its own destruction, and further re-
organization (re-equilibration) takes place at later times. 
Baldwin notes that while there is little evidence to support 
Piaget's ideas on equilibration there is not much to deny it 
or confirm an alternate hypothesis. Piaget certainly points 
the way to an important area in child development - the process 
by which the child acquires an organized system of knowledge 
(Baldwin, 1967. pp. 296-97). 
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5. COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDHOOD 
After this somewhat lengthy introduction we move on to a 
discussion of Piaget's theory of intellectual development and 
to some points of interest arising from it. Maier (1965) 
8 isolates five broad periods in Piagetts developmental theory; 
lnhelder(l953) and Flavell (1963) see four; and Baldwin (1967) 
threel This derives from a difference of terminology rather 
than from a conflict of opinion since, for example, all of 
Maier's points are included in the 9ther outlines (see Figure 1). 
(a) Sensori-motor period 
All four authors agree that the first period lasts from 
birth up to about eighteen months of age and is marked off into 
six stages. There i8 a very gradual process of development 
1n thi8 first per10d of 11fe, marked by a slow extension and 
mobility of schemas of behaviour which become more numerous 
and hence more inclusive While at the same time their inter-
action and joint co-ordination becomes more efficient. 
This period is characterized by the emergence of 
intentional behaviour from reflex activities culminating in 
the invention of new means to various ends and some early 
forms of mental representation. It should be remembered 
that Piaget sees in each stage of development aSJects of 
genesis and achievement; each i. a preparatory phase for the 
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next stage as well as a phase of equilibrium relative to the 
preceding one.9 
In the first month or so of life, says Piaget, all actions 
are totally involuntary; they may be a continuation of prenatal 
10 
activities triggered off by external or internal stimuli, but 
these stimuli are unrecognized by the infant at first. The 
more important reflexes exhibit a kind of feedback such that 
the ref~ex produces its own eliciting stimulus; this in turn 
sparks off the reflex, which produces another stimulus etc., etc. 
The sucking reflex represents one of the earliest instances of 
this auto-excitation. 
Sucking is elicited by the stimulation of the baby's lips. 
As milk reaches the back of the throat the swallowing reflex 
is triggered off; this is incompatable with sucking which 
momentarily stops. Now, immediately the milk has been swallowed, 
the lips are again stimulated by the breast or bottle and the 
sucking reflex begins again. 
It is difficult to judge just when the sucking reflex is 
triggered by the pressure on the lips and when the infant 
anticipates the pleasure derived from sucking and so exhibits 
a learned response. This recognition of the breast as a source 
of comfort takes the child into the second stage of development -
that of primary circular reactions (Flavell; Maier; Inhelder) 
or first acquired adaptations (Baldwin). 
:r 
',: 
Reflexive behaviour is slowly replaced in the second month 
of life by voluntary movement. This requires a certain 
neurological maturity since the infant must, have some control 
over his actions. The passivity of the infant's role is 
declining and behaviour becomes more deliberate. Behaviour 
is acquired, but its content is still based in hereditary 
mechanisms. For example, sucking is an hereditary reflex, 
but thumb-sucking is acquired - the child in this second stage 
can effectively take his own thumb to his mouth and keep it 
there; he does not have to rely on the random meeting of 
thumb and mouth to trigger off the reflex. 
The primary circular reaction from which this stage 
deriYes its name is the first of three such reactions whoee 
implications are beet seen by comparison. In general, the 
term circular reaction refers to the child's tendency to 
repeat certain motor activities over and over again. The 
differences among the three levels of reaction are seen in 
the locus of behaviour (its involvement with the child's own 
body or his environment) and the extent to which the child 
actively pursues the behaviour. 
By these criteria the primary circular reaction is ex-
tremely limited. It centres on the child's body - accommodation 
is minimized while assimilation is at a maximum. Accidental 
encounters with the environment (vaguely perceived .e it is 
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by the young infant) lead to certain interesting reactions 
which the child attempts to repeat by re-enacting his original 
movements. Obviously, the first circular reactions are very 
haphazard and relatively unsuccessful affairs, but in their 
operation the responses become strengthened and consolidated 
into the earliest schemas of behaviour. Gradually, new 
aspects of the child's environment become assimilated into 
these schemas and some slow accommodation to the differing 
properties of various objects ensues. This interest in the 
external world takes the child into Piaget's third stage of 
sensori-motor development - the stage of secondary circular 
reactions. 
This third stage lasts from about age 4~ months to age 
9 months and has four interesting features (see Flavell, 1963, 
pp. 101-09). First, the secondary circular reaction itself 
can be seen as a more advanced form of assimilation, being 
concerned with objects in the child's environment rather than 
with his own body - it is allocentric rather than autocentric 
(Flavell, 1963, p. 102). The chance occurence of an interesting 
event leads the child to repeat his sequence of actions in an 
attempt to recall the item. Whereas the child in the previous 
stage was concerned with grasping, sucking, etc. for their own 
sakes, now his interest lies with the effects which theae be-
haviours are seen to have on the objects around him. This 
repreeents in effect the child's first attempts at experimentation 
with his environment although the start of the sequence is as yet 
unintentional and triggered off only by chance. 
Second, the child shows his recognition of familiar objects 
through an abbreviated repetition of the schemas associated with 
those objects. The child is content with an outline of his 
normal reactions to familiar objects but must still physically 
act out a part of them - this behaviour is a forerunner of 
purely contemplative recognition. 
Third, Piaget points in this stage to a peculiar class of 
behaviours which he terms 'procedures for making interesting 
sights last'. By these behaviours, actions which the child 
previously found efficacious in recalling interesting effects 
(through the operation of secondary circular reactions) are 
now transferred to other similar situations although not 
necessarily in a successful manner. For example, the child may 
have discovered that the interesting noise made by a rattle can 
only be experienced when the rattle is shaken - he may later 
make shaking moyements in order to maintain any sound he hears. 
In Piaget's terminology the child is assimilating the occurence 
without accommodating to it at all; he is unable to alter his 
behaviour sufficiently to allow a proper recognition of the new 
event and the ways in which it might properly be recalled. 
Lastly, the accomplishments of this stage mark a definite 
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step in the direction of intentional behaviour where the goal 
is the important factor and the means are subordinated to it. 
Piaget sets three criteria for intentionality. In the first 
place, behaviour is more intentional the more it is directed 
towards objects; this distinguishes it from reflex or 
accidental actions. A second criterion concerns the number 
of intermediate steps involved in goal achievement, since 
the child is satisfied only after a more or less lengthy 
series of actions and is not interested primarily in the 
intervening steps. Finally, an intentional act in~olves 
deliberate adaptation to a new situation rather than being 
a mere repetition of habitual schemas. 
The behaviour of the child in the stage of secondary 
circular reactions is not, strictly speaking, intentional 
since it relies on a chance event to spark off the attempts 
at repetition. This stands in contrast to the recognition 
of a 80al and the deliberate seeking of means to an end 
typical of tertiary circular reactions discussed lter. 
The fourth stage of the sensori-motor period lasts up 
to the child's first birthday and is a transitional time 
marked by the co-ordination of Bchemas. Familiar schemas 
are combined in new situations and used as a means to an 
end - for example, the child may push aside one object (first 
schema) to grasp another ~second schema). There appears 
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accidental actions. A second criterion concerns the number 
of intermediate steps involved in goal achievement, since 
the child is satisfied only after a more or less lengthy 
series of actions and is not interested primarily in the 
intervening steps. Finally, an intentional act involves 
deliberate adaptation to a new situation rather than being 
a mere repetition of habitual schemas. 
The behaviour of the child in the stage of secondary 
circular reactions is not, strictly speaking, intentional 
since it relies on a chance event to spark off the attempts 
at repetition. This stands in contrast to the recognition 
of a goal and the deliberate seeking of means to an end 
typical of tertiary circular reactions discussed }ter. 
The fourth stage of the sensori-motor period lasts up 
to the child's first birthday and is a transitional time 
marked by the co-ordination of achemas. Familiar schemas 
are combined in new situationa and used aa a means to an 
end - for example, the child may push aside one object (first 
schema) to grasp another Gsecond schema). There appears 
the ability to execute in an intentional manner old behaviour 
patterns in new situations; pushing aside is not now enjoyed 
in itself but is a"means to an end and appears automatically 
in the pursuit of the second behaviour. 
A second variety of intentional behaviour may be briefly 
noted, as when a child makes use of objects as instruments in 
attaining a goal. Thus a stick may be used to set a doll 
swinging or to draw-in another object out of reach of the 
child's hand. 
Stemming from this intentionality. but with a somewhat 
different emphasis, the child shows evidence of anticipation 
and can respond to future actions which are implied by signs 
(e.g. he may cry if his mother puts on her coat since he 
associates this with her leaving him). In his exploration of 
unfamiliar objects the child shows a subtle change; he becomes 
more interested in the object's faatures and, in contrast to 
the previous stage, the incorporation of objects into secon-
dary circular reactions is not given first priority. 
The stage of tertiary circular reactions, or the 
discovery of new means through active experiment, lasts from 
about twelve and up to about eighteen months of age. The 
child performs activities he has never previously displayed, 
he engages in the deliberate variation of behaviour around 
familiar schemas and this ability is a valuable tool for 
problem solving. 
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Problems may be solved in two ways - the solution may be 
stumbled on by chance, or the subject can, by trial and error, 
vary conditions so that the solution has a better chance of 
appearing. In the stage of secondary circular reactions the 
child was able to profit from pure accidents - he was able to 
reproduce interesting events which occurred by chance in the 
course of his activity. The more sophisticated approach is 
experimentation, the intentional variation of actions which 
increases the possibility of a solution; this type of be-
haviour makes its appearance in this fifth stage of the 
sensori-motor period. 
In the previous two stages the child was concerned with 
incorporating objects into his familiar schemas and in com-
bining these schemas to allow more complex behaviours which 
implied intention. This assimilation now gives way to in-
creasing accommodation as the child tries to alter his 
schemas around a particular object; he experiments 'in order 
to see'. Although a chain of events may have been in-
augurated through a secondary circular reaction and the 
child's subsequent desire to reproduce the sequence of 
events, this behaviour is extended as the child tries out 
new actions so as to see their different effects on the 
object. 
The final stage of the sensori-motor period lasts up to 
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about two years of age and during this time there occurs a 
shift in focus from actual experiments to increasing reflection 
about them. The child does not now have to act out his Tarious 
behaviours in order to know their consequences; he can mentally 
anticipate the effects of his actions and can go straight into 
the required pattern of behaviour without overt trial and error. 
These accomplishments mark the end of the sensori-motor 
period. This does not mean that the child no longer develops 
. 
in his sensori-motor behaviour, but rather that Piaget's 
emphasis changes. The last stage in the aensori-motor period 
saw the emergence of symbolic thought and the child's ability 
to think things out rather than having to perform them 
physically. Piaget now follows through the later development 
of the intellectual processes since the more important 
developments in the child's capabilities take place on a 
conceptual-symbolic level and not on the aeneori-motor level.ll 
(b) Pre-operational period 
So far the four authora have agreed on lines of 
demarcation and rough age levels at which particular forms of 
behaviour chanae. As can be seen from Figure 1 aboTe, 
absolute congruence is lost for the period two to fifteen 
years. Maier and Baldwin are most in agreement - in fact 
Baldwin's second phase includes Maier's next two and his third 
phase Maier's last two; in contrast, Inhelder and Flavell are 
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less insistent on strict age demarcation for the stages they 
propose. Again, the differences are semantic since analysis 
reveals the same behaviour patterns in all four descriptions. 
Inhelder's is perhaps the best outline to follow (as would 
be expected from Piaget's closest colleague) but the others 
provide useful elaborations of her somewhat confusing pattern 
of development. 
Inhelder's second period of development in fact lasts up 
to about 11 years of age. To complicate the situation, 
Inhelder points out that there are really two overlapping 
phases in the later part of the child's development - one 
from 2 to 11 years and another from 7 to 15 years. For con-
venience she makes a break at 11 years and further subdivides 
the first period into formation or genesis from 18 months to 
7 years and equilibration from 7 to 11 years. It is the first 
of these periods (most commonly known as the preoperational 
period, although Maier terms its constituent parts the stages 
of Preconceptual thinking and Intuitive thought) which concerns 
us at the moment. 
During this period the child continues his slow elaboration 
of symbolic thought; there is a change in emphasis from eensori-
motor activity to mental representation, and language is 
increasingly important, being the major form of symbolic 
representation for the preliterate child.12 
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The main point which separates this period of development 
from the next is that the child now sees objects as individual 
members and not as part of a larger eroup or class. The child 
does not yet understand either that each member of a class is 
different from the rest, or that they are all alike in a certain 
respect. He may concentrate on either the whole of a collection 
or on an individual member of a group of objects but is unable 
to do both at once. 
Piaget has been very much concerned with invariancea - with 
the recognition of the conservation of number, volume, weight, 
space, etc. when certain plastic materials are rearranged or 
reshaped. It is Piaget's belief that the acquisition of these 
conservations depends upon the form of the child's intellectual 
structures. The child needs to develop certain related 
structures - such as reversibility, non-egocentric thought, 
decentered thought and aon-transductive reasoningl } - before 
his thinking can be sufficiently organized to cope with con-
servations. The thought of the preoperational child is 
typified by egocentric, irreversible, centered, transductive 
structures and is severely limited in comparison with even the 
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concrete operational child. 
In a classic conservation experiment, water is poured 
from one of two identical jars into a taller, but narrower, 
container. The preoperational child maintains that there is 
a different amount of water in the second jar15; there are 
four possible explanations of this unusual behaviour. First, 
the child may fail to integrate temporally separate events. 
It would be difficult for an adult to judge the amounts of 
water in different shaped jars if he had no previous knowledge 
of the quantities. The preoperational child may be in this 
position atter the transfer of liquid since he forgets the 
previous equality. Flavell (1963, p. 157) notes this 
limitation as the inclination to focus attention on successive 
states rather than on the transformation by which each is 
achieved. The child cannot link the separate states into an 
integrated whole. 
Secondly, the child may suffer from a lack of reversibility 
- he may not be able to conceive of the water being poured back 
and regaining its former quantity. He may also have difficulty 
in keeping constant the premises of his arguments, showing 
contradictions in his beliefs all the time. This makes the 
possibility of returning to an original starting point very 
difficult if not impossible tor the preoperational child. 
Piaget notes two distinct forms of reversibility which he 
terms inversion and reciprocity (see, for example, Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1969, pp. 136-38). In the water test, reversibility 
by inversion is seen when the water can be mentally poured 
back into the original container; it is also demonstrated when 
a movement in space is retracted. 
A second Piagetian test should illustrate reciprocal 
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reversibility. The materials for this test comprise twenty 
wooden beads, eighteen brown and two white (see Phillips, 
1969, pp. 79-80). The preoperational child may admit that 
the class 'wooden beads' includes both sub-classes of 'white 
beads' and 'brown beads' and that to isolate either of these 
16 two sub-classes would leave the other. However, if the 
child is asked which would make the longer necklace, the 
brown beads or the wooden beads he replies the brown ones 
'because there are only two white ones,.17 The preoperational 
child accepts that the class 'brown' is included in the class 
'wooden' (i.e. that B(,W) but is unable to reverse this 
relationship (such that W>B) and appreciate that there are 
more wooden beads than brown ones. With the development of 
operational thinking the child is able to acknowledge this 
form of reversibility which Piaget terms reciprocal. 
Both forms of reversibility may operate in the same 
problem. We have already seen the operation of reversibility 
by inversion in the water test - the water may be poured back 
and regain its former shape and quantity. In the same problem 
reciprocal reversibility may operate as well; the child may 
recognize that in the transfer of liquid to a tall, narrow, 
vessel the increase in the height of the column of liquid 
(such that H2'> Hl ) is accompanied by a decrease in width of 
the column (W2< Wl ). The combination of these two 
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observations as compensatory factors in the conservation of 
quantity involves a reciprocal reversibility such that the 
child is able to move from the one relationship (taller) to 
the other (thinner) and back again. Piaget refers to this 
form of comparison as a regulation and its abscenee is a 
third explanation of the preoperational child's failure to 
conserve quantity in the water test. 
Both forms of reversibility are developed by the pre-
operational child and used by the concrete operational child, 
but both children are able to recognize only one or the other 
at a single time in the explanation of a problem. In contrast, 
the formal operational child combines the two types of 
reversibility into a single system by which to explain 
conservation. 
Finally, the preoperational child may be unable to 
recognize that if nothing has been added and nothing taken 
away then the amount remains constant; this is especially 
true when the levels in the jars are so different. 
One aspect of the preoperational period which Piaget 
considers very important in limiting the child's development 
may now be briefly discussed. This is the child's egocen-
tricity which is most clearly typified by his inability to 
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assume the role of another person. The egocentric child 
is unable to recognize that his own viewpoint is only one 
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among many and so he cannot contrast his own ideas with others 
in order to realize the contradictions and illogicalities of his 
thinking; thus he cannot start on the process of regulation and 
reequilibration. Also, the preoperational child cannot think 
about his own thinking - he may run through an explanation once 
but he unable to repeat it exactly (hence the difficulties for 
reversibility by inversion). Piaget points to social inter-
action, and particularly to argument and disagreement, as the 
force behind the move away from egocentric thought.19 
In the later part of the preoperational period, the child 
can frequently feel his way through to a solution without any 
clear idea of the concepts involved. For example, in one 
experi.ent the child was shown three strung beads (one red, 
one yellow and one green) which were put inside a tube; the 
tube was rotated through 1800 and the child was asked to 
predict the order of the beads (i.e. 'Which bead would come 
out of this end first?'). There are only two possible 
solutions: R-Y-G rotated through 1800 becomes G-Y-R, while 
a further 1800 rotation restores the order to R-Y-G. The 
preoperational child does not recognize that an odd number 
of half-rotations reverses the order of the beads and an even 
number maintains it. This concept is not understood, and 
yet the child may cope successfully with two or three 
rotations while being unable to follow seven. 
He may fix his attention on the red end of the tube, say, 
and be able to predict where the red bead will appear, but 
he may have trouble in placing the other two - the concept 
of fixed order is not apparent; if the child's attention is 
diverted from the red end he may become completely dis-
orientated. The child is unable to view the parts and the 
whole at the same time; he may concentrate on one but he 
will lose the other. 
Piaget proposes a process which he calls decentering 
(or decentration) as the mechanism by which the child moves 
away from fixation on particular aspects of a situation to 
a consideration of parts and whole simultaneously. Inherent 
in the decentering process is the notion of reversibility; 
when the child can consider the parts and the whole at the 
same time he can move freely from one to the other. 
Towards the end of this period, then, several aspects 
of the child's thought show distinct changes. To quote Flavell: 
The rigid, static, and irreversible structures 
typical of preoperational thought organization 
begin ••• to 'thaw out' and become more 
flexible, mobil~ and above all decentered and 
reversible in their operation (Flavell, 1963, 
p. 163). 
This statement seems an admirable summing-up of the 
complex explanation needed for this preoperational period. 
However, many of the aspects of the child's thought which 
needed detailed discussion by means of introduction need 
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only brief mention in the outlines of the final periods of 
intellectual development which follow. 
(c) Concrete operational period 
After about 7 years of age the child enters the first of 
the two periods of operational thought. In the previous period, 
the child had been able to carry o~t certain mental actions; 
Piaget requires that these actions be reversible and incorpor-
ated into a system of similarly reversible items before they can 
be considered operations. In the preoperational period, 
inconsistencies and lack of clear definitions in the child's 
thinking are typical; in the periods of concrete and formal 
operations the child's thinking becomes far more stabilized 
and equilibrated due to the organization of operational thoughts 
. 
into interrelated systems. 
Concrete operations involve infra-logical groupings re-
1ating to relationships between the parts and the whole of a 
concrete group of objects; the child must be able to see the 
group in order to manipUlate it. This contrasts with formal 
operations which involve logical classes; a class is an 
abstraction and all members cannot be seen at once, although 
certain relationships can be inferred among the members. The 
younger child may be able to solve problems that he cannot 
answer in an abstract way once he can perceive the objects in 
a physical collection; the form~l operational child is not 
tied to reality in this fashion. 
Piaget believes that both forms of thinking develop 
simultaneously and that logical concepts (typical of formal 
operations) are not necessarily built on a previous under-
standing of physical groups (developed during the period of 
concrete operational thought). Even after the establishment 
of formal thought processes some concrete operations are 
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newly established whilst reversion to a concrete level is 
not uncommon in. the understanding of an unfamiliar problem 
(e.g. i~ may be easier to work out a problem on paper than 
mentally). 
Piaget considers there to be nine basic groupings (or 
groupements) which the child develops in the period of 
a 
concrete operations. A grouping is a structure in which 
elements are so arranged that there is some kind of trans-
formation, pathway or relationship that links every item to 
every other one; relationships are reversible and contain 
alternative pathways. 
One method of testing the presence of these groupings 
is to give the child a variety of objects which might be 
classified in different ways and asking him to put together 
those that are the same. In the period of concrete operations 
the child learns all the various groupings ani is able to 
apply them to objects he meets in the concrete world. The 
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groupings contain all the relationships necessary for hypo-
thetical thinking which the child cannot as yet successfully 
manage. 
Cd) Formal operational period 
Formal operational thought begins at about 11 years of 
age and reaches its state of equilibrium at about 14 or 15 
years. The child is now able to consider relationships 
other than those presented to him; in the period of concrete 
operations the child may understand all the relationships 
presented but he does not extend these to the other logical 
possibilities of the material in the way that the formal 
operational child might. 
Another of Piaget's experiments should help clarify the 
differences between this final period of development and the 
previous one. The child is presented with five bottles of 
colourless solutions; a few drops from one of these bottles 
is added to two beakers which the child is told contain some 
of the other four liquids singly or in combination. In one 
of these beakers the liquid turns yellow, while there is no 
change in the second; another of the liquids removes the 
yellow colour. The problem the child is set is to identify 
the liquids in the bottles which cause and bleach the colour; 
the experimenter's interest lies in the process by which the 
child attempts to determine the corr&ct reaction. 
Very young children commonly mix pairs of liquids in 
a quite random fashion and soon stop since they think they 
have exhausted all the possibilities, they cannot even 
repeat the combinations they used. In older children the 
major difference between the concrete and the formal 
operational child is that the latter begins his consideration 
of the problem by invoking all the possibilities implied by 
the data; this may even involve writing down all combinations 
of pairs, trios etc., and in some cases may take the form of 
permutations such that Bottle 1 plus Bottle 2 may have a 
different result to Bottle 2 plus Bottle 1 and this possi-
bi1ity must be accounted for. 22 The concrete operational 
child shows the beginnings of systematic thought; he may try 
the liquids in sequence and may with prompting exhaust the 
possible pairs of liquids but he does not show the planning 
ability of the formal operational child. 
The child in the period of formal operations begins his 
consideration of a problem by invoking all the possible re-
lationships implied by the data; he then tries by experi-
mentation to see which combinations do in fact hold true. 
This is a reversal of the process observable in the concrete 
operational child who makes only limited inference and 
extrapolations from the material presented. The adolescent 
can consider the non-present and the hypothetical while the 
------------------------------~------- -
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younger child's thought is much more restricted to his 
perceptions ot the immediate situation. 
This is the last stage in Piaget's theory ot development. 
He leaves unanswered the question ot what happens next -
whether the formal operations represent a sufficient level 
of conceptualization for the rest of his life or whether the 
child refines them in a still later period. Presumably, 
since formal operations represent a high level of logical 
sophistication, they are sufficient and develop further only 
insofar as they take in more and more aspects of the child's 
behaviour. 23 
6. A Terminological Approach To Piaget's Theory 
Although a chronological account of the child's develop-
ment such as that attempted above as an explanation ot 
Piaget's theory of intellectual development is useful, a 
second approach is also very effective. We have already 
noted the functional invariants (adaptation, organization, 
accommodation and assimilation) which apply in Piaget's 
scheme to all levels of development; we have also noted in 
passing several features which Piaget's periods of develop-
ment display in common although the structure ot these 
features changes with each period. In this context we 
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discussed egocentric thought, reversibility, centering, etc. 
At this point, it seems necessary and useful to give 
brief consideration to each of these features by way of 
summarizing what has already been said somewhat disjointedly 
with reference to individual periods. There are perhaps six 
factors whose developments have important consequences in 
limiting the form which the child's system of thought can 
take. These may be described under the headings of ego-
centricity, reversibility, centering (centration), states v. 
transformations, transductive reasoning and equilibration. 24 
All of these have been discussed or implied already but the 
inclusion of a further outline here is defensible in view 
of their importance in the Piagetian model of development. 
Certainly, all six factors are interrelated but the form 
of this dependance is not always immediately apparent. For 
example, while the process of decentering may be seen as a 
common background feature in reversible thought, part-whole 
relationships and the decline of transductive reasoning, its 
relationship with egocentric thought is not obvious; since 
non-egocentric thought is defined in terms of its reversibility, 
decenteredness, systematic organization to include part-whole 
relationships, etc., it should be regarded as a result of the 
other features and not their cause as a cursory reading of 
Piaget's work might suggest. 
Piaget is anxious to develop a definition of the term 
'egocentricity' which is divorced from its common usage. The 
value judgement implied in the everyday explanation of ego-
centricity as selfishness indicates an intentionality on the 
part of the individual; in fact, childish egocentricity is 
completely unintentional and denotes a difficulty in under-
standing differences in points of view between the child and 
another person (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p. 118). The child 
believes that all other people hold the same opinions as 
himself. It is the child's gradual accommodation to alternative 
viewpoints that marks declining egocentricity. 
One result of egocentric thought noted by Flavell et al 
(1968, e.g. p. 8) is the child's inability to 'tailor' his 
statements to allow for a different level of understanding in 
his audience. He rarely makes the explanations which are so 
often necessary in the transfer of information from himself 
to another, assuming in his egocentricity that because he 
understands then everyone else does. 
Piaget notes three distinct times in the individual's 
life when egocentricity characterizes his thought. For the 
infant, the world acquires meaning through his actions on it, 
his mental image of the world is severely limited; this is 
egocentricity in its most severe form. The preoperational 
child develops more sophisticated mental representations of 
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his world but believes that all other people view phenomena 
in the same way that he does; it is this level of egocentric 
thought to which Piaget has given most attention, seeing in 
it. decline the start of concrete operational thinking and 
the child's acquisitions of the first conservations. The 
third Level of egocentric thought appears in ado~escence when 
the individual romances, using his power of formal thought to 
explore certain possibilities in idealistic fashion while 
failing to relate these adequately to the real world or to 
alternative opinion; however, the adolescent does have the 
ability to perform this comparison whereas the younger child 
does not - in this sense the adolescent reflects the selfish-
ness which typifies the common interpretation of egocentricity 
rather than the cognitive deficiency which typifies Piaget's 
interpretation of the term (Phillips, 1969, p. 102). 
Piaget's definition of egocentricity revolves around the 
inability of the preoperational child to appreciate alternative 
points of view and not around his deliberate ignoring of them. 
In fact, Piaget has adopted the clumsy phrase 'symbolism 
centering on the self' to explain the arguments behind the 
term egocentriCity; he has taken this step 'in deference to 
the criticisms from many psychologists who are still not 
familiar with the practice in the exact sciences of using a 
term only in accordance with the definitions proposed, 
irrespective of its popular meaning or associations'l (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1969, p. 6ln). However, in the face of an 
increasing interest in what Piaget means (as opposed to what 
~ ~ his translators and transcribers think he means ) this 
deference is likely to be temporary. 
Perhaps the next most important aspect of Piaget's work 
is the concept of centering. This implies the child's 
concentration on one particular feature of a situation and 
his inability to consider even two features at one time. 
This forms a part of the explanation of egocentric thought 
since it indicates the child's blind recognition of only 
his own point of view. It has a wider application in 
relation to the Piagetian problems, however, in that the 
preoperational child centers his attention on a single aspect 
of the situation and ignores the others. We noted in the 
water test the fact that the preoperational child might say 
that there was more liquid in the second vessel because the 
column was taller, or that there was less because the column 
was thinner. Only by decentering and considering height and 
width simultaneously as compensatory factors can conservation 
be achieved. 
The decentering of affective and social constructions 
(implied in the recognition of other people's opinions) and 
that of cognitive 6ooBtructions (as in the water test) are 
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inseparable for Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p. 95) 
and they allow the developments which mark the decline of 
the remaining restrictions on the child's thought. We have 
already discussed the two forms of reversibility - inversion 
and reciprocity. Both imply a decentered view of the 
situation so that successive steps may be related and 
retraced. 
Two further features of decentered thought contribute 
to this reversibility; these are the decline of transductive 
reasoning and the linking of states and transformations into 
an integrated whole. Transductive reasoning may best be 
understood in relation to two other forms of reasoning. 
Induction involves reasoning from the particular to the 
general; deduction involves reasoning from the general to 
the particular; in contrast to both of these forms, trans-
duction involves reasoning from the particular to the 
particular. Events are related not to a more general 
system but instead to any other events which happen to be 
in juxtaposition. In fact, the juxtaposed event. may b. 
connected, in which case the reasoning relating them may be 
correct; however, in other cases they may not be connected 
and the child's reasoning is inaccurate. 
A much quoted example from Piaget relevant to trans-
ductive reasoning is the connection of a person's running 
hot water with his shaving. On occasion this will be a correct 
line of thought but there is no necessity for the one to precede 
the other (perhaps an electric shaver is used) nor for the one 
to follow the other (the water may be used for washing). A 
decentered view of the events, in which each is related to a 
classification of similar events (e.g. water for shaving, 
washing dishes, washing people, etc.; or shaving using an 
electric shaver, soap and water, an aerosol foam, etc.), 
allows a better representation of the possible relationships 
and more accurate prediction of the behaviour which might 
follow. 27 
The second limitation of the more general aspect of 
centered thought is the preoperational child's inability to 
integrate temporally distinct events into a structured whole; 
he concentrates on the successive states rather than on the 
transformations which link them. In the water test, for 
example, the child centers on the water levels after pouring 
but does not include the act of pouring in his system of 
thought; hence, he cannot conceive of the water being poured 
back. Also he apparently forgets that the water was poured 
at all; he may fail to recognize both the former state and 
the intervening process. 
A specific test of the child's ability to focus on 
transformations required him to draw the successive positions 
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of a stick as it falls from a vertical position to a horizontal 
position. The young child commonly drew the two end states but 
ignored the intermediate positions (Phillips, 1969, p. 64). 
The aspects of egocentric thought, centering, reversibility 
transduction, and states v. transformations are related in com-
plicated ways although it appears that the basic processes are 
those of decentration which lead directly (and indirectly through 
the decline of transductive thought and the recognition of both 
states and transformations) to reversibility which is the 
criterion for operational thought and which marks the decline 
of egocentricity. Diagramatically this may be expressed as 
in Figure 1. This model does not explain the decline of 
DEC ENTERING 
-------- -DECLINE OF LINKING OF STATES 
TRANSDUCTION AND TRANSFORMATIONS 
----- -------REVERSIBILITY (Inversion and ReCiprocity) 
I 
DECLINE OF 
EGOCENTRIC THOUGHT 
Figure 1: Factors Contributing To The Decline of Egocentric Thought 
egocentric thought completely, however, since it fails to account 
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for causal factors in the process of decentering. To make 
this explanation we must return to Piaget's outline of the 
factors which contribute to intellectual development. 
First is a biologically determined maturation force 
which sets an upper limit on the physical and mental 
activities of the child. The unfolding of this force is 
influenced by (and to a certain extent has an influence on) 
the social universe of the child - the factors brought 
consciously to bear in an effort to socialize and educate 
the child and those unique experiences which occur in random 
fashion. 
These factors influence the child's development by 
limiting to a greater or lesser degree the activities to 
which the child must accommodate, for it is only through 
the accommodation process that the child progresses. There 
can be no progress if all incoming stimuli can be fitted 
into the child's existing system of beliefs - euch extreme 
assimilation would result in a developmentally static system. 28 
It is the child's efforts to accommodate to new experiences 
which produce change in the system by necessitating the 
development of new structures to account for anomo1ies. 
It is through the accommodation processes that the child 
gradually realizes the limitations and inadequacies of his 
beliefs. This produces a circularity which eventually 
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snowballs to fruition in the decentering processes and the 
acquisition of conservations. The child very gradually 
notices items which he cannot fit into his existing system; 
the very act of accommodating to these inconsistencies will 
sharpen up further anomolies to which he must accommodate, 
and so the process continues. 
Thus, above the main box in Figure 1, and related 
causally to it, we must add this other group of factors 
which Piaget considers in his general discussion of 
development. There is, however, one factor yet to be 
taken into account; this is Piaget's concept of equili-
bration which appears among the group of general develop-
mental influences as well as being the final one of the 
six headings proposed at the start of this sub-section. 
We have discussed the way in which the child accommo-
dates his system of thought to new experiences where these 
cannot be assimilated; this leads to a change in the system 
but not to a radical reorganization each time. Rather, each 
accommodation produces a series of compensations within the 
system so that previous structures ar"e modified and re-
integrated and are not mere~y discarded in the face of 
conflicting evidence. 
Piaget sees the child's system of thought as an 
equilibrium state and he sees the process of development as 
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a succession of more and more stable levels of equilibrium. 
The equilibrium in this sense is a self-regulating system 
and equilibration is a 'series of active compensations on 
the part of the subject in response to external disturbances 
and an adjustment that is both retroactive • • • and 
anticipatory' (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969, p. 157). The 
child's mind forms a system which is in a state of delicate 
balance; change in any of its parts leads to compensations 
throughout the system which results in a new temporary 
equilibrium. This state is never perfectly stable, however,29 
and the idea of a dynamic equilibrium ever pOised for change 
is Piaget's model of the organization of thought. 
It is as difficult to sum up an exposition of Piaget's 
theory as it is to give a clear and full account of it. It 
is hoped that the chronological account of the scheme is 
clarified somewhat by the explanation of the major terms in 
the Piagetian technical vocabulary. The general aspects of 
Piaget's theory should be borne in mind during the disc~ssion 
of his theory of moral development·which follows, for it is 
argued in this thesis that certain theoretical threads 
especially those deriving from the decline of egocentric 
thought - may be seen linking the two. 
CHAPTER 2 
PIAGET'S THEORY OF lvlORAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Introduction 
Noticeable by its abscence from the earlier account of 
Piaget's general theoretical approach to child development 
is a disucssion of his specific theory of moral development 
in children. This theory is built upon some of his earliest 
investigations which are reported in his fifth book, The 
Moral Judgement of the Child (1932). This is not a direct 
sequel to his four previous volumes but certain theoretical 
threads can be seen to connect this study with the previous 
ones. The chapter which fo~~ows is a summary of the trends 
noted in The Mora~ Judgement of the Chi~d and is thus an 
outline of Piaget's theory of moral development. 
There are four lengthy chapters in The Moral Judgement 
of the Child; Piaget's style is as difficult as ever, and 
yet the book repays rereading for then the ideas seem 
clearer and it is easier to follow the extended arguments. 
The first three chapters of the book are experimental and 
theoretical, while the last is purely theoretical. Very 
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briefly for the moment, the first chapter is concerned with 
the child's attitudes to the rules of a game; the second 
discusses the child's judgements of the gravity of various 
misdeeds presented in story form; the third chapter maintains 
the story situation method, but switches its attention to 
what the child considers to be fair and unfair punishments 
and rewards for various group and individual misdemeanours 
or good behaviour; the final chapter reviews some earlier 
theories of morality and includes Piaget's criticisms of them 
together with his suggestions for using the knowledge gained 
from his own research in helping the child realize his full 
developmental potential. 
Fiaget considers eleven separate dimensions of moral 
development which will be described in detail later on (see 
especially Tables II and III). Each dimension comprises 
two extreme modes of thought, the first typical of younger 
children and the second of older children. Piaget contends 
that these occur in an invariant sequence such that success-
ively older children exhibit progressively more mature modes 
of thought. We may briefly note that while this age pro-
gression has been subsequently demonstrated for six of 
Piaget's dimensions, recent work has shown the invalidity 
of the hypothesis of constant improvement along the remaining 
five, where the trends were either curvilinear or absent. 
Piaget's experimental work may be considered in two broad 
parts. For the first, Piaget's desire to establish the meaning 
of respect for the rules from the child's point of view led to 
his analysis of the child's game of Marbles (1932, p. vii). He 
believed that boys have a better developed legal sense than 
girls (1932, p. 69) and so he concentrated on a boys game; his 
particular choice seems limited for. it is difficult to think 
of a collective game other than Marbles which has not been 
formalized by adults in the way that school sports have, for 
example. 
In contrast to the 'natural' setting of these investi-
gations of Marbles, the second broad area of Piaget's work 
involved the child's discussion of hypothetical situations. 
The bulk of the data reported in The Moral Judgement of the 
Child was derived from discussions of this sort involving a 
variety of misbehaviours. 
2. The Rules Of The Game 
The first part of The Moral Judgement of the Child 
describes an investigation of children's attitudes to, and 
behaviour regarding, the rules of the game of Marbles as 
played in and around Geneva and Neuchitel in the middle 
1920's (Piaget, 1932, Ch. 1). Piaget and his associates 
first collected details of the many variations in the game 
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of Marbles in preparation for their more detailed study. The 
questioning was divided into two sections: the first related 
to the child's grasp of the rules of the game - the extent of 
his knowledge of the differing methods of play and of the 
procedures for deciding who goes first, or the particular set 
of rules to be used etc.; the second set of questions related 
to the child's attitude to the rules, particularly who invents 
rules, why rules are binding and how permanent they are. 
During the i~ial investigation, Piaget feigned ignorance 
of the game and asked the child to show him how to play. 
Obviously, the fewer rules a child knows, the less he will 
conform to accepted standards. Piaget distinguished four 
stages in the development of the consciousness of rules. 
The first is typified by the child's incorporation of 
the marbles into his own sensori-motor schemas. The materials 
are used as free-play objects and, at best, the child develops 
private rituals of play and does not attempt to adapt hie 
behaviour to social rules. Piaget found that children up to 
about 3 or 4 years of age playee with the marbles in a 
variety of ways (dropping, 'cooking', piling, rattling, etc.) 
but that repeated motor activities were often evolved so that 
each child would prefer his own individually developed 
activity to all other uses of the marbles (1932, pp. 19-26). 
The second stage sees a slight decline in the child's 
egocentricity during the period 3 to 7 years as the child begins 
to imitate aspects of the rule-regulated play of older children. 
However, the knowledge gained is still fragmentary and is still 
used in individual play schemas; the child does not interact 
with others but continues to play in a world of his own, 
without regard for other children. Each child is immersed in 
his own game, the competitive element is missing and everyone 
can win. 
The decline of egocentricity continues through the third 
stage which lasts from about 7 years to about 11 years of age 
as the child begins to interact with his peers according to 
a mutually agreed set of rules. As yet, the child is a 
follower; his knowledge of the rules is incomplete and he 
must rely on older playmates at times when too fine a point 
of practise or theory is raised in the course of a game. 
After about 11 or 12 years of age all rules are com-
pletely understood and obeyed to the letter by all. Children 
in this stage of codification of rules are, in effect, the 
'reterence books' to whom the younger children turn when in 
doubt. The children at this level know every variation of 
the game and may go out of their way to elaborate a pre-game 
ritual of side choosing, of agreeing which rules to use on 
the day, and other strictly unnecessary refinements such as 
fixing a time limit, or stipulating what should happen if 
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a game is interrupted before a proper finish. 
Piaget proposes three stages in the development of the 
child's attitude to the rules. The first stage lasts up to 
about 4 years of age and for the child this young the rules 
are irrelevant; they are just not a part of his life except 
insofar as the motor rules mentioned above evolve. The 
second and third stages represent opposite ends of Piaget's 
first moral dimension - the fixity v. the flexibility of 
the rules (see Table II). 
For the 4 to 10 year olds rules are eternal and un-
changeable. The child may attribute them to parental or 
divine origin, and he will resist any attempt to invent new 
rules or alter old ones since 'they would not be fair', even 
if all other children agreed to abide by them. However, 
since the child's knowledge of the rules is incomplete 
until 11 years or so, he now unwittingly breaks rules at 
every turn and may in fact be playing in a unique way whilst 
denying the fairness of rule invention. 
From 10 or 11 years onwards the child recognizes rules 
as existing for the convenience of the group and capable of 
being changed accordingly. Corresponding with the stage of 
rule codification above, much discussion takes place in 
deciding which rules to use today, although once agreed the 
rules are binding, for that game at least. The child accepts 
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that rules have probably changed considerably since the game 
first began and that, subject to peer approval, it is 
perfectly valid to invent a new rule. 
Certain shortcomings of this part of Piaget's book are 
already apparent; some of the methodological weaknesses apply 
to his later studies as well. The discussion of the rules 
of the game is restricted almost entirely to information 
collected from boys; this is a possible source of bias 
additional to any other arising from the selection of the 
sample. Piaget gives no clear indication of his sampling 
or interview techniques and so it is impossible to assess 
the validity of his datal and more carefully controlled 
replication studies are always needed before his ideas can 
be fully accepted. Piaget does suggest that girls tend to 
elaborate their games far less than boys do (1932, pp. 69-76) 
although quite considerable variety can be seen in, say, the 
girl's game of 'Two-ball' (see Lydiat, 1967). In fact, sex 
differences in the rate of moral development have generally 
proved insignificant although Bull finds 'striking sex 
differences • • • evident in almost all areas of moral 
judgement (1969, p. 17).2 
As usual, Piaget's interest lies in the sequence of 
stages rather than with age/stage correspondences or with 
factors which might accelerate or retard the child's 
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achievement of a particular stage. Recent validation work has 
suggested several factors which seem important in affecting 
the rate at which a child achieves a particular stage and 
these are discussed in detail later on (see Chapter 3). 
On a broader and more constructive theoretical level, 
Piaget points to the decline of egocentricity (as a result 
of biological maturation plus increasing peer cooperation) 
as the main driving force in the development between the 
stages he notes. Here can be seen the first and perhaps 
the most important, link between Piaget's theory of moral 
development and his theory of ~ognitive development. Piaget 
believes that important. factors in the child's development 
are his relationships with other people and his increasing 
ability to notice flaws in his own beliefs as he compares 
them with those of others. 
In this respect chronological age is doubly emphasized. 
In the first place it sets a rough limit to the child's 
neurological development which, in turn, modifies his 
behavioural capabilities. Secondly, chronological age is 
commonly taken as an indication of the type of social re-
lationship into which the child is supposed to enter; this 
is shown in anthropological studies of puberty rites and 
is also evident in our own society in the extra-special 
celebrations marking a twenty-first birthday. A more 
traditional aspect of age considerations is adult acceptance 
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of older children as equals whilst taking offence at 'cheek' 
from younger ones. 
Age is also an important factor limiting the extent to 
which the child's opinions are brought into family decisions 
this is particularly relevant to Piaget's general thesis that 
the more immature types ot judgement and behaviour, especially 
in the area of moral judgement, result from relationships of 
constraint, while the more mature forms stem from relation-
ships of co-operation and equality. 
3. Adult Constraint And Moral Realism 
Piaget next focusses his attention on the child's ideas 
of moral rules laid down by adults, in contrast to those 
developed among children (Piaget, 1932, Ch. 2). He regards the 
typical adult-child relationship as one which restricts the 
child's development considerably since it is based in unilateral 
respect; Fiaget's immediate interest lies in a comparison of the 
moral judgements of the younger children who must endure such 
relationships of constraint with those of older children who 
enjoy relationships of co-operation with their peers and, 
increasingly, with adults. 
Piaget believes that moral constraint combines with the 
young child's egocentric thought to produce what he terms 
moral realism, whose features give rise to the immature aodes 
of thought along several moral dimensions and whose decline 
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allows the more mature modes to develop. Moral realism has 
three important features: in the first place, it gives rise 
to a heteronomous attitude to rules as sacred and untouchable -
any act which shows obedience to a rule is good; secondly, 
moral realism requires that the letter and not the spirit of 
the law be observed - thus deviation from the rule 'is con-
demned and must be expiated by a punishment; the third 
feature of moral realism is its objectivity - there is no 
place for individual motives to be taken into account, actions 
are judged in accordance with their exact correspondence to 
the rule and consequences are more important than intentions, 
which are completely ignored. 
Several of Piaget's moral dimensions are implied in this 
outline of moral realism. The fixity of rules has already 
been mentioned in the discussion of the game of Marbles; the 
idea that rules could never be changed gave way gradually to 
a recognition of the flexibility of rules subject to peer 
group approval. The restrictive effect of moral realism may 
be noted in the discussion of the other dimensions which 
follows. 
(a) Objective responsibility 
Objective responsibility is the term which Piaget applies 
to the younger child's tendency to judge situations by their 
consequences alone (1932, pp. 116 ff.). This mode of thought 
is gradually replaced in older children by a subjective 
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responsibility in which the intentions that motivated the act 
are considered (see Table II). 
Evidence for the decline with age of objective responsibility 
is taken from Piaget's investigation of children's attitudes to 
some hypothetical moral situations relating to clumsiness and 
stealing. For each part of the investigation the subject is 
presented with a pair of stories and is asked to judge the 
relative culpability of the actors. Each of a pair of stories 
differs from the other in two respects - with regard for the 
seriousness of the consequences of the acts and with regard for 
the intentions which motivated the acts. 
A few examples taken from The Moral Judgement of the Child 
should clarify the differences: in one of a pair of stories, a 
girl cut a big hole in her dress while trying to cut out a 
piece of sewing to help her mother - in the other story. a 
girl was playing about with a pair of scissors and she cut 
a small hole in her dress; in a second pair of stories, a boy 
was called to dinner and knocked over a tray of cups which 
lay behind a door in such a position that he could not see 
t~em - the second boy was trying to get some jam from a cup-
board when his mother was out and he knocked one cup over; 
in another pair, a girl steals a bird from a cage because 
she is sorry to see it locked up - the other girl takes some 
sweets when her mother is out, then hides and eats them all 
up (Pia~et, 1932, pp. 118-19). The differences are apparent -
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in each case it is the child who has the better intentions 
who causes the most material damage. 
Piaget suggests that a morality of constraint, typified 
by reference only to objective consequences in the judgement 
of right and wrong, obtains among children up to about 8 
years of age. 3 The average age of children relying on a 
morality of constraint was 7 years; for those relying on a 
morality of co-operation it was 9 years, although responses 
from each category were found at all age levels. Piaget links 
the change from judgement based on outcome to that based on 
intention to the nature of the parent-child relationship. 
Piaget suggests that there are two extreme forms of 
parent-child relationship. In one, the child's misdemeanours 
are judged solely by their consequences; Piaget points out 
that most of the children h~ saw came from very poor districts 
and that the average housewife would be more angry over the 
breakage of fifteen cups than one, say, and independent up to 
a point of the child's motivation (1932, p. 129). This adult 
behaviour reinforces the child's objective attitude in 
evaluating stealing and clumsiness. 
Piaget recognizes a second type of parent-child re-
lationship in which the parents try to give their children 
a moral education based on intention and which 'can achieve 
very early results as is shown by ••• the few examples of 
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subjective responsibility we were able to note at 6 or 7'. 
(Piaget, 1932, p. 130).4 Even with such a sympathetic parental 
attitude, it is likely that the younger child will judge 
situations in which he finds himself according to the material 
damage done and not according to intentions. Perhaps he has 
met other adults less sympathetic, or his own parents have 
lapsed occasionally into the much more spontaneous reaction 
of anger to damage; such experiences mey have a much more 
profound effect than all the subsequent explanations of motive, 
and are likely to give rise to guilt feeling or judgements 
based on a morality of constraint rather than co-operation. 
(b) Lies and morality 
Two further moral dimensions implied in the features of 
moral realism are isolated during Piaget'e discussion of 
lies (1932, pp. 135 ff.). Piaget sees lying as a natural 
tendency rooted in the young child's egocentricity; the 
egocentric child contradicts reality without his realizing 
it, although this unintentional aspect of the behaviour 
makes it difficult to apply the term 'lie' in a strict sense. 
Adult constraint combines with egocentric thought to 
give the earliest definitions of the wrongness of lying. 
Children are told not to lie by adults and any act showing 
disobedience to authority is wrong. Second, lies are wrong 
because they are punishable, because you get slapped or 
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told off if you lie. The first of these dimensions is 
gradually replaced by its more mature form of duty defined 
in terms of conformity to the expectations and obligations 
of peer group relationships of equality. For the second 
dimension, there is the gradual appearance of judgements 
made independently of sanctions (see Tables II and III). 
In the next stage of the development of the child's 
attitude to lies, the gravity of a lie is judged according 
to its content - the technical quality of the lie (its 
credibility) is the criterion for judgement. A harmless 
lie which could not be believed is judged worse than a 
deceitful lie which might be believed. 
During a third stage, the idea gradually forms that 
intent to deceive is the important criterion. Whereas, 
previously, a lie may have been judged worse because it 
had serious consequences, intention to mislead is now taken 
into account. This is further evidence of the decline of 
objective responsibility noted above. Additionally, 
younger children tend to regard lies to adults as worse 
than lies to children; this aspect gradually becomes 
irrelevant - extra support for the decline of the definition 
of duty as obedience to authority. 
(c) Egocentricity and moral judgement 
The final dimension which Piaget outlines in his 
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discussion of the child's attitudes to adult rules is that 
of absolutism of value v. relativism of value (1932, 
especially pp. 84 ff.). This dimension is a direct result 
of the child's egocentricity which prevents his appreciating 
viewpoints other than his own. Childish egocentricity and 
the limits which it sets on intellectual development have 
already been discussed (see Chapter 1); since the child can 
conceive of only his own perspective on an act, he believes 
that all other people are of his opinion. In cases of clear 
conflict, however, the adult view is always held to be the 
correct one since, for younger children, duty is defined as 
obedience to authority. 
This absolutistic approach is replaced in the older 
child by a relativistic view of value and the recognition 
of shades of right and wrong as motives are taken into 
account. The remarkable influence of this dimension on 
others mentioned previously can be easily seen (see Table II). 
(d) The child's social network 
In his discussion of the first five moral dimensions 
(rule fixity, objective responsibility, duty as obedience to 
authority, wrong defined by sanctions and absolutism of 
value) Piaget notes a common factor facilitating the child's 
progress from the immature to the mature modes of thought. 
This factor is the nature of the child's social relationships.5 
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The younger child is typically constrained by a one-sided 
relationship involving fairly strict adherence to adult 
authority; this heteronomous control reinforces the 
immature modes of thought of the younger child. Peer 
co-operation and an increasing equality with adults allows 
the older child more freedom of thought and action and the 
gradual realization of autonomous control. Adult rules 
and societal norms become internalized and the child now 
conforms to stipulated behaviour patterns since he re-
cognizes their utility and not because he is afraid of the 
consequences of deviance. 
Critics of Piaget (e.g. Bull, 1969; Kohlberg, 1963b) 
have pointed out that his more mature autonomous stage does 
not represent self-rule proper but implies conformity to 
social norms. Sometimes, individual considerations may 
6 transcend norms of behaviour and even laws, and autonomous 
thought is more mature than socionomy (Bull, 1969; Ugurel-
Semin, 1952) or a morality of conventional role conformity 
(Kohlberg, 1963b, p. 13), invoking as it does principles of 
individual conscience. 
While Piaget has drawn attention to an important shift 
in the child's level of moral judgement, he was incorrect in 
assuming that his second level (of autonomous thought) was 
the most mature form of reasoning. It is probably the 
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highest level at which the oldest children with whom Piaget 
dealt could function (given a double limitation of the 
subjects' ages and the naivety of Piaget's situations) and 
it may represent the typical mode of thought for many adults 
(Bull, 1969, p. 33) but it is insufficiently mature to 
account for the reasoning of some people. Necessary ex-
tensions to Piaget's theory are suggested by Bull and by 
Kohlberg. 
4. Co-operation And The Idea Of Justice 
In his investigation of co-operation between children 
insofar as the concept of justice is concerned Piaget 
isolated the remaining six moral dimensions (Piaget, 1932, 
Chapter 3). Piaget's attention now focusses on children's 
ideas on the fairness of punishments for various misdeeds 
and rewards for good behaviour. 
These last dimensions may be seen as extensions of 
the first five, expecially in the young child's high regard 
for adult authority and his concern with punishments in the 
definition of bad behaviour. 
(a) Expiation and restitution 
Piaget argues that at any age ~evel children regard 
certain forms of punishment as being fairer than others; 
the relative fairness of different punishments varies with 
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the age of the child. Piaget proposes a continuum of 
severity of punishment and suggests that older children 
regard less and less physical puniehment as most fair 
and increasingly favour social sanctions as the means of 
control. The younger children think that strict punish-
ment is both just and necessary to expiate misdeeds; the 
child who has been punished will conform more in the 
future. 7 For older children, fair punishments are those 
which entail putting things right or making the wrong-
doer realize the consequences of his behaviour; this can 
be achieved without resorting to physical punishment 
(1932, pp. 197 ff.). 
~xpiative justice is typified by strict, painful 
physical punishment; it is arbitrary in the sense that 
it is not normally related to the offence in a logical 
manner. Reciprocal punishments, in contrast, involve 
helping the child realize why his behaviour is wrong by 
inflicting a punishment logically related to the offence. 
Piaget distinguishes six levels of reciprocal punishment 
roughly representing progressively less severe measures 
(Piaget, 1932, pp. 205-07). 
First is the offender's exclusion from the group. 
As a temporary break in the social bond this is probably 
fairly common in the child's relationships with both 
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peers and adults, as when children refuse to play with 
someone who cheats all the time, say, or when an adult 
will not take a child for a walk when he has shown that 
he cannot behave on such occasions. 
A second group of punishments relates to the child 
suffering the consequences of his misbehaviour - for 
example, having no bread for dinner if the child has 
refused to fetch some and there is insufficient to share 
all round; being put to bed if he has pretended to be 
ill; or having a cold room if he has broken a window pane.8 
As a third form of punishment, the child may be 
deprived of the misused object should he wish to borrow 
it again - he may not be allowed to look at a book which 
he has defaced, say. 
Reciprocity proper appears in the fourth group of 
punishments by which the 'eye-for-an-eye' philosophy is 
applied. The child is punished by actions exactly the 
same as those by which he misbehaved - one might break 
his toys if a child had damaged those of another. While 
this form of punishment is perfectly legitimate in making 
the child understand the results of his actions, it can 
become irritating and absurd on occasion. 
Purely restitutive punishments form a fifth group; 
the child is made to pay for the damage he causes. This 
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may be completely divorced from the censure involved in 
punishment, but commonly the child is told off as well as 
having to pay for the damaged property. 
Finally, punishment may take the form of censure only 
without any attempt at retribution. The child would have 
explained to him why his actions were wrong and what adverse 
effects his behaviour had. This form of punishment seems 
unfair and inappropriate to younger children who see the 
necessity of physical punishment to expiate the misdeed. 
Thus we have come full circle in discussing the fairness 
of punishments as seen by children (see also Table II). 
(b) Collective responsibility 
Quite commonly the consequences of some misbehaviour 
may be discovered without evidence of the culprit's identity. 
This is perhaps more typical of the classroom setting where 
there is relative safety in numbers and certainly a much 
greater chance of escaping detection and punishment than in 
a smaller group such as the family. Under such circumstances 
the question is what should the teacher do, and how fair do 
children think the alternative courses of action are? (1932, 
pp. 231 ff.) 
There are, in fact, three possible situations. Firstly, 
the teacher may Funish the whole class without making any 
attempt to discover the offender. This course of action is 
denounced even by the youngest children whom one would normally 
expect to regard all adult actions as being fair. They all 
insist that the teacher should make some effort to discover 
the guilty party. 
Secondly, the teacher may try to discover the culprit who 
is additionally known to the class. Should the guilty person 
not confess and should the class not give him up then a rather 
confused pattern of ~eplies is found. The children might 
believe that the teacher is fair in punishing the whole class -
the younger children say that an offence has been committed 
and at least this way the guilty party would be punished as 
well as the rest (this derives from the young child's belief 
in expiative justice); for older children it is the group 
solidarity (which renders everyone an accessory after the 
fact) which is punishable rather than their failure to co-
operate with authority per see Alternatively, it might be 
maintained that nobody should be punished since the teacher 
does not know who is responsible.and does not have the right 
to ask the class to tell tales. 
In a third situation the class may not be aware of the 
identity of the culprit. Again, younger children see the 
necessity for some form of punishment to expiate the wrong, 
and so the whole class must suffer. Older children believe 
that no-one should be punished - it is worse for the innocent 
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to suffer than it is for the guilty party to go free. 
The child's age, commonly linking in with the nature 
of his social relationships with adults, is proposed by 
Piaget as the 1rt:portant factor in this discussion of 
collective responsibility. The young child's respect for 
adult actions, and his desire that punishment should 
always follow a misdeed, lead to a belief in collective 
responsibility. Older children lack this awe of authority 
and can comple many arguments to modify this strict belief 
in the necessity of punishment. 
(c) Immanent justice 
Stemming from the young child's acceptance of expiative 
justice Piaget notes the development of belief in natural 
punishment such that objects are thought to deal out 
automatic retributions for misdeeds; this phenomenon Piaget 
terms immanent justice (1932, pp. 250 ff.). One of the 
situations which Piaget uses to illustrate the development 
of belief in immanent justice describes how a boy is 
disturbed while stealing apples; he runs away across a 
rotten bridge which collapses. The problem is: why did 
the bridge collapse? (Piaget, 1932, pp. 250-51). Younger 
children see it as a natural punishment for stealing -
the bridge collapsed because the boy had been misbehaving; 
older children say that the bridge would have collapsed 
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anyway (see Table II). 
Parental teaching may well reinforce the belief in 
immanent justice. The statements 'It serves you right' or 
'It wouldn't have happened if you'd behaved yourself' or 
something similar are commonly heard after the child is 
hurt while messing about. Equally true, aspects of immanent 
justice may persist in older children and even adults; it is 
fairly common for one to seek out past misdeeds in partial 
explanation of present misfortune. The decline of belief 
in immanent justice is due partly to changing parental 
admonitions and partly to intellectual development and in-
creased experience of the world. 
(d) Distributive justice 
We have already noted the child's attitudes to 
collective punishments; in a somewhat similar vein Piaget 
investigated situations where an adult favours one child 
more than another in the allocation of rewards or attention 
(1932, pp. 262 ff.). Typically, the obedient child is 
favoured at the expense of the others. This non-reward 
approach to punishment of disobedience may be legitimate 
from the point of view of retributive justice but not 
necessarily from that of distributive justice. Some 
familiar trends may be seen in Piaget's data. 
Younger children see nothing wrong in unequal treatment 
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since all adult actions are fair and binding. Slightly 
older children (up to eleven or twelve years of age) demand 
absolute equality of treatment regardless of behaviour. 
still older children modify this rabid equalitarianism 
with considerations of equity by which each case is judged 
on its individual merits (see Table III). 
(e) The child as a punisher 
Obviously, if a child has sufferensome wrong at the 
hands of another there are two broad courses of action for 
which he might opt: he can redress the wrong himself or he 
can seek out an adult to administer a punishment. Once 
more, Piaget proposes an age progression such that the 
younger children favour telling an adult while older 
children increasingly prefer to fight their own battles. 9 
The younger child's attitude is based in his reverence 
for adult authority. In the first place, the adult says 
that fighting, stealing, cheating etc. are wrong - the 
young child is therefore bound not to do these things even 
in retaliation. Secondly, since adults impose the sanctions 
it is their duty to inflic·t the punishments. Thirdly, 
telling an adult may be the only way a smaller child can 
seek restitution from a bigger one. 
Piaget contends that the retaliation of the older child 
is based more in considerations of justice and equality than 
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in coldly calculated revenge which is in fact condemned 
(1932, p. 304). 
(f) Rights and obligations 
In connection with the child's attitude to the rules 
of marbles we noted that younger children held rules to be 
sacred and fixed, while older children recognized the right 
of the group to make and change rules. This dimension 
leads to another concerned with why it is wrong to cheat 
in games - the increasing importance of reciprocity (1932, 
pp. 304 ff.). 
From the younger child's reverence for rules develops 
the notion that cheating is wrong because it is naughty 
(i.e. forbidden by adults) or because it is against the 
rules. In older children this strict adherence to rules 
for their own sake is replaced by the recognition that 
cheating makes co-operation impossible, that it undermines 
the security of the group reiationships and is contrary to 
equality, being unfair to the others (see Table III). 
This increasing reciprocity in defining ri~hts and 
obligations observable in the child's attitude to cheating 
was also present in Piaget's data on lies, and while younger 
children said it was worse to lie to adults than to children, 
older children thought that both were equally bad. 
( 
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5. Co-operation And Constraint 
The eleven moral dimensions proposed by Piaget indicate 
slight differences in emphasis around the general problem 
of what constitutes fair or unfair forms of behaviour in 
children and adults. As we have seen, several of the 
dimensions can be linked together directly and underlying 
them all Piaget recognizes the heteronomy-autonomy continuum 
of adult-child relationships. He claims that relationships 
of constraint hinder moral development and produ~e the 
immature aspects of the dimensions while moral progress is 
facilitated by relationships of co-operation between peers 
and, more importantly, between adults and children. Piaget 
concludes his experimental investigations in The Moral 
Judgement of the Child with these remarks: 
••• we find in the domain of justice, as in the 
other two domains already dealt with [moral 
realism and the rules of the game]. that oppo-
sition of two moralities to which we have so often 
drawn the reader's attention. The ethics of 
authority, which ~s that of duty and obedience. 
leads, in the domain of justice, to the confusion 
of what is just with the content of established 
law and to the acceptance of expiatory punishment. 
The ethics of mutual respect, which is that of 
good (as opposed to duty), and of autonomy, leads 
••• to the development of equality, which is 
the idea at the bottom of distributive justice 
and of reciprocity. Solidarity between equals 
appears once more as the source of a whole set 
of complementary and coherent moral ideas which 
characterise the rational mentality •••• But 
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what is certain is that the moral equilibrium 
achieved by the complementary conceptions ot 
heteronomous duty and of punishment properly 
so called, is an unstable equilibrium, owing 
to the fact that it does not allow the person-
ality to grow and expand to its full extent. 
As the child grows up, the subjection of his 
conscience to the mind of the adult seems to 
him less legitimate, and except in cases of 
arrested moral development, caused either by 
decisive inner submission (those adults who 
remain children all their lives), or by 
sustained revolt, unilateral respect tends 
of itself to grow into mutual respect and to 
the state of co-operation which constitutes 
the normal equilibrium (1932, p. 324). 
Piaget's argument here is that the nature of the 
child's social relationships is the crucial factor affecting 
his moral development. We shall see later on (in the con-
sideration of the validation work of Piaget's theory of 
moral development) that many factors other than the child's 
social relationships have been suggested as important 
variables in this respect and that, in fact, unilateral 
constraint is more effective in retarding the chi1d's 
development than is mutual respect in accelerating it. 
6. Educational Implications .. 
In the final chapter of The Moral Judgement of the Child 
Piaget attempts to summarize his findings as they relate to 
earlier ideas on morality and to the child's moral and 
general education (1932, Ch. 4). Underlying his eleven 
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moral dimensions Piaget again stresses the continuum of 
adult-child relationships from those of heteronomy and 
constraint to those of autonomy and co-operation. 
Piaget notes that Fauconnet (1920) demonstrated an 
historical change in justice and penal law from objective 
to subjective responsibility - the very same trend which 
Piaget found in the child's development. Fauconnet's work 
derived from that of Durkheim (19 ) whome Piaget criti-
cizes for not recognizing the binding nature of relation-
ships of equality, insisting as he did that moral rules 
were imposed by the group on the individual. There does, 
however, appear to be a way of reconciling this apparent 
conflict between Piaget and Durkheim. 
Accepting that norms may derive from relationships of 
constraint or co-operation, both sets influence the in-
dividual in similar ways. Although their sources are 
different their effect is the same and both assume the 
authority of rules which exist above and beyond the group 
as a means of controlling its behaviour. While developing 
from seemingly opposite premises (heteronomous and auton-
omous control) they operate in identical fashion and with 
this interpretation the views of Piaget and Durkheim 
compleruent each other. 
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Piaget argues that a further modification of Durkheim's 
theory of morality is made by Bovet (e.g. 1912) who considers 
moral obligation as having two components - commands and 
respect for those issuing commands. However, Piaget thinks 
that Bovet shares Durkheim's weakness of ignoring relation-
ships of equality as a source of moral norms. 
In Piaget's opinion Baldwin's (1897) theory is also 
inadequate because, although Baldwin implies a process 
similar to Piaget's own of declining egocentricity as the 
driving force behind moral development, he maintains that 
the child's intelligence is the crucial factor in the 
development of an autonomous moral conscience. Piaget 
points out that declining egocentricity lies at the root 
of both intellectual and moral development and so it 
is invalid to explain the one by the other. 
The general educational implications of the constraint-
co-operation continuum are very important to Piaget. He 
believed that the child's final and most mature level of 
moral and cognitive development is achieved through dis-
cussion, comparison, criticism and reorganization made 
possible by relationships of co-operation and reciprocity.10 
The typical adult-Child relationship is one of constraint 
and unilateral respect, at least until the child attains 
what the adult considers to be a minimum level of maturity. 
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The criterion for this level is most likely to be the child's 
chronological age and the relationships of constraint which 
apply until then have been suggested by Piaget as reinforcing 
the childish egocentricity which marks the more immature 
levels of reasoning. 
Similarly, the school situation is typically one which 
relies heavily on relationships of constraint between teachers 
and pupils. Faced with the problems of controlling a large 
number of children the teacher demands immediate obedience, 
order, quiet etc. It is clearly easier for the teacher to 
Ulpart knowledge under such conditions rather than by allowing 
the children to experiment and compare results for themselves. 
This is, however, exactly what P1aget advocates - individual 
ideas contrasted through discussion and criticism; different 
aspects of a single problem taken up by separate groups and 
compared later on; co-operation among equals rather than 
the imposition of knowledge by a person in authority. These 
arguments had been advocated before Piaget by Dewey, Sanderson, 
Cousinet and others under the general eollective description 
of the Activity School. Only recently, however, has any 
attempt been made to apply these suggestions in school situ-
ations and even now this application is limited to Primary 
11 
school work. 
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7. Summary And Conclusions 
In this chapter Piaget's theory of moral development has 
been described through an outline of his book The Eoral 
Judgement of the Child. Eleven moral dimensions were 
isolated, although several of these could be seen to 
interconnect in various ways; Piaget traced these inter-
connections back to the nature of the child's social 
relationshipt. Piaget's criticisms of earlier theories 
of moral development were also noted briefly. 
A major qualificatio!l of Piaget's theory should be 
borne in mind, however. In the next chapters we deal 
with modifications of Piaget's theory by considering 
direct validation work and by considering theories of 
moral development which approach the problem from pers-
pectives other than the cognitive one (i.e. psycho-
analytic and learning theories). The validation stUdies 
have suggested many factors other than the adult-child 
relationship as being influential in the child's moral 
development; even where this specific factor has been 
considered results have not been at all consistent and 
there is some doubt about the developmental status of 
those moral dimensions which invoke relationships of 
co-operation as an impetus for change through Piaget's 
scheme. 
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A partial explanation of the inconsistent links established 
between the child's social relationships and his moral deve"lopment 
may lie in the limited attention given to the problem. For this 
reason, and also because of its crucial position in Piaget's theory 
of moral development, the seeking of possible relationships between 
parental attitudes to the child and the child's moral development 
seems an important area of study. 
As we s~all see, the different approaches of psychoanalytic 
and learning theories to moral development suggest that Piagetts 
cognitive theory 1s only a partial explanation of the problem; 
even for the cognitive aspects of moral development Kohlberg has 
suggested an alternative scheme which is far more sophisticated 
and extensive than that of Piaget. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE VALIDITY OF 
PIAGET' S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPNENT 
• 
So far we have discussed Piaget's theories of cognitive 
and moral development. We noted some similarities between 
the two, especially insofar as the child's performance on 
Piaget's tests of moral judgement are dependent on certain 
intellectual abilities (e.g. non-ego-centric thought); thus, 
it is after the age of eight years or so that the child 
exhibits both non-egocentric thought and the more mature 
modes of moral judgement (see Chapters 1 and 2). 
Piaget's approach to moral development has been termed 
cognitive, since it deals with what the child knows about 
good and bad, right and wrong, better and worse etc., and 
since this knowledge is largely dependent on the child's 
mental abilities. Furthermore, this cognitive approach has 
been contrasted with other approaches, notably a behavioural 
one followed by Hartshorne and Hay, for example, and an 
emotive one typical of Freudian analysis (see Wright, 1968; 
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Kohlberg, 1963a). The major purpose of the present chapter 
is to review the findings of the validation studies of 
Piaget's work on moral development. First consideration will 
be given to the content of Piaget's scheme as the studies 
concerned with the characteristics and order of succession 
of stages are discussed; later consideration is given to the 
mechanism of moral development and to attempts to explain 
rather than describe the process of development. 
1. Some Early Studies Of Moral Development 
Before discussing the validation literature, however, 
it is interesting to consider some studies of moral devel-
opment published before that of Piaget. The tremendous 
impetus given by Piaget to the investigation of the child's 
moral development means that his is commonly thought to be 
the first study in this field. In fact, there were at 
least six studies prior to that of Piaget and, although 
they had no,. direct connection with his work, some of their 
discoveries were replicated by him. 
At the turn of the century, Barnes (then Professor of 
Education at Stanford University) edited several series of 
Studies in Education. All the reported studies involved 
very large samples; a group questionnaire was administered 
to each sample. One study, Punishment as seen by Children, 
used information collected from about two thousand children 
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aged 7 to 16 years who were asked to report examples of fair 
and unfair punishments they had received (Barnes, 1894). 
Barnes noted the fact that punishments were often considered 
to be just, merely because they came from adults; also, the 
idea that offences could be paid for in terms of pain became 
less frequent with age (c.f. Piaget's ideas on the decline 
of expiatory punishment). 
Piaget's work on the development in the child's attention 
to intentions and consequences 1n misbehaviour was fore-
shadowed by Schallenber~er's (1894) study of three thousand 
children aged 6 to 16 years. She posed a situation where a 
girl painted the dining room chairs 'to make them look pretty' 
and was sent to bed as a result. She found that younger 
children were inclined to demand that the sirl be punished 
severely, a tendency which declined with age; older children 
said that the mother need only explain why the girl was wrong. 
Schallenberger concluded that 'younger children judge by 
results, older children look at the motives which prompted 
them' (1894, p. 96). 
Barnes (1902) attempted a validation of Schallenberger's 
work when he posed the same situation to over a thousand 
English children aged 8 to 14 years. He noted that most of 
the children he studied came from working class or lower-
middle class backgrounds, the first time that the class 
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factor had been mentioned in such studies. 2 Again, Barnes 
found the recommendation of punitive measures to be more 
typical of younger children, while older children thought 
that explanation would be sufficient to impress on the 
child the seriousness of his actions. 
These three studies, some thirty to forty years before 
Piaget's, focus on issues similar to those with which Fiaget 
concerned himself, and they adopted a similar developmental 
approach in linking age with type of response. Concern for 
the moral education of the child gave rise to two more pre-
Piagetian studies. HcGrath (1923) administered a number of 
tests to children aged 6 to 18 years in order to obtain 
information which could be used as the foundation for a 
course in moral instruction.3 
Hacauley and Watkins (1925) took tLe idea of 'wickedness' 
as the basis of their work. They asked 2,420 children aged 
7 to 18 years and from a variety of social baakgrounds to 
'make a list of the most wicked things anyone can do'; they 
also asked each child to choose their 'ideal person'. The 
experimenters' aims were to seek any changes in type of 
response with age, to attempt correlations between moral 
development and moral ideals as shown in the choice of 
ideal person, and to note the effects of environmental 
4 influences on moral development. 
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Macauley and Watkins areued that there were four broad 
stages in moral development. Up to about 9 years of age, 
the child lives in a 'small world of immediate personal 
relationships • • • • He states as crimes those small 
personal acts which he has been taught to consider wrong 
by the categorical prohibitions of parents or teachers.' 
(1925, pp. 19-20). This implies two ot Piaget's dimensions -
egocentricity and respect for adult commands. The second 
stage of moral development lasts from 9 to 14 years of age 
and in it the child learns to generalize from particular 
events to more broad conceptions such as stealing, murder, 
fighting etc. However, these abberations are still judged 
in terms of conventional moral codes and mitigating cir-
cumstances are not taken into consideration. During the 
third stage, adolescence brings an upsurge of rebellion 
which is shown in-the child's greater concern with offences 
against parents. Lastly, at about 19 years, the child (~) 
adopts self-control and autonomous judgements become im-
portant. 5 
To conclude this review of the pre-Piagetian work, 
brief mention must be made of Hartshorne and Nay's three 
volume study of moral conduct (1928-30). They were 
interested in behaviour in about a hundred test situations 
where subjects were tempted to deviate (cheat, lie, steal 
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etc.). The children involved were under the impression that 
there was no risk of detection, although this was not the 
case, of course. This study produced two important, if 
somewhat negative, results: firstly, there seemed to be no, 
generalized morality of conscience (specific situational 
variations caused different responses); and secondly, there 
was no correlation between the exhibition of good conduct 
and attendance at Sunday School, Boy Scouts etc. 
2. The Replication Studies 
The publication of The Moral Judgement of the Child 
heralded the start of a new approach to the consideration 
of morality; Piaget's ideas have persisted to the present 
day to a remarkable degree. This section reports the 
findings of some two-dozen stUdies carried out in an 
attempt to validate and extend Piaget's ideas. Such 
validation studies are essential, espeCially in view of 
,the methodological weaknesses of Piaget's earliest work. 
The major shortcomings of Piaget's methodology have 
already been discussed, but briefly they include a lack 
of standardized procedures for information collection, 
lack of concern with sampling techniques and extremely 
sporadic reporting of results. 
The earliest validation stUdies were concerned with 
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more than mere replication, however. Important as this 
function was, they also tried to isolate the variables 
which might accelerate or retard the child's development 
through Piaget's stages. The most common variables 
considered were social class, national culture and in-
telligence, although more limited discussion has been made 
of such factors as the specific nature of the test items, 
the sex of the child, religious teaching and adult pressures. 
The role of each of these variables will be considered in 
due course. 
We noted in the outline of Piaget's theory that he 
discusses eleven different dimensions of moral development 
(see Chapter 2). Each of the two-dozen or 60 most commonly 
quoted validation studies of Piaget's work considers a 
different combination of these dimensions in isolation or 
in relation to a variety of environmental factors which 
might be expected to influence the child's rate of develop-
ment (see Table IV). 
During a very thorough review of the research liter-
ature in moral development, Kohlberg (1963a) suggests that 
not all of Piaget's dimensions show suffiCiently consistent 
age trends for them to be thought of as genuine develop-
mental dimensions. Kohlberg argues that the validity of 
such a dimension is indicated by responses which become 
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regularly more mature with age regardless of the nature of 
the situations about which the child is questioned, and 
regardless of the child's own social environment. The 
results of the validation stUdies have been consistent 
enough to suggest that six of Piaget's dimensions are 
developmental while the results from the other five have 
varied considerably from study to study. This is an 
important distinction since the modifying effects of the 
variables discussed below apply almost entirely to the 
developmental dimensions only; favourable factors show 
their effects in similar fashion to increasing age, by 
stimulating an increase in the maturity of response along 
the dimension. 
Kohlberg points out that one can detect a fairly 
clear-cut distinction between the developmental dimensions 
6 
and the other dimensions in that the former group reIlect 
an increasing cognitive ability to know what is right and 
wrong, while the latter reflect the child's attitude to 
adult authority. The validity of constructing these two 
groups of dimensions will become apparent during the 
discussion of the variables which follows. 
In this section, the role of the individual variables 
listed in Table IV will be considered in relation to each 
dimension. Later, we shall discuss the developmental and 
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non-developmental dimensions by way of summarizing the main 
effects of individual variables; to avoid repetition this 
second discussion will be only brief. The findings dis-
cussed below are those of the twenty studies of moral 
development given in Table IV.? These findings are summar-
ized for the developmental dimensions in Table V and for 
the non-developmental dimensions in Table VI. 
Ca) Chronological age 
Of course, the crucial test of a developmental dimension 
is that responses relating to it become more mature at 
successively later ages. It is this fact which defines the 
developmental dimensions and distinguishes them from the rest. 
Piaget thought that chronological age was an important 
factor in influencing the child's level of response for two 
main reasons. In the first place, it affected the child's 
intellectual maturation. This is important in Piaget's 
approach since we have already noted his concern with the 
cognitive aspects of moral judgement. The immaturity of the 
younger child's judgements may be largely explained by his 
egocentricity and this feature of the child's thought dis-
appears in time (see Flavell et al, 1968). 
Piaget proposed a second less important and less 
successful application of age as a factor influencing moral 
development. He believed that relationships of equality 
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with adults and peers were reserved for older children, 
while younger children were constrained in heteronomous 
relationships. Developing from this, Piaget thought that 
relationships of constraint restricted the child's 
development while those of co-operation and equality 
promoted it. We return to this point in the discussion 
of adult constraint and peer group participation later on. 
Naturally increasing a3e correlates with greater 
maturity of response for the developmental dimensions. 
This relationship was established in seven studies each 
of objective responsibility and immanent justice and in 
four studies of expiation v. restitution. One study of 
rule fixity and one of wrong defined by punishment 
supported this trend. 8 The results for these last d1-
mensions are obviously not as strong support for develop-
mentality as the several consistent findings for the 
first three; however, there 1s no evidence to contradict 
their inclusion as developmentsl dimensions. 9 
It can be seen from Table VI that there is considerable 
inconsistency in the findings relating to the non-
developmental dimensions. A curvilinear relationship was 
established between age and type of judgement for the 
dimensions of duty defined as obedience to authority, 
belief in punishment by authority and reciprocity in 
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defining rights; other studies established positive relation-
ships between the two for the same dimensions and one study 
could establish no relationship at all for the dimension of 
reciprocity. The single study of belief in individual or 
collective responsibility established a positive relation-
ship between age and type of response which ostensibly 
qualifies it for inclusion as a developmental dimension; 
however, in contrast to, say, the final developmental 
dimensions, each of which was also supported by a single 
study, the results of a consideration of other variables 
does not show the consistency expected of a developmental 
dimension. 
It is somewhat misleading to speak of age as a variable 
in relation to developmental and non-developmental dimensions 
since age is the criterion by which a dimension is SO judged. 
We have seen, however, the inconsistency in the findings for 
several of the dimensions and the remarkable consistency in 
others. Moreover, as we shall see, these consistencies are 
repeated in the data for the developmental dimensions when 
the other variables are considered while the data for the 
non-developmental dimensions display no consistency. 
(b) Intelligence 
Having established the dichotomy of developmental and 
non-developmental dimensions on the basis of the age trends 
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shown by each, it can be demonstrated that certain other 
factors influence progress along the dimensions in similar 
fashion to age; that is, they stimulate an increase along 
the dimension. 
Higher intelligence is one factor which is favourable 
to the child's better performance on Piaget's tests of 
moral judgement. Again this is not surprising since we 
have noted several times the emphasis which Piaget's theory 
places on cognitive abilities. 
The results of the validation studies show higher 
intelligence to have a far more noticeable effect on the 
developmental dimensions than on the others. Thus the 
accelerating effect of higher intelligence was noted in 
seven studies of objective responsibility, in three studies 
of expiation v. restitution and in two studies of immanent 
t ' 10 jus ~ce. The study by Abel (1941) of mentally subnormal 
girls found no relationship between higher intelligence 
and better performance along the dimension of immanent 
justice although she did establish such a relationship for 
objective responsibility and expiation v. restitution. 
In contrast, the four separate studies which con-
eidered intelligence and performance along the (non-
developmental) dimensions of duty defined as obedience 
to authority, reciprocity in defining rights and individual 
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and collective responsibility failed to find any correlations 
in any direction. 
Intelligence, then, is a very important factor in in-
fluencing the child's performance and progress along the 
developmental dimensions of Piaget's scheme; no correlations 
between intelligence and performance were established by the 
few studies of the non-developmental dimensions. 
(c) Social relationships 
In fact this heading covers the two variables of adult 
constraint and peer group participation in Tables IV, V and 
VI. It will be remembered that Piaget proposed two ideal 
types of social relationship - one of constraint and one 
of co-operation (see Chapter 2); he believed that younger 
children were constrained by a heteronomous relationship 
with adults and with slightly older children, while re-
lationships of equality with adults and peers were reserved 
for older children. 
Piaget extended the implications of this typology into 
his theory of moral development. He thought that relation-
ships of equality and co-operation promoted the child's 
development while those of constraint retarded it. In 
fact, data collected subsequently does not altogether 
support these two contentions. 
Adult constraint related in a conaiatent fashion to the 
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child's progress along both developmental and non-developmental 
dimensions; a negative relationship was established between 
constraint and slower development in three studies of immanent 
justice, in two each of objective responsibility and duty 
defined as obedience to authority, and in one each of 
expiation v. restitution, individual and collective respons-
ibility and punishment by authority v. retaliation. Three 
studies failed to find any correlations between constraint 
and some of the other dimensions (see Tables V and VI).ll 
Peer group participation has been less extensively 
investigated. One study failed to find any correlation 
between peer group interaction and progress along the 
dimension of objective responsibility (Porteous and Johnson, 
1965); Boehm's series of studies established correlations 
between peer group participation and more mature judgements 
along the (non-developmental) dimensions of duty defined 
as obedience to authority and pumshment by authority v. 
retaliation (see especially Boehm, 1962a and 1963a). 
In general, adult constraint appears more successful 
in retarding moral development than does peer group partici-
pation in promoting it. 
(d) Social class 
Social class affiliation has been shown to correlate 
with differences in behaviour and performance in many areas 
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(see, for example, Klein, 1965, Vol. II). 'Piaget did not 
realize the possible effects of social class variations but 
the findings of several studies have implications for his 
theory of moral development. 
11i.ddle class parents are more likely than working class 
. 
parents to encourage their child's education at school and 
pre-school levels; they probably had a longer education 
themselves and would therefore, appreciate the benefits of 
qualifications in long-term career prospects; these social 
advantages in education supplement any genetic advantage 
inherent in the intellectual superiority of middle class 
parents. These factors give the middle class child an 
intellectual advantage over the working class child and, 
as we have seen, performance in Piaget's tests of moral 
development is dependent to a large extent on intellectual 
abilities. 
A second set of factors which is pertinent to the 
problem of moral development, and which would also give 
the middle class child an advantage in moral dilemmas, 
relates to the measures of control used over the children 
in middle and working class families. The middle class 
parent is more likely than his working class counterpart 
to adopt non-physical forms of control with his children; 
these social or psychological measures have proved to be 
,the more successful in the formation of the guilt aspects 
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of conscience (see Kohlberg, 1963a). 
The research findings reported in Table ~V support these 
implications of social class for the developmental dimensions 
of Piaget's theory of moral development. Children .from middle 
class homes were found to be more mature than those from 
working class homes in three studies of objective responsibility, 
in two studies of expiation v. restitution and in one study 
each of immanent justice and absolutism of value. 
For the non-developmental dimensions the general picture 
is one of no correlation with social class (see Table VI). 
Two notable exceptions appear from Boehm's (1962a) studies 
of punishment by authority v. retaliation and duty defined 
as obedience to authority where she found working class 
children to return more mature answers than middle class 
children. Boehm explained this anomoly by pointing to the 
greater freedom allowed the working class child outside the 
horne (fewer checks on friends, activities, time of return 
home, etc.) and the more prolonged contact with peers which 
results. Working class children therefore show more inde-
pendence from adults in redressing wrongs and show an 
earlier rejection of the concept of goodness seen in terms 
of obedience to adults. 12 
In &eneral social class appears to correlate with 
different rates of moral development to the extent that it 
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TABLE IV Distribution of Dimensions and Variables by Author 
Author 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Harrower 1934 I I ./ ./ ,/ 
Abel 1941 ./ , 1./ J ../ ./ 
Dennis 1943 1./ ./ ../ 
Liu 1950 ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Ugurel-Semin 1952 1./ v' ./ ./ ./ 
l'-1acRae 1954 ,/ II ./ IIJ ./ ./ ~ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Dukes 1955 II I ./ 
Morris 1958 .; ./ / 1/ ./ 
Kagan 1958 I I ./ 
Hilliard 1959 ./ j 
Wheeler 1959 
./ 
Medinnus 1959 ./ ./ ./ ./ ~ 
Durkin 1959-61 J ./ ./ ~ ./ ../ ./ 
Bobroff 1960 1/ ./ ../ 
Johnson 1962 a ./ II I ~ /' ../ ./ ./ 
Boehm 1957-63 1./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ../ ./ / ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Medinnus 1962 I ./ 
Edwards 1964-65 ./ ,/ ./ 
porteous and I I 1./ / ../ ./ / Johnson 1965 
Breznitz and 
Kuge1mass 1967 J I ./ 
TOTALS 9 8 6 2 1 2- 3 3 3 1 0 117 10 7 6 5 4 3 3 3 2 
KEY Dimensions - (1) objective responsibility; (2) immanent justice; 
- (3) expiation v. restitution; (4) wrong as punished; (5) fixity of 
rules; (6) absolutism of value; (7) duty as obedience to authority; 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
(8) reciprocity in rights; (9) punishment by authority v. retaliation; 
(10) individual and collective responsibility; (11) favouritism in 
the distribution of rewards and punishments. 
Variables - (12) age; (13) I.Q.; (14) adult constraint; (15) social 
class; (16) situational differences; (17) nationa'lity,(18) cognitive 
afftective differences; (19) religion; (20) sex; (21) peer group 
participa tion. 
~ 
I 
Table V 
Age 
IQ 
adu1 t constraint 
social class 
situational 
dif'ferences 
nationality 
cognitive & 
affective 
differences 
religion 
sex 
peer groups 
participa.tion 
Totals 
Findings of Twenty Studiesa by Dimension and Variable 
The Developm.en tal Dimensions b 
DnlENSIONS 
objective imnanent expiation v absolutism 'Wrong defined 
responsibili ty justice restitution of value as punished 
7 +; 6 ,7 ,9 ,15 , 7+;3,6,7, 4+; 1,4,6,15 c 1+;17 3+j 
16,18,20 9,12, 1e;2 
15.16 
7+;2,6,15,16, 2+;12,15 3-+; 1,2,15 
18,19,20 18;2 
d 3-;2,6, 28;2,15 2e;6. ,~ 
2-;2,6 15 1-;q. 
3+;6,15,16 1+-6 , 2+;:1,15 1+;6 
2+;6,16 1+;12 
1+;3 li+';q. 
le;l 
f 2+ ;6,16 
le; 19 
1+;16 1+;4. 
1 .... ;19° 1+;19° 
Ie; 19 le19 
9 8 6 4 2 
----
Fixity of 
rules 
1+;14 
1 
~ 
~ 
+-
KEY:: + this varia.ble would assist child's development along this dimension; - this variable VIOuld retard 
- the child's development along this dimension; e no effect found. 
a The studies are referred to by the number given to each in Table IT. b See Chapter 2 for an 
explanation of each dimension. c See Kohlberg (1963a) plus explanation in the text. d Tnle of 
cognitive aspects only. e True of' affective aspects only. f + here means that cognitive and 
affective stim.l1i elicited different levels of response maturity. g Girls more mature than boys. 
til 
~ 
H 
&:Q 
<4 
H 
p:; 
<4 
:> 
Table VI Findinr';s of' 'l\venty Studies by Dimension end Variable 
The Non-Developrr~ntal Dimensions a 
DIMENSIONS 
duty is reprocity in Punishment by individual and favouritism in 
obedience rights authority v. collective distribution of b 
to retaliation responsibili ty rewards and Totals 
authority punishments 
Age 1+;8 1+i5 2+;8,16 1+;15 
1P;16 1P;13 1P;13 17 
le;8 
-
IQ 29;6,16 19;13 Ie; 15 11 
.Adult 
Constraint 2-i 6 ,16 1--~6 , 1-i 15 7 
c Social 1+ ;16 
c Class le-6 le;13 1+ ;16 1e;15 6 , 
situat- 2+;6,8 1+;13 1+;13 5 i·:>nal 
dff'fer-
ences 
nation-
ality 1+;16 1+;16 4-
cognitive 
& af'fect-
i ive diff- 3 
, erences 
-
religion 1+;16 3 
sex 2e ; 5~13 3 
3'~er grouJ: s.-1+·16 1+-16 2 
-. 
Totals 
KEY! 
3 3 3 1 0 
-
• t:hi l':. V s\"'; S\h 1 A wrmlrt S\!': c::; ~ +. p.hi 1 rt' A rtl'nrp.lnnm 4---- - -~ng u.L..&...Io..~ ~~.~""'V'.&."'J 
retard. child's development along tlns dimension; e no effect fOLmd; 0/ relatior.sr.ip was 
cw:vilinear (IrlE1de at about 10 years) a See Chapter 2 for an explanation of each dimension 
b These totals are sUIIIll8X1zed across both developmental and non-developmental dimensions 
c Workw£ class chi ldre?Li1iJj bett.er.Jban...mi&il.P----CJ~_"-'CO'-L!hi.1.d.l"JQn.._ 
• 
..... 
..... 
\.n 
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influences other intermediary factors such as intelligence, 
parental control of the child and peer group participation. 13 
(e) Situational differences 
Moral judgement and behaviour are not unvarying concepts. 
Similar situations may evoke different responses at different 
times. This problem is very important since it throws into 
doubt the lay conception of morality as a general code of 
conduct and substitutes seemingly hedonistic oonsiderations 
of risk and profit. This problem reflects on Piaget's theory 
of moral development; different test situations may effect 
the apparent maturity of a child's response. 
Hartshorne and l-1ay (1928-30) noted the ways in which 
variations in the particular situations facing the child 
affected his behaviour; under conditions where they were 
tempted to lie, cheat and steal, the children behaved 
according to specific situational cues (for example, the 
chances of detection) rather than acting in any consistent 
manner which could be taken as an indication of strength 
of conscience. 
This same effect has been suggested of Piaget's work -
it may be easier to respond in a mature fashion to some 
test situations than to others. This tendency has been 
suggested in five separate studies of the dimensions of 
objective responsibility, immanent justice, duty defined 
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as obedience to authority, reciprocity in the&finition 
of rights and punishment by authority v. retaliation. It 
applies equally to developmental and non-developmental 
dimensions. 
A special aspect of the situational variations has 
been noted by MacRae (1954) and Boehm (1962b); this aspect 
concerns the cognitive and affective components of the 
test situations in studies of moral development. It is 
argued that the child may be able to identify better with 
some situations than others, and that these affective com-
ponents influence the maturity of his response in a 
different fashion to the cognitive aspects which only 
require knowledge of right and wrong. For the affective 
aspects, the child is much more emotionally involved, 
giving evidence of his own anxieties and concern for the 
opinion of others. It is suggested that middle clas8 
children (who have the intellectual advantages noted 
previously) advance more quickly with regard to the 
cognitive aspects of moral development while working 
class children (who ehjoy more prolonged peer group 
interaction) do better in relation to the affective as-
pects (see Boehm, 1962b; MacRae, 1954). 
Porteous and Johnson (1965) attempted a similar 
distinction but could not separate the maturity of 
l~ 
responses to the cognitive and affective aspects of moral 
judgement at a significant level. This disagreement with 
the findings of Boehm and MacRae may be partly explained 
by the different techniques which Porteous and Johnson 
used to assess affectivity; whereas the first two studies 
looked for cognitive and affective aspects within Piaget's 
situations Porteous and Johnson used a separate projective 
test for the affective components and regarded Piaget's 
tests as purely cognitive. 
(f) Nationality, religion and sex 
The final three variables may be dealt with together 
since their investigation has been very limited and no 
clear patterning across the dimensions is as yet discern-
able. 
To the extent that nationality differences in the 
child's rate of moral development can be seen, they tend 
to reflect the relative opportunities for peer group 
relationships and freedom from adult constraint. Boehm 
(1957) attributed the greater maturity of American pre-
school children compared with Swiss children to the earlier 
American peer group involvement; Liu (1950) proposed that 
the closeness of the Chinese-American family is a favourable 
factor in the acceleration of the moral development of the 
American born Chinese children when compared with native 
born American children. 
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Explicit training appears to be an important factor in the 
recognition of intentions in behaviour. This aspect is 
emphasized in the Catholic and Jewish religions (Boehm, 
1962a & b, 1963a) as well as in Confucianism (Liu, 1950). 
Religious participation in general does not, however, 
correlate with more mature moral judgement (see, for example, 
Bull, 1969) or with better behaviour (Hartshorne and May, 
1928-30). 
There is some limited evidence that girls mature more 
early than boys in their moral jUdgements. Bull (1969) 
noted that the 8irls in his sample showed a spurt in moral 
development some two years before the boys, although this 
finding must be modified in view of the higher intelligence 
of the girls at each age level which would give them an 
advantage in any case. Porteous and Johnson (1965) also 
reported the greater maturity of girls' responses. This 
might be partly explained by the quicker biological matur-
ation of girls, although the sex factor does not seem to 
have been an important variable in the several other 
validation studies which have used mixed-sex samples. 
(g) Summary 
In the discussion above of the results of the vali-
dation studies of Piaget's theory of moral development we 
noted the several variables whose operation it has been 
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demonstrated contributes to the child's slower or faster 
development. 
On the basis of the consistency of age trends in 
maturity of moral judgement, a primary distinction was 
made between the six developmental and the five non-
developmental dimensions of Piaget's scheme. Several of 
the variables discussed later showed consistent re-
lationships to the developmental cimensions although 
there was much disagreement in the data relating to the 
non-developmental dimensions. 
The two most immediately apparent differences between 
the developmental and the non-developmental dimensions are 
the number of replication studies for each and the con-
sistency of the findings relating to each (see Tables V 
and IV). There have been far more studies of the develop-
mental dimensions (twenty-nine compared with ten for the 
non-developmental dimensions) and there is much more 
agreement about which factors influence performance in 
tests in the developmental dimensions and what these 
effects are. 
In the overwhelmin~ majority of studies which attempted 
the correlations, better performance on all the develop-
mental dimensions related positively with increasing age, 
higher intelligence and middle class background; other 
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important considerations were situational variations, nationality 
and sex of the respondents and religious teaching of the bases 
of moral decisions. 
Despite the fact that it holds such an important position 
in Piaget's theoretical approach to moral development, the 
general area of the child's social relationships has been 
the subject of very little empirical investigation. Of the 
seven stUdies reported as considering the variables of adult 
constraint (see Table IV) only two (MacRae 1954; Johnson 1962a) 
attempt to assess parental attitudes; the others suggest that 
freedom from adult constraint is likely to be a partial ex-
planation for the faster moral development they noted in some 
children, although this seems to be a hypothetical assumption 
derived directly from Piaget's discussion of heteronomy and 
autonomy. 
MacRae (1954) was unable to establish any correlation 
between the strictness of parental control over the child 
and his performance on Piaget's tests along the dimension of 
objective responsibility; Johnson (1962a) was similarly 
unable to correlate parental attitudes with the child's per-
formance along this dimension but he was able to do this for 
immanent justice and communicable responsibility. The im-
portance of the adult-child relationship in Piaget's 
theoretical scheme, plus the fact that the area had received 
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little empirical attention, suggested the need for further 
work on the possible correlation of parental attitudes and 
moral development; the data reported later on (in Chapter 
7) goes some way towards meeting this need. 
Despite the smaller number of studies of the non-
developmental dimensions, Table VI presents a much more 
confused picture than that shown for the developmental 
dimensions. The only consistent findings of any real 
importance are that of a positive correlation between 
adult constraint and retarded development, and the in-
dication of the effects of situational differences on 
the maturity of the child's response; these data support 
the findings for these variables with the developmental 
dimensions. 
Other consistent correlations may be noted for the 
non-developmental dimensions in relation to the minor 
variables of nationality, religion and peer group par-
ticipation. Perhaps the major surprises of Table VI 
appear in the disagreement over age trends and in the lack 
of correlation of intelligence or social class with per-
formance on most dimensions. 
3. The Mechanism Of Moral Development 
In the discussion of the replication work deriving 
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from Piaget's study of moral development, we noted that 
several of the moral dimensions outlined by Piaget showed 
age trends which allowed them to be called developmental 
in the strict sense of the term. In other words, for 
these dimensions at least, the separate stages proposed 
by Piaget followed one another in a fi%ed order and 
responses to test items relating to these dimensions 
became progressively more mature with age. 
In this way the validity of the content of Piaget's 
theory of moral development was demonstrated. A separate 
problem, and one which has been given far less attention, 
concerns the mechanism of development from stage to stage. 
What is the process of moral development? What factors 
bring about the maturation of moral judgements? Why does 
the child gradually alter the premises of his moral 
reasoning? These are the sorts of questions involved 
in the consideration of this second major prob1em deriving 
from Piaget's theory, and the following section describes 
three attempts which have been made to supply some of the 
answers. 
It is only fair to point out that although Piaget 
did not directly discuss the problem of the mechanics of 
moral development he has expounded at length a theory of 
intellectual development which contains an indication of 
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the process by which the higher mental structures evolve. 
It has been suggested that the process of moral development 
is the same as the process of intellectual development as 
described by Piagetj Kohlberg has proposed that moral 
development occurs through a mechanism of cognitive conflict 
by which the child must reorganize his beliefs to account 
for some newly recognized feature. This process is identical 
with what, in the cognitive field, Piaget has termed 
e quilibra tion. 
Now there are several ways in which a disequilibrium 
can be induced to which the child must adjust and so develop. 
The major variation among the studies discussed below 
concerns the source of the disequilibrium or conflict. Two 
of the studies are concerned directly with Piaget's scheme 
of moral development; the third is more directly relevant 
to Kohlberg's work but it is included here since the 
meehanism of change proposed is identical to that favoured 
by Piaget. 
In broad outline, each of the three studies adopts a 
very silliilar approach. The first step is the assessment 
of the level of moral maturity of individual children in 
a sample; this assessment involves the placing of the child 
14 
at one particular stage of development. For the next 
step, attempts are made to alter the level of the child's 
12.5 
thought through various training programmes; it is in this 
area that the studies differ most, each using a different 
reinforcement in its attempt to influence the child. The 
final step involves the retesting of the children to see 
what effects the training programme has had; again, slight 
differences are introduced here in the varying time span 
over which the children are posttested after the conditioning 
experiments. 
f~he three studies used different training programmes in 
an effort to condition the child to alter his initial res-
ponses. The first tried to assess the importance of an 
adult model, the second that of discussion and prizes as 
a reinforcement and the third that of peer group opinion. 
The effect of all three conditioning attempts was to induce 
a conflict in the child's mind between what he believed 
and what some other person now suggested. The experiments 
indicate some techniques which might usefully be applied 
in a programme of moral education or the acceleration of 
moral development. 
(a) Adult model and verbal reinforcement 
Bandura and McDonald (1967) carried out the first in-
vestigation of the mechanism of moral development. They 
designed their experiment to show that. moral judgement 
responses were less age specific than Piaget contended, 
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and that the child's moral orientation could be altered by 
the manipulation of rewards and by the provision of appro-
priate models after whom the child could fashion his 
responses. 
Their investigation used situations relating to a 
single dimension of Piaget's work - objective responsibility. 
This dimension has been discussed at leng~h (see Chapter 2) 
but briefly Piaget demonstrated that younger children tended 
to judge the seriousness of a misdemeanour by the amount of 
damage caused - they based their judgement on the con-
sequences of the action. Older children were able to modify 
this type of judgement by taking into account the intentions 
of the actor. The mode of judgement of the younger children 
was termed objective by Piaget, and that of the older 
children was termed subjective. 
Bandura and McDonald used a total of 42 test items, 6 
of which were taken directly from Piaget (1932) while the 
rest were specially constructed. Children were assessed as 
objective or subjective in their judgements of Piaget's 6 
items as a pretest; for the experimental work, groups of 
children were chosen whose responses were consistently 
objective or subjective, those with mixed responses being 
ignored. In this way, 36 children assessed as objective 
and 48 assessed as subjective in their moral judgements 
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were picked from a total sample of 165 (78 boys and 87 girls 
aged 5 to 11 years). Boys and girls were equally represented 
in this sub-sample as were younger and older children, 
The aim of the experiment was to alter the maturity 
of response of each group of children such that those 
showing objective judgements would later show subjective 
judgements and vice versa. The training sessions used to, 
realize this objective involved the presentation of a 
further 24 test items; these were administered under 
different conditions to three separate sub-groups of 
children (with 12 boys and 16 girls in each) in the following 
way. 
For the first condition, the child was questioned in the 
presence of a colleague of the investigator; the child and 
the colleague were each given.twelve test items which were 
presented alternately, beginning with the child. The 
colleague always responded on a level of maturity opposite 
to the child's original mode of thoueht and it was expected 
that the presence of this model would influence the child 
to alter his level of judgement. As the model responded 
he was rewarded by the investigator who said 'That's fine', 
'Very good' etc.; this verbal reinforcement was similarly 
applied whenever the child adopted the model's mode of 
thought i.e. altered his own original mode. This ex-
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perimental condition was termed model plus reinforcement by 
Bandura and McDonald. 
The conditioning for the second group was similar to 
that for the first except that the child was not praised for 
adopting the model's mode of thought. Again, twelve items 
were administered to child and model alternatively and again 
the model was praised for an answer phrased on the level of 
moral judgement opposite to the child's. The child was 
questioned and his responses noted without comment from the 
investigator. This condition was termed model only. 
For the third experimental group, no model was present; 
the child answered all twenty-four test items. However, 
the investigator praised any response opposite to the child's 
original mode of jUdgement. This condition was termed 
reinforcement only. 
Immediately after his conditioning experiment, each child 
was given a posttest comprising the twelve remaining test 
items; the child's responses to this posttest allowed a check 
on the success of each condition in altering his mode of thought. 
Bandura and McDonald found that the first two experimental 
conditions were more successful than the third'in securing a 
change in the child's mode of thought; they could not distinguish 
between the first two conditions at all. In other words, 
reinforcement alone was the least successful of all three 
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conditions used. This fact suggests that the presence of 
the model was the most important influence even in the first 
condition where both reinforcement and the model were used. 
A humber of weaknesses of this experiment may be 
mentioned. Bandura and HcDonald do not make any distinction 
between the groups of children who were originally objective 
or subjective in their moral judgements; that is, they imply 
that their efforts were as successful in accelerating the 
child's development (from judgements based on consequences 
to those based on intentions) as they were in producing a 
regression in children already judging by intentions. This 
point is taken up later in the discussion of the final study 
in this section. 
A problem which will be emphasized during the discussion 
of the next two studies is that of the durability of ex-
perimentally induced modes of thought - is the child likely 
over a period of time to revert to his original level of 
judgement? This is an important consideratioll if any ex-
tension from these types of experiment is attempted into 
a programme of moral education or acceleration of moral 
development; it is vital that the most effective influences 
be isolated and applied. It is possible for the child to 
recite parrot-fashion, responses which are rewarded whether 
or not he really understands the reasoning behind the response. 
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This problem has been tackled in the field of intellectual 
development by Smedslund (see especially 1961c) but his 
warnings have implications for moral development as well. 
Smedslund had induced conservation of weight in children who 
had previously demonstrated a lack of conservation.l6 In a 
later attempt at extinction of the concept, Smedslund noticed 
that it was much easier to achieve this in children with whom 
conservation had been induced than in those who had achieved 
conservation naturally; the first group were apparently only 
making rote responses which were easily reversed in appropriate 
circumstances. 
Now, if these findings are adapted into the field of moral 
development, it seems possible that any changes induced by 
Bandura and McDonald Gould be reversed if the necessary training 
programme were adopted; it is also possible that the child might 
revert to his original mode of thought naturally when the effects 
of the conditioning experiments had been forgotten. Unfor-
tunately, Bandura and McDonald give no analysis of responses over 
a period of time which would allow any pattern of reversion to 
appear. 
A final weakness of this experiment is that Bandura and 
McDonald use test items along a single moral dimension -
objective responsibility. It is by no means certain that their 
experimental conditioning would be successful if applied to 
other dimensions. 
~l 
(b) Discussion and moral content 
Crowley (1968) attempted a refinement of the work of 
Bandura and McDonald; he used a more intensive programme' 
of training with his groups, gave a stronger reinforcement 
(poker chips exchangeable for prizes instead of mere praise) 
and also assessed the pattern of responses over an eighteen 
day period after the training sessions. 
Again, Crowley restricted his test items to situations 
. 
based in Piaget's dimension of objective responsibility, but 
he concerned himself only with accelerating children assessed 
as objective in their moral judgements to a level taking 
account of intentions. 
For the training sessions Crowley devised what he termed 
'simple' situations; he regarded Piaget's original situations 
as' complex' since they involved the manipulation of two 
dimensions - intentions and consequences. The test situations 
involved the comparison of actions in a pair of stories; 
Crowley's situations held constant the consequences of the 
actions in each pair of situations and the child had to base 
his response on the intentions or else just guess at an 
answer. l7 
Crowley used four separate experimental groups plus a 
control group; his rather- complicated division of experi-
mental conditions needs some explanation. The four conditions 
l3~ 
can be considered in terms of a 2 x 2 table which has as 
one dimension the moral or non-moral content of the stories 
and as the other the reinforcement of responses by labelling 
or byJabelling plus discussion (see Figure 2); these 
dimensions need further clarification. 
Labelling 
Labelling 
plus 
Discussion 
Content 
Moral Non-moral 
Figure 2 The Four Experimental Conditions of Crowley's Study 
Crowley devised ninety pairs of test situations of 
which forty-five were moral in content (similar to those 
which typify Piaget's work except that, as mentioned 
previously, the consequences in each pair were held constant); 
the other forty-five pairs were non-moral in content in-
volving a judgement of skill in hitting a target deliber-
ately or by accident, say. The children were asked of the 
moral situations 'Who was the naughtier?' and of the non-
moral 'Who was the better shot?'. 
The first condition along the reinforcement dimension 
involved the mere labelling by the investigator of the 
child's answer as right or wrong, the child was given a 
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poker chip for each correct answer. For the second reinforcement, 
the investigator indicated whether a response was right or wrong 
and awarded a chip for correct responses; however, he also 
entered into a discussion of each answer with the child so that 
the child would be aware of the reasoning behind correct and 
incorrect answers. 
Crowley's training programme involved three separate 
sessions with each child using fifteen different situations 
each time (a total of forty-five situations in all for each 
child). A twelve item posttest was administered eighteen 
or nineteen days after the final training session. 
Generally. Crowley's results were superficially im-
pressive. On the postteat, the groups trained on non-moral 
situations did better than the control group (significant 
at the 0.05 level) while those trained on moral situations 
were even more successful than this. Comparisons of 
reinforcements revealed that there were no significant 
differences between the labelling and the labelling plus 
discussion conditions. 
It appears then that mere reinforcement of acceleratory 
tendencies, with or without discussion of the principles 
involved, is successful in leading the child to adopt a more 
mature mode of thought. Training in the moral situations led 
to a greater maturity in the (moral) posttest sttuations 
than did training in the non-moral situations; the training 
in the moral situations is perhaps more easily transferred 
to similar situations. 
On the basis of these results, Crowley wondered why 
the shift from consequence- to intention-based judgements 
takes so long in the Piagetian scheme. In answer, he 
pointed to the factor noted previously deriving from 
Smedslund's work on the problem of conservation; Smedslund 
(196lc) showed that conservation of weight induced by 
training can often be extinguished by an opposite rein-
forcement schedule. Only children who support conservation 
in the face of (apparently) opposing evidence had attained 
the concept proper; the other children were making rote 
responses which were easily reversed in appropr.iate cir-
cumstances. 
Similarly, Crowley implied in his own work that some 
children who have apparently been accelerated to operate 
on a level considering intentions in judgements might 
easily be trained to regress to a consequence-oriented 
mode of judgement (c.!. Bandura and McDonald, 1963). 
Crowley did not believe that the change in response he 
was able to elicit represented a true conceptual change; 
rather, it was a situational response pattern without 
any underlying generalized rationale. In support of this 
argument Crowley observed that children rarely gave the 
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principles underlying their choice spontaneously, that 
discussion of the principle was no more effective than mere 
labelling and that training on non-moral situations was 
not generalized to moral situations. This particularization 
(as opposed to generalization) is one aspect of Piaget's 
general cognitive theory which he calls centration (see 
Chapter 1). Crowley concluded that centration appears to 
be a major factor in moral judgements.19 
(c) Peer group pressures 
While Crowley was concerned with advancing the child 
through the stages of moral development, Lefurgy and Woloshin 
(1969) approached Bandura and McDonald (1963) more closely 
in that they attempted to reinforce the opposite modes of 
thought of both mature and immature children. Lefurgy and 
Woloshin used test situations from Kohlberg'a work rather 
than Piaget's but the study has relevance since the process 
of change is the same for both authors (cognitive disequil-
ibrium for Piaget, cognitive conflict for Kohlberg). 
Turiel (1966; Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) 
demonstrated that opinion change is brought about by a 
complex interaction between the child's present mode of 
thought and the highest level of moral logic which he can 
comprehend; Turiel showed that children could be more 
easily influenced to adopt a level of thought directly 
136 
above their own than they could to adopt yet higher levels 
or the level immediately below their own. LeFurgy and 
Woloshin were trying to see the long term patterns which 
experimentally induced regression or advancement of this 
20 
sort might show. 
LeFurgy and Woloshin's experimental procedure was in 
five phases over an average period of 100 days. First 
there was a pretest of ten items (from a battery of thirty-
five tests) on the basis of which subjects were assigned 
to one of two groups, above and below the population mean 
on a relativistic/realistic scale. Kohlberg's situations 
typically oppose two sets of moral orientation - the one 
relating to some commonly held norm or rule of behaviour 
and the other involving considerations which ,would affect 
only the individual concerned. For example, a man 'faces 
the dilemma of returning some money he has found or else 
using it to finance an operation for his wife; in another 
dilemma a stUdent ,considers seeking illegal help with his 
work to avoid being failed by an unfair teacher. In 
Lefurgy and Woloshin's study, children were termed realistic 
if they judged consistently in favour ,of the rule; the more 
mature form of judgement is the relativistic one where the 
need for strict adherence to the rule is modified in terms 
of individual extenuating circumstances. 
t. 
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The next day, the experimental exposure was started; 
subjects (27 boys, 26 girls aged 13-14 years) were brought 
to the laboratory in sets of six and assigned to a six unit 
console with headphones. Each was told that he was to take 
part in some more tests but that he would also hear the 
opinions of the other five people; in fact, what each heard 
were pretaped responses opposite to his original mode of 
thought. This procedure was maintained for twenty test 
situations which were not used subsequently; any effects 
of this exposure to peer group opinion had therefore to 
be generalized to the new test situations. Control groups 
heard the twenty items but were not exposed to other 
opinions. 
Immediately after this training session the subjects 
were given a ten item test programme to which they responded 
and, a week later, another ten item programme was administered. 
The last phase of the experiment was a repeat of the ten item 
pretest. and this was given on the first occasion that 
individual subjects returned to the laboratory during the 
next few months (presumably for other experi.ents). The 
average duration between pretest and final issue was 100 days. 
Results showed first that adolescent peer group pressures 
had a very strong influence on the individual subjects. Both 
sexes responded to opinions opposed to their own by a dramatic 
shift in the direction of the commonly held view. The 
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patterns through time were different for the originally 
realistic and relativistic groups, however, and tended to 
support previous views (Smedslund, 1961c; Turiel, 1966) 
that children are more susceptible to acceleratory than 
to retrogressive elements; the long term influence was 
more marked in the case of the group of realistic children 
who were advanced by experimental exposure. 
LeFurgy and Woloshin suggested that disequilibrium 
induced by peer group pressures in a developmentally ad-
vanced direction is quite easily resolved by accommodation 
in this direction. The results for the experimentally 
regressed children were less permanent, however; certainly, 
disequilibrium induced by peer group pressures in a 
developmentally retarded direction had significant short 
term effects but accommodation to this idea (which had, of 
course, been previously discarded) was gradually dissipated 
over the next 100 days. The fact that return to normal was 
only gradual suggested that there was some residual effect 
of exposure. 
Again, the question of concept attainment must be raised. 
Are the exhibited responses merely learned and repeated in 
rote fashion, or do they represent an underlying conceptual 
change? The gradual return of the regressed subjects to a 
relativistic mode of thought suggests that this level is in 
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fact their real conceptual level, and they tend to revert 
towards this level when peer group pressures are relieved 
or forgotten. Presumably those who reverted to their 
former level most quickly had the stronger, more stable 
concepts originally. The real conceptual level of the 
experimentally advanced group 1s more difficult to 
ascertain; this study suggests that they would immediately 
revert to their former level if exposed to appropriate 
peer group opinion. The problem is, would they later 
return to the more advanced level as they should if this 
level has been attained on a conceptual rather than a 
purely mechanical basis during the first conditioning? 
This is surely the important criterion for any training 
programme designed to have long term beneficial effects; 
it is crucial that the concept be understood rather than 
a parrot-like repetition being achieved. Some support 
for the view that the higher level concept is attained is 
provided in the generalization from the twenty training 
sets to the ten posttest situations; the lessons learned 
in the training sessions were tranferred to the new 
situations. Attempted extinction of the concept should 
separate the truly relativistic subjects from the rote 
repeaters (c.l. Smedslund,lg61c). 
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(d) Equilibration as a process in moral development 
We have noted the several limitations of the three 
attempts to clarify the problem of the mechanism of moral 
development. The two studies which used test situations 
most similar to those of Piaget (Bandura and McDonald, 
1963; Crowley, 1968) considered in effect only the dimension 
of objective responsibility; similar treatment of the other 
dimensions of Piaget's scheme (especially the five other 
developmental dimensions) would be useful. The most 
ambitious of the three experiments (LeFurgy and Woloshin, 
1969) ased test situations taken from Kohlberg's work2l 
but was included here since the mechanism of development 
proposed is identical to that which Piaget calls equilibration. 
A traditional S-R approach to development is in-
sufficient to account for all the findings reported above; 
superficially, it seems possible to argue that changes in 
response were induced through the presentation of some 
reward (praise, a poker chip or conformity with peer group 
standards) and that this explains the shift of opinion seen 
in each case. However, closer examination reveals that the 
long term effects of the conditioning varies with the 
direction of the change in level of thought induced. Children 
who were conditioned to operate on a level less mature than 
their real level reverted to their original mode of thought 
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more quickly than did children who were conditioned to 
operate on a more advanced level (LeFurgy and Woloshin, 
1969). Tbis suggests the presence of something more 
permanent and less specific than the normal S-R paradigm 
implies; responses were generalized from the training 
conditions to the posttest situations and so were not 
solely dependent on the rewards offered in training. 
Also, the greater difficulty experienced in maintaining 
long term regression suggests a further~akness of S-R 
theory in this context. 
Equilibration theory can provide adequate answers 
to these problems. It seems that the child's exposure 
to more mature opinions is sufficient to induce a change 
in his own views. According to equilibration theory the 
child's intellectual system cannot tolerate inconsistencies 
and must reorganize previously held beliefs in order to 
come to terms with an unfamiliar situation. What the 
experimental conditioning achieves is the child's forced 
awarenese of a more mature point of view; this awareness 
would appear more gradually naturally but the process is 
the same in any case. 
The child settles down more easily following a 
reorganization in the direction of greater maturity than 
he does if his judgements are regressed experimentally; 
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this is shown by the long term patterns for accelerated and 
regressed children where the latter group revert to their 
original level more readily than do the former (LeFurgy and 
WoloshiD, 1969). The more mature modes of thought are 
permanent acquisitions; since the child apparently reverts 
to his original higher level more quickly it seems reasonable 
to suggest that the conditioning was not entirely successful, 
that disequilibrium was produced between the child's real, 
more mature level of thought and that suggested in the 
experiment, and finally, that the child tends to reorganize 
towards this more mature level soon after the training 
programme is discontinued. 
The operation of equilibration in this manner suggests 
a way to check on the proper acquisition of the higher level 
concepts which it might be the aim of a programme of moral 
education to induce; this attainment could be compared with 
rote learning responses in the following way. Any higher 
level concept which has been properly understood and to 
which the child has reorganized his beliefs is more difficult 
to extinguish than is a response induced merely by rewards. 
If the child has not fully adjusted to the higher level 
operation his opinion can be easily altered; if he has made 
this adjustment he is likely to argue against suggestions 
contrary to his beliefs. 
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This kind of process is suggested in the sphere of cognitive 
development by the work of Smedslund on experimentally induced 
and extinguished conservation of weight22 and in the field of 
moral development by the findings of LeFurgy and Woloshin (1969) 
in particular. Much work remains to be done in this area of 
accelerating moral development, however, and there seems a much 
greater willingness to adapt the findings of studies of moral 
development into programmes of moral education. 23 
The experiments reported above suggest another link between 
Piaget's theories of moral and c~gnitive development. We have 
already noticed that it is around the age of eight years of age 
that important changes take place in the child's cognitive and 
moral ordering of his world; these changes were attributed to the 
decline of egocentric thought. Now, we suggest that the process 
of development in both areas is the same, namely one of equili-
bration. In this way the two most important features of Piaget's 
scheme of cognitive development (equilibration and the factors 
contributing to the decline of egocentric thought) appear to have 
a critical part to play in moral development as well. 
144 
CHAPTER 4 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF NORAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to consider the 
contributions of three further approaches to the problem 
of moral development. These theories derive from the 
work of Koh1berg, who has developed a cognitive scheme 
of morality more extensive than that of Piaget, from the 
psychoanalytic work of Freud, and from the findings of 
the learning theorists whose experimental work has 
involved animals rather than children. 
These three will be contrasted with Piaget's theory 
of moral development which was discussed at length in 
the two previous chapters. This comparison is vital 
since no single theory is sufficient to give a complete 
explanation of moral development; each emphasizes a 
1 
separate area of the problem and concentration on any 
one at the expense of the others must provide a dis-
torted picture. 
The comparison of each theory with that of Piaget 
is complicated somewhat since each stands in contrast to 
separate parts of Piaget's scheme. Thus Kohlbergts is a 
stage-dependent theory of moral development much more 
extensive than Piaget's and although the age/stage 
correlations proposed by Kohlberg differ from those of 
Piaget both authors concentrate on the cognitive aspects 
of conscience and bot~ invoke a mechanism of equilibration 
as an explanation of the process of change and development. 
Psychoanalytic theory allows a comparison of both the 
content of the stages outlined by Freud and the mechanism 
of change between stages. 
In contrast to the theories of Piaget, Kohlberg and 
Freud which were developed specifically to explain the 
growth of moral standards, the approach of the learning 
theorists has been adapted to the study of morality from 
more obvious problem-solving experiments. The only 
issue here is the mechanism of development since no stages 
of moral growth have been proposed by any learning-theorist. 
In order to avoid duplication the reader is referred 
to Tables II and III in Chapter 2 where Piaget's theory of 
moral development is presented in outline for each of the 
eleven dimensions he considered. In a general way it may 
be noted that most of the changes to what Piaget considered 
more mature modes of thought occur at about eight years of 
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age. It will also be remembered from the description of 
Piaget's general theory of cognitive development that it 
is at about this age that egocentric thought begins to 
decline most rapidly allowing the development of concrete 
operational thought. This is not mere coincidence for it 
is the decline ot egocentric thought (especially the young 
child's tendency to centre on individual aspects of a 
situation) which allows a consideration of motives as well. 
as consequences in any moral dilemma. 
The decline of egocentric thought also apparently 
allows the child a more accurate perspective on adult 
commands and requests. The child gradually realizes that 
adult opinions have no specially sacred quality and his 
early regard for adults as omnipotent rule and decision 
makers declines as his own thought becomes increasingly 
autonomous. 
It is the child's willingness and ability to take an 
independent view of a situation which provides part of 
Piaget's solution to the problem ot moral development. 
The other important part of the developmental process 
dertv,es from the inability of the child' ssystem ot thought 
to tolerate any inconsistencies or imbalance.. Any dis-
equilibrium (to use Piacet's terminolocy) triggers off a 
series of compensations and rationalizations by which the 
• 
inconsistencies are reconciled and a more accurate model 
of the real life situation is developed. 
These are the main arguments of Piaget's theory of 
moral development which should be borne in mind during the 
discussion of the theories of Koh1berg, Freud and the 
learning theorists which follows. 
2. Koh1bergts Theory Of Moral Development 
Like Piaget and Freud, Koh1berg proposes a developmental 
scheme of moral development; he believes that there are sis 
qualitatively different stages in. the process of moral 
development and these are discussed below. However, in 
contrast to these other two theorists (and also learning 
theory) Koh1berg ts scheme extends over a much longer age 
span. He says that the other theories assume that the basic 
characteristics of adult conscience are developed in early 
childhood; this assumption is necessary if morality is to 
be seen as survivals of infant experiences as is implied 
by all three theories (Koh1berg, 1963a, p. 321). Koh1berg 
believes that conscience proper (the internalization of 
standards as opposed to guidance by sanctions) does not 
appear until quite late, certainly not before late 
adolescence. These important age variations appear as a 
result of Koh1berg's different interpretation of the 
148 
mechanism of the moral development process which is brought 
out later on. 
(a) The scheme 
Kohlberg bases his six part typology of moral development 
on work carried out with 72 boys aged 10, 13 and 16 years; 
half his sample were from lower to lower-middle class and 
half from upper-middle class backgrounds. The basic data 
for Kohlberg's study came from a two-hour taped interview 
with each boy discussing nine hypothetical moral dilemmas. 
The technique has also been used by Kohlberg with two dozen 
16 year old delinquents, with the same number of 6 year 
olds and a group of fifty 13 year old boys and girls 
(Kohlberg, 1963b, p. 12); other workers have applied 
Kohlberg's techniques in America, Taiwan, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Mexico and among the Mayan Indians (Kohlberg, 1967, p. 170), 
so there is considerable data available and the trends which 
Kohlberg proposed have been validated. 2 
Kohlberg isolated thirty separate aspects of morality 
from the interviews he taped (1963b, p. 14) although more 
recently he has reduced this number to twenty-five (Kohlberg, 
1967, p. 170 and Table 2 pp. 172-73). These aspects form 
the basis ot Kohlberg's analysis and he claims that any 
statement can be assigned to one ot these aspects which are 
grouped into seven broader Codes; two of these Code. are 
detailed below along with a brief outline of the other five. 3 
Code I relates to the locus of value and comprises six 
aspects of the mode of attributing value to acts, persons 
or events or of assessing the value consequences of a 
situation. The aspects of this first Code are the consider-
ation of motives in judging action, the consideration of 
consequences in judging actions, the subjectivity v. the 
objectivity of the values assessed, the relation of 
obligation to wish, identification with the actor or the 
victim in judging action, and the status of the actor or 
4 
victim as changing the moral worth of the situation. 
Code II in Kohlberg's scheme relates to the subject's 
choice of mechanism for resolving or denying the awareness 
of conflicts; the three aspects of this Code are the 
limitation of the actor's responsibility by shifting re-
sponsibility to others, a reliance on discussion and 
compromise and a distortion of the situation so that 
conforming behaviour is always seen as being in the best 
interests of all concerned.5 
In similar fashion, Kohlberg outlines a further sixteen 
aspects of morality in the five more general Codes of 
sanctions and motives, rule conceptualization, the definition 
of rights and authority, positive justice (which relies on 
reciprocity and equality) and, finally, punitive justice. 
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Now, in addition to its placement in one of Kohlberg's 
twenty-five aspects of morality, the individual statements 
received were given an estimate of maturity along a six-point 
scale. This brings us on to the developmental side of 
Kohlberg's scheme, the areas discussed previously being more 
descriptive and analytically useful. The six stages of moral 
development are grouped in pairs on three moral levels (after 
McDougall, 1908) in the following manner (see Kohlberg, 1963b, 
pp. 13-14 & 1967, p. 171): 
Level I Pre-Moral Level: moral value resides in events, 
bad acts or in needs rather than in persons and standards. 
This level corresponds with McDougall's stage in which 
instinctual behaviour is modified by rewards and 
punishments. 
stage I Punishment and obedience orientation - this 
stage is typified by the child's submission to a more 
powerful authority and a desire to avoid punishment. 
It is also typified by reliance on objective re-
sponsibility (judgement in terms of consequences 
rather than intentions). 
stage 2 Naive instrumental hedonism - this stage is 
typified by the beliet that right action is that 
which satisfies the self's needs and, occasionally 
and incidentally, those of other people. There 
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occurs the slow development of reciprocity and 
relativism of value (derived from Piaget's under-
lying dimension of declining egocentricity). This 
stage represents some internalization of the 
attitudes of Stage 1 such that rewards and punish-
ments are anticipated and behaviour is altered 
accordingly. 
Level II Morality Of Conventional Role Conformity: moral 
value resides in the performance of roles recognized 
by the community as good or right and in the main-
tenance of conventional order and the expectations 
of other people. In McDougall's scheme this 
corresponds with the stage in which social control 
is achieved through the anticipation of blame or 
praise; these verbal controls replace the physical 
sanctions of the previous Level. Both stages in this 
level imply the child's ability to assume the role of 
another person - in other words, they are dependent 
on role-taking capacities. 
Stage 3 Good-boy orientation - this stage is typified 
by an orientation to helping and pleasing other people 
and a conformity to stereotypes of good behaviour. 
Intentions, rather than consequences,' now become im-
portant in the judgement of right and wrong. 
, 
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stage 4 Authority maintainin~ morality - this stage is 
typified by an orientation to duty' defined in terms of 
respect for authority and the social order independent 
of the personality considerations which typify Stage 3; 
the organized social order is defined in terms of rights, 
duties and rules. 
Level III Morality Of Self-Accepted Principles: moral value 
resides in conformity to shared standards, rights or 
duties. Attempts are made to achieve autonomous de-
cisions with regard for rules and the law where possible 
but transcending these considerations in favour of more 
6 general principles or moral ideals in many cases. In 
McDougall's scheme this Level represents the stage in 
which behaviour is regulated by ideals which seem right 
regardless of the praise and blame of the immediate 
environment. 
stage 5 Contractual legalistic orientation - this stage 
is typified by the recognition of the arbitrary nature 
of laws and rules although duty is defined in terms of 
contract, avoidance of the violation of the rights of 
others and concern for the welfare of the majority. 
There is heavy reliance on the law for the definition 
of right and wrong although the possibility is re-
cognized that legal and individual or legal.and societal 
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concerns may conflict. The legal rules are seen as 
having an arbitrary, though mutually agreed, basis 
in contrast to the earlier (Stage 4) sacred regard 
in which they were held. 
Stage 6 Conscience or principle orientation - this 
stage is typified by an orientation to wider prin-
ciples as well as (and often in opposition to) 
existing social or legal rules. Conscience is 
interpreted as a guide to choice rather than as a 
punisher (through guilt feelings) in cases of rule 
infringement. 
This scheme is a logical one - each stage shows 
qualitative differences from the others and they are arranged 
in an order which demands progressively more mature and more 
complex modes of thought. The combination of these six 
stages of maturity and the twenty-five aspects of morality 
gives a matrix of one hundred and fifty cells which Kohlberg 
uses to classify the individual statements received during 
the discussions of his moral dilemmas. 
Before turning to the experimental evidence of the 
invariant nature of Kohlberg's six stages we must consider 
the nature of the dilemmas which he uses. These are in 
fact, more complicated than are Piaget's situations and 
often there is no obviously right or wrong decision. In 
fact, Kohlberg states that the action alternatives chosen 
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by his subjects allowed none of the expected trends tq 
appear; more useful in this respect was the way in which the 
subject posed the conflict and his reasons for his choice 
of action (Koh1berg, 1963b, p. 12). 
Here are three of Koh1berg's dilemmas (Koh1berg, 1963b, 
pp. 13, 18-19 and 22-23): 
1. Joe's father promised he could go to camp if he earned 
the $50 for it, and then changed his mind and asked Joe 
to give him the money he had earned. Joe lied and said 
he had only earned tlO and went to camp using the other 
$40 he had made. Before he went, he told his younger 
brother Alex about the money and about lying to their 
father. Should Alex tell their father7 
2. In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of 
cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought 
might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist 
in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was 
expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten 
times what the drug cost him to make. He paid '200 for 
the radium and charged '2000 for a small dose of the drug. 
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew 
to borrow the money but he could only get together about 
$1000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist 
that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper 
or let him pay later but the druggist said: tlNo, I dis-
covered the drug and I am going to make money from it". 
So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to 
steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have 
done that? 
3. (As a continuation of the above.) The doctor finally got 
some of the radium drug for Heinz's wife but it didn't 
work, and there was no other treatment ~nown to medicine 
which could save her. So the doctor knew she had only 
about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but 
she was so weak that a good dose of pain killer like ether 
or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious 
and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods vhe 
would ask the doctor to give her enough ether to kill her. 
, She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to 
die in a few months anyway. Should the doctor do what she 
asks and make her die to put her out of her terrible pain? 
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Other situations contrasted family and public concern 
as when a life-boat captain learns that his family have been 
burt in a car crash just as he is about to embark on a 
rescue mission, and when an air defence warden has to choose 
between staying at his post in a bombing raid and going to 
see if his family is safe. 
As an illustration of the form of responses obtained 
and as an indication of the ambiguity of action choice and 
the greater utility of the subject's reasoning, Koh1berg 
gives the following example derived from Story 1 above 
(Kohlberg, 1963b, p. 13). In defining the situation as a 
prelude to an actual choice of action, one respondent said 
that Alex might tell his father in order to avoid a spanking 
or he might keep quiet to avoid a beating up from his 
brother. According to Kohlberg, what matters in this answer 
is not the assertion that Alex would or would not tell his 
father; what is important is the reasoning behind the choice. 
In either case the decision would be made on a consideration 
of the physical consequences of the act - Alex's course of 
action would, according to this respondent at least, depend 
on the relative physical attributes of his father and brother. 
Kohlberg considers that this response shows Stage 1 reasoning 
(a punishment and obedience orientation). 
Careful analysis of an individual's responses to a 
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variety of moral dilemmas allowed the isolation of a dominant 
stage of development for that individual. Naturally not all 
responses could be categorized into a single stage although 
there was considerable consistency in an individual's level 
of thought across the twenty-five aspects of morality 
previously outlined. Thus, Kohlberg mentions that of his 
original group of seventy-two boys , fifteen were classified 
as beihg in the first stage of moral development and 45% of 
the thinking of these boys was characterized as stage 1; 
obviously any individual is likely to show certain fluc-
tuations in the maturity of his arguments but Kohlberg 
maintains that one particular stage will be dominant. 
Kohlberg claims preliminary support for the order of 
the stages in his scheme from a comparison of the incidence 
of the separate stages at different age levels. He shows 
that Level I modes of thought (Stages 1 and 2) tend to 
decrease with age, while Level II (Stages 3 and 4) modes 
increase to age 13 years and then stabilize and Level III 
modes (stages 5 and 6) increase up to 16 years of age 
(Kohlberg, 1963b, Fig. 1, p. 16). These trends are· 
supported (with slight variations) by cross-cultural 
data although Kohlberg suggests that the last two Stages 
(comprising Level III) do not develop clearly in pre-
literate vilige or tribal communities (Kohlberg, 1967, 
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p. 170, and Fig. 1, p. 176; Koh1berg and Kramer, 1969, 
Fig. 1, p. 104).7, 
Koh1berg derives a~ditiona1 support for the invariant 
nature of his scheme from a Guttman quasi-simplex correlation 
matrix among his six stages of moral thought. In this way 
it was shown that particular modes of thought correlated less 
and less with more and more distant modes as would be ex-
pected if they formed a fixed sequence. 
Koh1berg maintains that the later stages of moral thought 
represent augmentations rather than replacements of the 
earlier ones, and while a particular mode of thought is 
dominant in any individual he may still oscillate between 
earlier and later forms in any argument or real-life judge-
mente The beauty of Kohlberg's scheme is that it can be 
applied to a:ny speech., debate, etc. as a yardstick for 
assessing the degree of moral sophistication of the arguments 
8 
used. 
(b) The validity of Kohlberg's scheme 
Kohlberg's theory raises two immediate problems - the 
validity of his work as demonstrating a developmental scheme 
in the strict sense of the term; and second, the modifications 
whieh it suggests of Piaget's theory of moral development. 
The first point, which has already been dealt with in brief 
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fashion as we saw in the exposition of Kohlberg's theory 
above, has been taken up by Kohlberg's postgraduate students 
who report both experimental and longtitudinal studies of the 
scheme; the comparison with Piaget is discussed in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Turiel's study (1966) was designed specifically to test 
two major hypotheses derived from Kohlberg's work. If, as 
Kohlberg proposes, the six stages form an invariant sequence 
then it follows that an individual's existing mode of thought 
restricts which new modes he can acquire; it was therefore 
expected that subjects would be more susceptible to reasoning 
immediately above their own level than to that at even higher 
levels. Secondly, it was proposed that each stage represented 
a reorganization and displacement of earlier stages rather 
than mere addition to them; therefore, subjects should be 
more susceptible to reasoning above rather than that below 
their own mode of thought. 
Turiel's sample comprised forty-four boys aged 12-14 years 
of age; all came from midd1e-calss backgrounds. The boys were 
presented with six of Kohlberg's nine dilemmas as a pretest and 
were allocated to one of Koh1berg's stages; in fact, they were 
all in Stages 2, 3 or 4. The scores on the dominant stage were 
at least domb1e those on the next most dominant stage; twenty-five 
subjects had been discarded from an original sample of sixty-nine on 
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this basis. The forty-four subjects remaining were assigned 
to one of four conditions, three experimental and one control. 
Subjects in the three experimental groups were presented with 
Kohlberg's three other dilemmas but, before making any choice 
they were exposed to two opposing sets of advice. (The con-
trol group obviously received none of this exposure.) 
For example, in the case of the druggist (Story 2 above) 
the subject would be asked to assume the role of Heinz and 
would be given by one friend several reasons in favour of his 
breaking into the store and by another friend several reasons 
for his not breaking in. However, both sets of advice can be 
phrased in terms of any of Kohlberg's six moral stages - we 
have already noted that Koh1berg found the reasoning rather 
than the actual action choice to be useful in establishing a 
pattern of development. This is where the different ex-
perimental conditionsappear~ 
In one condition subjects were exposed to reasoning one 
level above their own dominant stage (this is referred to as 
a +1 treatment). The second group was exposed to reasoning 
two levels above their own (a +2 treatment) and the third to 
reasoning one level below their own (a -1 treatment). Turiel 
uses the example of the druggist to illustrate the advice 
9 given and phrased on a Stage 3 level of reasoning~ 
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(a) You really shouldn't steal the drug. There must be 
some better way of getting it. You could get help 
from someone. Or else you could talk the druggist 
into letting you pay later. The druggist is trying 
to support his family; so he should get some profit 
from his business. Haybe the druggist should sell 
it for less, but you still shouldn't steal it. 
(b) You should steal the drug in this case. Stealing 
isn't good, but you can't be blamed for doing it. 
You love your wife and are trying to save her life. 
Nobody would blame you for doing it. The person 
who should really be blamed is the druggist who was 
just being mean and greedy (Turiel, 1966, p. 613). 
Advice phrased on the appropriate level and in the 
appropriate directions was concocted for each of the three 
dilemmas used in the experimental conditioning. Turiel's 
hypotheses, phrased in more simple terms than above, were 
I 
that a +1 treatment would be more successful in securing 
a change of level of reasoning than either a +2 treatment 
or a -1 treatment. 
Turiel discusses his results in two sections. Kohlberg's 
whole nine-dilemma programme was used as the posttest in 
Turiel's study; consequently, subjects (except for the control 
group) were faced with three situations for which they had 
received advice at a level of reasoning different to their own 
and six situations for which they had received no advice. 
Data obtained from the three situations are referred to as 
direct scores since here the subjects had been directly in-
fluenced; these are contrasted with the indirect scores 
obtained from the six situations in which any changes must 
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be generalized from the experimental conditioning. 
Analysis of the direct scores showed that Turiel's 
hypotheses were correct; the +1 treatment had most success, 
first in securing any change at all and second in leading 
to the adoption of a mode of thought one level higher than 
before (p(O.005). The -1 treatment was more successful in 
achieving a -1 level of thought than was a +2 treatment in 
achieving a +2 level of thought (p<O.lO) and this indicated 
that some subjects could be influenced to regress in their 
moral judgements, at least temporarily. 
Turiel's analysis of the indirect scores revealed trends 
similar to those noted for the direct scores but at only 
minimally significant levels. The +1 treatment was again 
most successful in securing any change at all, although it 
was not significantly more successful in achieving a +1 
level of thought. These trends suggested that there was a 
process at work which was more than mere rote learning of 
specific situational responses (as might be true of the 
direct score trends) and that some generalized qualitative 
change in moral concepts had been induced. 
Turiel's support for the developmental nature of 
Kohlberg's scheme is duplicated by the findings of another 
study; again it was found that 'children assimilate think~ng 
that is directly above their own stage more readily than 
162 
thinking that is either one stage below or two stages above 
their own' (Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969, p. 237). 'However, 
the main aim of this second study was the clarification of the 
process of change between stages and this point is taken up 
during the comparison of Kohlberg's scheme with that of Piaget. 
It should be briefly mentioned here that Kohlberg's scheme 
is a complete one in addition to being developmental in the 
strict sense of the word. 10 Kramer (1968, Kohlberg and Kramer, 
1969) has demonstrated that stage 6 reasoning is the most 
advanced level and that there are no Stages 7 ar 8 for adults; 
instead, there occurs a generalization of Stage 6 reasoning 
so that more and more moral judgements are included in it.ll 
(c) Comparison with Piaget 
Obviously Kohlberg's scheme has a far greater applicability 
than has Piaget's. It is viable for a much wider age range, 
indeed it is applicable to moral development in its entirety. 
In comparison, Piaget's scheme is limited in two main respects -
first he did not consider development after about twelve years 
of age; and second, the test situations he developed are too 
naive to be usefully applied at ages much later than this. 
Kohlberg is superior on both these counts. Nonetheless the 
question remains: to what extent can the two theories be 
reconciled, and to what extent has Kohlberg's work modified 
Piaget's ideas! 
Kohlberg believes that his own Stage 1 and 2 value 
orientations coincide descriptively with Piaget's heter-
onomous and autonomous stages respectively, although he 
interprets these coinciding stages differently from Piaget. 
Thus, Stage 1 judgements show concern for consequences 
rather than intentions, a lack of awareness of the relativity 
of value and involve defining right action as that showing 
obedience to authority. Piaget interpreted such trends as 
evidence of the child's inability to judge for himself and 
his consequent reliance on adult authority; and he saw the 
young child's orientations to punishment as evidence of the 
child's reverence for adults and adult-derived rules. In 
contrast, Kohlberg prefers the interpretation that the 
child's definition of wrong in terms of punishment simply 
reflects the desire to avoid punishment rather than reverence 
for the adult. 
Kohlberg also challenges Piaget's account of the stage 
of moral autonomy, which he equates with his own Stage 2 
reasoning. Like Piaget, Kohlberg found an increase in peer 
reciprocity up to ten years of age along with increasing 
moral relativism in judgement and the denial of the superiority 
of adult authority. However, Kohlberg doubts that the resulting 
stage 2 morality is based in mutual respect among peers since 
he found some boys who, while operating on this level, yet had 
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no sense of obligation to others, merely seeking their own 
satisfaction and using their peers to suit their own selfish 
purposes. 
Kohlberg saw the need to extend Piaget's typology to 
take in the more mature modes of thought in adolescence and 
adulthood, to embrace an orientation to social norms or 
internally held standards. He therefore, developed his 
scheme to include these later forms of reasoning which 
Piaget's theory could not encompass. 
Koh1berg, then, criticizes Piaget's interpretation of 
the modes of thought of children up to twelve years or so, 
particularly insofar as Piaget's dimension of respect for 
authority v. respect for peers is concerned. We have seen 
that Piaget placed great emphasis on the constraining effects 
of the unilateral respect typically ope~ating in a relation-
ship between the child and the adult; he also stressed the 
beneficial effects of relations~ip8 of co-operation between 
adults and children. Kohlberg denies the importance of these 
social relationships, preferring other explanations of the 
child's reasoning. 
It is difficult to compare the schemes of Piaget and 
Kohlberg on a chronological basis. We have already noted the 
several areas of moral development studied by Piaget and 
have indicated the age levels assigned to stages in each case 
(see Tables II and III in Chapter 2). Kohlberg's scheme is 
compartmentalized even less definitively than that of Piaget. 
In his chronological accounts of his theory of moral develop-
ment Kohlberg prefers graphical representation of the trends 
shown by each of his six modes of thought to a tabular 
description of six separate stages of development (see, for 
example, Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969, Figs. la and lb, p. 104). 
Thus, Kohlberg's first two modes of judgement decline quite 
rapidly after about ten year8 of age, and his next pair 
increase to about thirteen years of age when they stabilize. 
In fact, these form the dominant mode of thought for m08t 
adults being superceded only occasionally by the last two 
most mature. forms of reasoning. 
There remains, however, one vitally important area of 
agreement between the theories of Kohlberg and Piaget; this 
concerns the process of change from one moral level to the 
next. Kohlberg rejects the approach to moral edQcation 
which involves 'thoughtless moralizing' by teachers when 
children commit minor infringements of rules or engage in 
behaviour which irritates the teacher; and also he rejects 
attempts to inculcate majority v.lues, especially those 
derived from vague stereotypes of. morally good and bad 
character. In contrast, he prefer8 a moral education system 
which has as its goal tbe stimulation of the child's 'natural' 
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moral development, and of the capacities for using appropriate 
moral judgements in the control of his own behaviour. 
This approach assumes first that we know what the pattern 
of moral development is and at what point along it the child 
is situated; Kohlberg has developed a six-part typology to 
cater for this. A second assumption is that we know how and 
why a child develops morally i.e. what causes a change to a 
new mode of thought. It is in the discussion of this aspect 
that Kohlberg approaches Piaget most closely. 
Turiel (1966, p. 617) argued that at the root of 
transition from one stage to another in Kohlberg's scheme 
there was a process of cognitive conflict. This is identical 
to Piaget's theory of equilibration (see Chapter 1) but 
Turiel says that Piaget did not refine the concept suffi-
ciently. The process has been demonstrated in the sphere 
of cognitive development by Smedslund (e.g. 1961b) who showed 
that a challenge to an existing equilibrated system (lack of 
conservation) can produce a reorganization of the system to 
a more stable equilibrium state' (acquisition of conservation). 
A similar process seems to occur in respect of moral develop-
ment; thus, change occurs when a conflicting opinion is 
recognized (thereby disturbing the present equilibrium) and 
a new equilibrium level is sought through the reorganization 
of previous beliefs. 
It will be remembered that Turiel exposed subjects to 
reasoning one level above, two levels above and one level 
below their own level of thought and found the +1 treatment 
to be most successful in inducing change. Rest, Turie1 
and Kohlberg (1969) build on this discovery and suggest an 
explanation for the greater success of a disequilibrium 
which tends to advance rather than retard the child. Their 
argument involves three components of the child's tpought -
preference, comprehension and assimilation. ,'!'hey find 
evidence to support their hypothesis that children prefer 
concepts above their own predominant stage to concepts below; 
however, children find thinking two stages above their own 
level more difficult to comprehend than that one level above 
and find thinking one level below easiest of all three. 
Therefore, the child will assimilate reasoning at the level 
immediately above his own more readily than that at any other 
level (Rest, Turie1 and Koh1berg. 1969, p. 237). 
Again an invariant sequence is found in the process of 
development from latent appreciation of a higher level 
structure to its active expression; thus, preference preceeds 
comprehension which in turn is followed by assimilation and 
usage in new situations. It can be seen that Kohlberg, like 
Piaget, considers that the driving force in development is 
a process of organism-environment interaction rather than 
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the unfolding of a biologically inherent and latent hierarchy.12 
Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) have also expounded a 
second approach to the problem of disequilibrial advance. They 
explain why children at each particular level reject the 
earlier levels. They considered children at stages 2, 3 and 
4 of Kohlberg's scheme and suggested that children at Stage 2 
reject stage 1 reasoning because it is rooted in fear and 
because it involves an irrational reliance on physical punish-
ment as a rule enforcer; Stage 2 morality is rejected by 
children exhibiting Stage 3 judgement because it is egoistic 
(it makes the individual think only of himself; one should 
not make the decision merely in the hope of being paid back) 
and because it ignores moral feelings; Stage 4 children reject 
Stage 3 reasoning because it is based on individual consider-
ations rather than moral rules.13 The trends noted are taken 
as evidence that children can comprehend lower levels of thought 
but reject them in favour of higher levels. 
The problem of precocious moral development is given a 
psychological explanation by Ko~lberg; Piaget's work, in 
contrast, suggested a sociological explanation by invoking 
the nature of the child's social relations~ips as an in-
fluential factor on the rate of moral development. Kohlberg 
adopts Vygotskyts (1962) idea of zones of proximal development 
whereby children ostensibly at the same level of development 
as others may be helped towards the solution of problems more 
appropriate to older children; thus, some children can solve 
problems one year in advance of their own level, while others 
can achieve a level say four years in advance of their own 
(Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969, p. 248). The children who 
have the ability to solve the more advanced problems (those 
who have the wider zones of proximal development) tend to 
do better in their school work. Kohlberg contends that this 
might also apply in the moral sphere. 
However, there are two restrictions on development 
according to equilibration theory. When a child has only 
recently achieved his present level and is in the process 
of organizing this level (i.e. he is in the process of 
stabilizing his stage) then he is not susceptible to upward 
movement. Also, when a child has fixated at a particular 
level due, perhaps, to a personality disorder and thus tends 
to respond defensively to stimuli which conflict with his 
beliefs, then he too is not likely to move up a s~age (Rest, 
Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969, p. 249). Rest, Turiel and 
Kohlberg found some support for these views. The~found 
that older children at the higher levels (stages 3 and 4) 
have a greater comprehension of the moral development hier-. 
archy than have younger children who have apparently just 
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attained the same level; and secondly, they note that the 
older children at the lower levels (Stages land 2) figure 
more in the low comprehension than in the high comprehension 
groups, suggesting that they had fixated at this level. 
(d) Summary 
Kohlberg has proposed, and he and his students/colleagues 
have validated, a theory of moral development more compre-
hensive and eminently more practical than that advanced by 
Piaget. However, it should be noted that Kohlberg opts for 
a process of development identical to Piaget's theory of 
equilibration in cognitive development; this similarity 
between cognitive and moral development further strengthens 
the view that the two processes are similar in certain 
respects. 
3. Psychoanalytic Theory 
The psychoanalytic theory of moral development derives 
from the work of Sigmund Freud. The aspect of his theory which 
is of immediate interest for a consideration of the child's 
moral development is the formation of the child's conscience, 
particularly his guilt feelings. 
Freudian theory supposes that the individual's adult 
personality represents some form of balance between three 
elements - the id, the ego and the superego. Each of these 
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elements develops at successively later ages although none 
disappears altogether from the personality structure. 
Personality development is basically an adjustment of 
various instinctual drives - the biological tensions 
produced in the individual and the activities in which he 
engages to satisfy them. These states of tension and the 
processes of their release are discussed by Freud under 
the heading of the~. The id is governed by the pleasure 
principle, the desire to reduce pain and maximise comfort; 
moreover, it is concerned with immediate gratification. 
Clearly, this level of operation is a severely limited 
form of behaviour. Its selfishness and impulsiveness render 
it inappropriate for moral functioning proper, which implies 
empathy and the recognition of the possible consequences of 
an act such that gratification can be delayed to a more 
suitable occasion or an alternate course taken (see Peters, 
1960). Even for the infant, the id may restrict his 
satisfaction, for example when immediate gratification is 
not available and the id turns to wish-fulfillment - the 
imagining of the desired object as a means of release. 
This unsatisfying state of affairs leads to the frustration 
of the id and to the development of the ~ which regUlates 
the energy of the id and channels it into proper tension-
release behaviours. 
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The principle governing the ego is that of reality -
behaviour aimed at tension release is postponed until the 
desired object can be secured. The ego controls the ides 
irrational expenditure of energy in the pursuit of an 
image; instead, these energies are diverted away from 
immediate gratification-seeking in the form of reflex 
actions into reflection and problem solving which allow 
more accurate and efficient perception of the situations 
facing the child. Since it is consistently more success-
ful than the id in satisfying the child's needs, more and 
more energy becomes devoted to the ego. 
So far, the child has learned more efficient ways of 
obtaining the satisfaction of his needs. The child is 
yet amoral - his concern is for himself alone and he has 
only developed the capacity to adjust his behaviour insofar 
as this is instrumental to his own needs. The social aspect 
of behaviour and control is included in the development of 
the superego which is the judicial branch of the personality 
concerned with ideal activity. The superego develops from 
two sources - fear of punishment and desire for approval -
both of which are attributable to the child's relationships 
with his parents. Both sources of the development of the 
superego contribute to the process of identification. 
Although, for.the most part, Freud did not clearly 
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separate the aspects of fear from those of approval-seeking 
in his theory of superego development, this distinction has 
14 been sugsested by more recent authors. The term anaclitic 
identification is used to refer to the mechanism which in-
volves loss of love, while the element of fear is contained 
in the idea of aggressive identification. Kohlberg (1963a) 
calls the two forms of identification developmental and 
social power respectively. Involved in the first, he says, 
are such factors as parental affection and nurturance, the 
extent of parental interaction with the child, the use of 
'love-withdrawal' disCipline techniques, and clarity and 
consistency of parental role-modelling. In the second type 
of identification, parental power over the resources desired 
by the child, the relative power of each parent and physical 
control of the child are important variables. 
Identification is proposed by Freud as the means by 
which the Oedipus and Electra complexes are resolved. In 
each case, the child forms a sexual attachment to the parent 
of the opposite sex and sees the same-sex parent as a rival; 
the child then tends to adopt the characteristics of the 
same-sex parent. He may do this to secure a loved and loving 
object (anaclytic identification) - for example, a boy may 
emulate his father in order that his mother might give him 
more attention; or perhaps he adopts these characteristics to 
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avoid the threat of aggression from the same-sex parent who 
might regard the child as a rival for the spouse's affections 
(aggressive identification). It is likely that both aspects 
are,inextricably mixed in the identification process. 
Whatever the process of identification, its result is 
the child's adoption of the same-sex parent as a model for 
his own behaviour. This ego-ideal sets a standard which is 
gradually internalized into the superego and which then 
performs the function of regulating the child's behaviour 
through the provision of negative and positive sanctions 
(guilt and pride respectively). The superego opposes both 
id and ego (both of which are selfish in their operation 
and lack a social orientation) by forcing an idealistic 
view of the world taking account of the social implications 
of any course of action. 
This account of identification is no doubt over-
simplified and one may note several possible modifications 
of it. The process is not entirely fortuitous - there are 
social pressures that boys should become masculine and 
girls feminine and parental models may be fashioned accord-
ingly. For example, boys are not normally given dolls to 
play with while this is seen as an important aspect of a 
girl's life in that she is supposed to act out her future 
role as a mother. 15 
As a second modification it can be noted that parents 
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are not the only models which a child might adopt and that 
there are at least three aspects of any model after which 
the child might pattern himself. These are the model's 
overt behaviour, his personal motivations or his aspir-
ations for the child. These three are not necessarily con-
sistent and identification with each may produce a different 
personality structure in the child. Nevertheless, contained 
in the superego is an ego-ideal, a list of 'dos and don'ts' 
to which the child must accommodate to avoid the negative 
aspects of conscience (guilt) and achieve the positive 
(pride or self-praise). 
In Freud's scheme, the superego is seen to develop 
independently of specifically peer group relationships. 
These form an important part of Piaget's theory and stand 
as a first contrast between the two. In Freud's analysis 
of identification processes the parent is seen as an auth-
ority figure over the child and it is the child's awe of 
this authority which induces his adoption of the character-
istics of the parental model. In contrast, Piaget proposes 
a relationship of equality between adult and child as the 
most beneficial to moral development; Piaget believes that 
the child's subjection to relationships of constraint can 
only restrict his development. 
The most obvious and important difference in approach 
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between Piaget and Freud is that Piaget's is a cognitive 
approach to moral development while Freud's is emotional. 
Piaget is concerned with what the child knows about good 
and bad behaviour; Freud concentrates on the child's con-
science, especially insofar as this inhibits his deviance 
or results in guilt feelings after transgression. 
In the same vein, both Piaget and Freud recognize a 
scheme of development (although their schemes are different). 
Piaget lays initial stress on the most highly developed end 
of the scheme and indicates the way in which the child has 
arrived there. In contrast, Freud emphasizes the roots of 
development and the ways in which the child must progress. 
Both indicate the possibility that the individual may not 
complete the course, may fixate at a premature level, 
although Freud has spent more time in accounting for partial 
development and possible ways of helping those whose 
development is incomplete than has Piaget~o stresses the 
use rather than the usefulness of his model of development 
(Boyle, 1969, p. 147). 
4. Learning Theory 
In this section it will be argued that stimulus-response 
theories of moral development.do not provide clear cut ex-
planations of the child's behaviour or thought, any more 
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than do the theories discussed so far. The failures of 
S-R theories give additional weight to the importance of 
situational factors involved in moral jUdgement16 and 
re-emphasize the need to give separate consideration to 
the positive and negative aspects of social control. 
Learning theory suggest a point of view long held 
in lay circles - namely that character development is a 
process of training in 'good habits' and training out 'bad 
habits'; traditionally, tuition, example and reward could 
achieve the former while physical strictness was applied 
for the latter ('spare the rod ••• I). 
Hartshorne and May (1928-30) failed to find hypothesized 
links between honesty and exposure to moral training in 
Sunday School, Boy Scouts or even character education classes. 
Their data suggested that children were influenced greatly 
by situational cues (for example the chance of being caught; 
or what one's friends were doing) rather than by a general 
underlying code of honesty. These findings contradicted 
the popular belief that moral development was merely a matter 
of correct training or upbringing and stand in opposition to 
the classic paradigm of the learning theorists. 
The approach of learning theory to moral development 
derives from the finding that animals could be made to perform 
certain activities through the experimenter's manipulation of 
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rewards and punishments. If animals could be trained in 
this manner to behave as the experimenter wished then it 
should be possible to condition children to adopt socially 
desirable forms of conduct. 
One difficulty of this transfer from overt conformity 
in animals to human morality is that, at least one the 
behavioural level, the animal is trained to perform a certain 
action while the child is trained to avoid certain deviant 
action. The conditioning precedures of the learning theorist 
are aimed at producing reflex responses to stimuli whereas 
the objective of moral guidance is the child's ability to 
distinguish good and bad and to act in a non-deviant manner 
through an anticipation of the expectations of others. In 
fact, as we shall see later, the use of strict physical 
punishment implied by learning theory to be effective in 
securing behavioural conformity tends to correlate with 
delinquency. 
A second broad area of morality may be contrasted to 
behavioural conformity. This is anxiety or 'pangs of 
conscience', the internalized mechanism of control which 
determines the degree of conformity or deviance in any 
individual. Again, the fear of physical punishment which 
typifies animal learning experiments is less effective in 
developing this control (and hence conformity) than are the 
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psychological or love-oriented punishments. 
The problem of the efficacy of physical and psychological 
punishments is highlighted in a recent statement by Eysenck 
in which he expresses the learning theory approach to moral 
development in lucid fashion. He says: 
• • • A young child behaves in a socially undesirable 
manner i.e. by being aggressive, by indulging in overt 
sexual activity, by stealing, lying and cheating, or 
in whatever way anti-social behaviour is defined in a 
given society. There is an immediate sharp punishment -
a slap, withdrawal of some pt-ivilege, 'shaming', ex-
clusion from the family circle, or whatever it may be. 
This punishment produces pain and fear • • • which 
in turn become attached to the type of situation and 
the type of action which call forth the punishment, 
thus producing a conditioned anxiety reaction whenever 
similar situations and action re-occur (Eysenck, 1960, 
p. 14). 
This statement contains three elements which need 
examination in more detail. First, is the 'conditioned 
anxiety reaction' generalized to similar situations? Second, 
do psycholggical and physical forms of punishment have the 
same effects on the child? And third, does a conditioned 
response of the type described by Eysenck have the features 
of conscience proper? 
We have already noted the doubtful nature of the first 
assumption in the light of Hartshorne and I-jay' s data. They 
found little correlation in any individual's scores on the 
several tests of moral conduct which they used;: the particular 
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characteristics of the test situations were more important 
than any general trait of honesty. The tendency for moral 
behaviour learned under one set of circumstances to gener-
alize to other situations is unsupported. 
The second assumption of Eysenck's statement (regarding 
the form of punishment involved in avoidance learning) needs 
more detailed analysis. Eysenck makes no distinction between 
physical and social/psychological punishments as factors in 
the achievement of a conditioned anxiety response; physical 
punishment seems the less successful in instilling intern-
alized standards which mark conscience proper from mere con-
formity. That is, while the threat or use of physical 
punishment miGht lead to immediate behavioural comformity 
(simply through a fear of the consequences of misbehaviour) 
this does not necessarily imply the presence of a general 
internalized control; it is likely to be a temporary state 
which might easily be reversed if the conditions of the 
punishment were changed. Conscience proper ~mp1ies a more 
enduring orientation to right and wrong, indeed one which 
would be adhered to even in the face of physical threats. 
It implies an ability for individual reflection and decision 
rather than the exhibition of hedonistic expediency. Classic 
learning theory suggests that morality and a conscience can 
be forced upon the child through the proper manipulation of 
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rewards and punishments. In fact, this argument is largely 
unsupported by experimental evidence; Kohlberg's review 
(1963a) suggest that on a behavioural level parents of 
delinquents use more punitive, inconsistent and unreasoning 
modes of discipline, while opposite modes of discipline 
relate to social conformity. 
The discussion above has touched on the third point 
arising from Eysenck's statement. Conditioned response in 
animals takes the form of an unthinking reflex action 
following a certain stimulus. Now the aim of moral guidance 
is surely not unthinking behavioural conformity? It is the 
fostering of the ability for individual judgement based on 
a consideration of the situation in hand. There are often 
extenuating circumstances whose presence may justify overtly 
deviant behaviour (c.f. Kohlberg's dilemmas) and it is 
unreasonable to expect the individual to judge a person~ 
actions (or to personally behave) in an automatic and iden-
tical fashion time after time. The work of Hartshorne and 
Hay has demonstrated the importance of situational factors 
in determining children's susceptibility to stealing and 
cheating. 
Considering for a moment Piaget's more general theory 
of cognitive development, it has been shown that traditional 
S-R techniques used in an attempt to accelerate the child's 
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development have been notoriously unsuccessful (see Flavell, 
1963, pp. 370-79). This evidence was interpreted as suggesting 
the existence of an important maturational force in development; 
without the child's attainment of a certain level of physio-
10zica1 development other cognitive structures could not be 
induced artificially as it were. Piaget believes that develop-
ment must precede learning contrary to the popularly held 
belief that learning promotes development (Boyle, 1969, 
pp. 113-14). 
Perhaps the best work in this field has come from Smeds1und 
(1961a,b, etc.) who has shown that a superficial acquisition 
of conservation could be trained into children but that it 
could just as easily be extinguished. In contrast, children 
who had achieved conservation naturally proved more resilient 
to attempts at extinction (see Flavell, 1963, pp. 372-75). 
Similarly, in the case of moral development, it seems 
likely that any behavioural conformity induced through the 
fear of punishment or promise of reward is a limited form of 
morality in two ways. First, we have already noted that. 
severe physical punishment correlates with delinquency while 
the psychological forms of control and punishment correlate 
with internalized standards and guilt feelings (Kohlberg, 1963a, 
p. 281). So the classic learning theory paradigm would appear 
unsuccessful in instilling elements of conscience proper. 
Secondly, what the learning theory approach may be successful 
in achieving is an outward conformity without internal con-
viction; non-deviance solely through a fear of the consequences 
of misbehaviour. Such an unthinking conformity is the 
antithesis of the highest levels of morality and works against 
the advancement of moral standards. Moral progress has been 
achieved because individuals occasionally rebelled against the 
pre vai1ing moral co de and had the originality and courage to 
suggest new opinions and allegiances. This type of progress 
would be impossible if morality were developed according to 
the S-R theories of learning. 
The discussion so far has made no direct reference to 
the work of Piaget although many of the citicisms of the 
learning theory approach suggest Piaget's contribution to an 
understanding of moral development. Piaget shows moral 
development to be a slow process in which the impetus for 
change is internal; moral development is not an arbitrary 
response to external pressures. Piaget notes and stresses 
the active part which the child takes in all areas of his 
development whereas the learning theorist views the child 
as a passive receiver of data. In Piaget's theory the child's 
declining egocentricity leads to his ability to see his own 
point of view as one among many and the ensuing possibility 
of his reconciling opposite opionions. In Piagetts termin-
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ology, the child re-equilibrates a system which is unbalanced 
as he recognizes alternative points of view. 
5. Summary And Reconciliation 
In this chapter we have considered the differing approaches 
to the problem of moral development of Kohlberg, Freud and 
learning theory. These were compared with each other and with 
Piaget's theory which was discussed at length earlier on (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). 
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is 
difficult to make comparisons between Piaget's theory of moral 
development and the others since each stands in contrast to 
separate aspects of his scheme. This difficulty arises in part 
from the nature of the area under consideration. Morality and 
conscience are not unitary concepts but have several divergent 
features which admit little or no intercorrelations. In effect 
the individual theorists mentioned above have discussed separate 
aspects of moral development. 
Consider Figure 3, which shows the aspects of conscience 
which have been discussed by Piaget, Kohlberg, Freud and 
Learning Theory. Four of these aspects (inhibition of wrong 
behaviour, guilt feelings after transgression, seeking of 
altruistic actions and the discrimination of right and wrong) 
are derived from Wright (1968). It can be seen that there 
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is very little common ground among the separate approaches. 
Both Piaget and Kohlberg follow the cognitive approach to 
moral development by attempting to assess a sequence of 
stages typifying the child's knowledge of right and wrong 
behaviour. Freud and Learning Theory consider guilt and 
behavioural conformity although they each propose different 
processes of development. It is, in fact, only about the 
process of development that all four approaches have some-
thing to say, and even here we have noted differences among 
them. None of the approaches deals directly with the impulse 
to pursue virtue in an altruistic way although this is 
implied by Freud's notion of the superego and by Kohlberg's 
highest level of moral reasoning. 
It is difficult to disagree with Wright's contention 
'that the four features he outlines constitute independent 
dimensions along which people vary and that the factorawhich 
determine an individual's position on them will also vary 
independently (Wright, 1968, p. 54). Separate consideration 
of any of the dimensions isolated by Wright leads to an 
incomplete picture of conscience. \ihile recognizing the low 
correlations among these aspects, their combination does 
allow a more accurate model of conscience to be constructed. 
An attempt at this construction is now made by way of 
drawing together the separate theories discussed above. 
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Inhibition Guilt 
of wrong 
behaviour 
Altruism Discrimin- Process 
ation of 
right and 
wrong 
Piaget / / 
Kohlberg ~ ~ 
Freud 
Learning 
Theory 
~ 
~ 
/ ~ 
~ ~ 
Figure 3 Aspects Of Conscience Discussed In Four Approaches 
The major distinction to be made is that between knowledge 
and action. On the one hand there is the problem of what the 
individual knows about right and wrong, or good and bad etc.; 
this capacity is, by implication, largely dependent on his 
general intellectual abilities and this view is supported by 
the links established between performance on Piaget's tests 
of moral development say, and intelligence. 
On the other hand, we have the individual's actual 
behaviour and the factors which influence it. In this case 
we adopt the approach of Freud and the Learning Theorists 
far more than that of Piaget and Kohlberg. We are concerned 
with the anticipation of praise and guilt which influences 
the individual's choice of action and the mechanisms by which 
these controls are internalized. l ? 
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It is possible to construct a three dimensional model 
of conscience which combines the contributions of Freudian, 
learning and cognitive theories to the understanding of 
guilt, behaviour and knowledge of right and wrong. Such 
a model is shown in Figure 4. 
The north-south axis of Figure 4 is the dimension dis-
cussed by Piaget and Kohlberg - the individual's knowledge 
that a course of action is right or wrong and the rationale 
underlying this belief. The east-west axis of Figure 4 
concerns action; in any practical dilemma the individual 
mayor may not act. The front-back axis of Figure 4 relates 
to the individual's guilt feelings. The dimensions forming 
the second and third dimensions have been developed from the 
work of Freud and the learning theorists. 
It is useful to consider the various combinations of 
these three dimensions and to develop their implications. 
Consider first the case where an individual knows that a 
particular course of action which he is contemplating is 
. 
wrong; this is shown on Figure 4 by looking at the model 
from Perspective A - underneath the model in fact. Now 
the individual has two choices - he may follow through his 
course of action, even though he knows it to be wrong; or 
he may abandon the project. Additionally, he mayor he 
may not feel guilty whatever he decides to do. 
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Now, since the individual knows that his intentions are 
wrong, if he follows then through he is likely to feel guilty 
about his actions; this would be regarded as a normal reaction 
in these circumstances. However, some people are capable of 
committing themselves to courses of action which they know 
to be wrong and yet they feel no sense of guilt about this -
this, in essence, is a definition of the psychopath. 
In practice, there are various levels which must be 
taken into account along all three dimensions. Along the 
dDnension of knowledge that an action is correct, one might 
want to know the reasons for this belief because some reasons 
might have greater validity than others. Piaget has suggested 
that a decision based on the individual's consideration of 
motives is more mature than one concentrating on the con-
sequences of the act; Kohlberg has suggested three broad 
levels of maturity in the individual's reasoning and he 
maintained that a strictly hedonistic assessment of a situ-
ation ('What's in it for me?') is less mature than a con-
sideration of the social implications ('What will my friends 
thirut?') which in turn is less mature than an appeal to the 
principles involved ('Is this right?'). 
The dimension of action appears fairly clear cut -
either a person does something or he does not do it. Possible 
complications to this straightforward pattern arise if the 
l~ 
individual attempts to reverse his actions by premature 
curtailments (e.g. breaking into a shop but not stealing 
anything) or by an attempted compensation (e.g. returning 
stolen goods). In the long run, the effects of these 
reversals is the same as if no action had been trucen, but 
they do not alter the fact that some deviant action has 
occurred. 
There are also various levels of guilt and in some 
senses there are levels of guilt - abscence. This con-
sideration of the absence of guilt has implications for 
a definition of psychopathic behaviour since it seems 
likely that psychopathy is a continuum rather than a cate-
gory. Probably all of us are capable of actions which 
would be regarded as psychopathic given a strict inter-
pretation of the law or morals - many examples could be 
produced: the man who takes a pen home from work to &ive 
his child; the man who 'adjusts' his income tax form; 
the motorist who exceeds the 30 m.p.h. limit or who ienores 
the parking restrictions; the worker who asks his mate to 
clock him out and so give him an extra hours pay. All 
these activities are illegal, and yet few would give rise 
to any guilt feelings; indeed some (particularly tax and 
breathalyser 'loopholes') may be a source of pride. It is 
fairly easy to say that this particular action is anti-
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social and dangerous and that another particular action is 
not - it is far more difficult to lay down rules beforehand 
to indicate which levels of psychopathic behaviour are 
acceptable and which others are not. 
Nevertheless, the broad framework of the model presented 
in Figure 4 is still applicable at each level along each 
dimension. So far we have dealt with one aspect of one 
perspective on Figure 4 (the combination of action and guilt / 
no guilt); we must now deal with the non-action end of the 
scale. Again there is the dual possibility of presence or 
absence of guilt feelings. The normal reaction would be a 
I 
replacement of guilt by a sense of pride for having acted 
'sensibly' - i.e. for having refrained from deviant action. 
However, there is still the possibility that the' 
individual will suffer pangs of guilt - the mere contem-
plation of the deviant act may be regarded as enough cause 
for this. In Figure 4, Perspective A such a reaction is 
regarded as a form of neurosis, and once more this is likely 
to operate on various levels. In its more extreme forms 
this might be one precondition for religious confession _ 
the individual may be overcome by guilt until he obtains 
absolution. (Alternatively, this might be regarded as a 
very shallow form of neurosis and guilt since all it takes 
to clear the conscience is the verbal admonition of another 
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person.) strong and enduring feelings of guilt following 
the mere contemplation of a deviant act are interpreted in 
Figure 4, Perspective A as an abnormal personality adjust-
ment rather than as evidence of a powerful conscience with 
its usual conotations of optimal personality development. 
This illustrates in extreme fashion the point noted earlier 
during the discussion of Freudian theory - the suggestion 
that a too highly developed superego might restrict the 
individual's activities enormously by requiring that they 
be ideal in many impractical ways. 
So far we have dealt.with the possible combinations 
of guilt/no-guilt and action/no-action when the individual 
knows that a particular activity is wrong. The modi-
fication of the individual dimensions to take account of 
various levels of knowledge, action and guilt should be 
borne in mind during the discussion of the other end of 
the cognitive dimension which follows. The general case 
of the individual contemplating action which he knows to 
be right is shown in Figure 4 by Perspective B - looking 
down on the model. 
The individual who eventually followed through the 
contemplated course of action without any feelings of 
guilt would be regarded as having a normal personality; a 
second form of normality would be the appearance of guilt 
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feelings for failure to execute activities which were known 
to be correct - perhaps this most commonly takes the form 
of a mental 'ticking off' (e.g. 'I really should have 
stopped to help that man mend his puncture'). 
Altruism is given a special interpretation here in 
terms of extreme guilt for non-action rather than in terms 
of action for the sake of others. Of course, the outward 
expression of altruism is service to others on various 
levels up to self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group 
'(e.g. Oateswith Scott's expedition; or the Japanese suicide 
squads in World War II); but these are the outward mani-
festations of altruism rather than its cause. The impli-
cation of Figure 4, Perspective B is that to refrain from 
action known to be right would cause certain individuals 
extreme guilt under certain circumstances; in avoiding this 
guilt (i.e. by following through the accepted course of 
action) these individuals are likely to display activities 
which are thought of as altruistic. 
Some individuals might refrain from activities which 
they know to be right and yet experience no guilt; these are 
interpreted as psychopathic personalities in Figure 4, 
Perspective B although once more there are many levels 
before this phenomenon is regarded as being dangerous. In 
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some ways, the person who recognizes the unfairness of two 
skinheads attacking one Pakistani might be thought of as 
displaying psychopathic traits if he did not intervene; 
alternatively this might be regarded as a very normal -
i.e. probable and expectable - course of actionl Watching 
a person drown would be generally regarded as more immoral 
(more psychopathic) than watching an unfair fight. 
The final category of Figure 4, Perspective B (action 
coupled with guilt) is interpreted as a case of slight 
neurosis or embarrassment; some examples should clarify 
this category. A person may walk around a supermarket, 
fail to find anything he wants and yet feels nervous at 
replacing an empty basket and leaving for fear of being 
accused of taking something without paying; or a person may 
feel embarrassed at having to interrupt a neighbour's party 
to request less noise. These examples do not have the ex-
treme symptoms of neurosis proper but they do indicate some 
mental discomfort which is of a similar kind. 
The other two important aspects of Figure 4 are 
Perspectives C and D (looking from the back and the front 
respectively). Perspective C considers the absence of 
guilt and contrasts the conditions of psychopathy (exe-
cuting actions known to be wrong; or not executing actions 
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known to be wrong) with those of normality (refraining from 
action known to be wrong; following through actions known to 
be right). Perspective D presents the other extreme - the 
presence of guilt feelings and the conditions under which 
they might be thought of as normal (following action known 
to be wrong), as neurotic (following mere contemplation of 
deviant action), as slightly neurotic (appearing eve~ though 
the course of action is accepted as correct) or as a cause 
of altruism (extreme guilt would follow inaction). 
One interesting side feature of conscience as presented 
in Figure 4 can be noted. For any action to be considered 
moral or immoral the individual must be aware of the pre-
vailing moral code. Thus the cognitive dimension in Figure 
4 is Action-known-to-be-right/Action-known-to-be-wrong rather 
than Action-known-to-be-right/Action-not-known-to-be-right. 
If the individual does not know what is right and wrong we 
must speak of amoral action which denies the appearance of 
guilt. The individual is not held responsible for his actions 
since he is unaware of right and wrong behaviour. 
Two general cases of amorality may be noted. The first 
is that of young children - Piaget has shown that the child's 
judgements of right and wrong change as he grows older. In 
England, the child is not legally responsible until he is ten 
years of age; before this time he is regarded as being amoral 
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and afterwards he is delinquent if he brerucs the law. The 
second special case is that of diminished responsibility, 
usually on the grounds of mental subnormality, where it is 
held that the individual could not realize that his actions 
were contravening the social or legal order. Under normal 
circumstances, however, ignorance of the law is not a valid 
excuse and is insufficient grounds for the waiving of 
prosecution. 
It is only possible to use Figure 4 as a classificatory 
model; it does not allow any explanation of the process of 
moral development or act as other than a general guide to 
the dimensions of conscience. Any more detailed analysis 
must rely on the intricacies involved in the separate cog-
nitive or psychoanalytical or S-R theories of moral develop-
ment. However, the construction and application of a model 
such as that presented here does emphasize the diverse nature 
of the three main aspects of conscience. It also suggests 
that the contributions of theorists working in separate areas 
can be successfully combined to produce a more accurate re-
presentation of the problems and implications of moral 
development. 
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SECTION B 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
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The work of Jean Piaget is fraught with theoretical and 
methodological issues; this is particularly true of his 
earliest studies. Piaget's style of writing is difficult to 
follow, his ideas are often eomplex even when they have been 
discovered. and the evidence with which he supports his 
theories is inconclusively reported. 
These problems have been dealt with already (see Chapter 
2) and we must now consider the methodological decisions 
needed for the present investigation, and the results which 
were obtained. This section sets out the experimental aims 
of the present study and the particular techniques selected 
in an attempt to realize them; also included is a discussion 
of the results obtained and their implications for Piaget's 
theory of moral development. 
Basically there are two parts to this investigation. One 
is a straightforward validation study of some of the ideas 
expressed by Piaget in The Moral Judgement of the Child. For 
this it was necessary to obtain from a sample of children, 
responses relating to certain story situations; the sample, 
technique and results for this part of the study are reported 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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The second part involves a discussion of the home background 
of some children in an attempt to establish some links between 
parental attitudes to child-rearing and the child's performance 
in the Piagetian tests used in the first part. Piaget laid great 
emphasis on the nature of the adult-child relationship as a factor 
influencing the child's moral judgements; in fact, the implications 
of Piaget's models of social relationships have not yet been fully 
explored empirically. The approach and data reported in Chapter? 
go some way towards developing this aspect of Piaget's work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AIMS AND TECHNIQUES OF STUDY 
1. Introduction 
In the previous section Piaget's theory of moral develop-
ment was discussed in detail, as were alternate theories of 
moral development and Piaget's theory of intellectual develop-
ment. Consideration was also given to the findings of the 
twenty or so studies which attempted to test and extend Piaget's 
ideas on the development of moral judgements in children. Un-
doubtedly a major concern from which the need for replication 
work derived was the obscurity surrounding Piaget's sample 
selection and experimental execution. 
This same dissatisfaction with Piaget's methodology was 
an impetus for the present study, although the author was not 
aware of all the relevant literature until after the fieldwork 
was complete. There are several methodological shortcomings 
in Piaget's work. One of the Piagetian 'trademarks' is the 
clinical approach to questioning children and another, 
developing directly from the first, is a lack of statistics 
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to indicate the nature of the samples used or to support any 
trends suggested by the data. 
In the clinical approach, Piaget adopts a very open form 
of questioning, letting the child's responses lead here and 
there around the central problem but with little standard-
ization from one subject to the next. Since the questions 
asked of each subject are never the same, and since even the 
situations about which the subject is questioned may also be 
varied, it is more difficult to quantify the data obtained. 
This type of criticism of Piaget's methodology is more 
appropriate to his earliest studies which were intended as 
exploratory rather than final. Inhelder has expressed her 
concern regarding the different interpretations of develop-
mental trends which might result from the adoption of more 
standardized techniques of investigation. She points out 
(Inhelder, 1961) that in the first explorations of an area 
of development the Genevan psychologist use a very flexible 
approach, one which is highly adaptable and sensitive to 
the nuances so often missed or misinterpreted when more rigid 
methods of investigation are applied. 
One gets the definite impression that Piaget explores 
particular areas in great detail and with much empathy until 
certain trends are suggested. He then accepts these trends 
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as universal and inevitable and moves on to a new area. In 
fact, many of the trends lightly traced by Piaget have been 
filled in more definitely by other workers using more 
standardized techniques of investigation and larger samples. 
Unfortunately, other trends have not found this support and 
while any new ideas need verification (and Piaget has been 
a veritable fountain of original thought) this applies even 
more strongly to Piaget's work. It is certainly true that 
Piaget, and particularly his colleagues, have recently 
applied themselves to large scale and longitudinal studies 
to check the validity of their ideas but Piaget published 
only the one volume in the field of moral development and 
its shortcomings remain. 
It was suggested in the previous section that Piaget's 
ideas on the development of moral judgements had been largely 
incorporated into and superseded by Kohlberg's work (see 
Chapter 4); it seems inevitable that future research on moral 
development should take Kohlberg's stages as their frame of 
reference. Support for Kohlberg's scheme is relatively recent 
and restricted to his own and his colleagues researchl • The 
present study concentrated on Piaget's work rather than 
Kohlberg's since the validity and importance of the latter 
was not immediately apparent. 
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\,le must now gauge the ex.ten t to which the general. 
criticisms of Piaget's methodological approach apply to his 
work on moral development; we must ascertain the weaknesses 
and obscurities in his research design in order to improve 
on them. 
First of all it is exceedingly difficult to discover 
exactly how many children were involved in the questioning 
for The Moral Judgement of the Child. After careful scrutiny 
it is possible to isolate at least fourteen separate samples 
from the book (see endnote 1, Chapter 2); most of these are 
small, rarely exceeding a hundred, and several are of in-
determin~te size. Now, if the trends which Piaget proposes 
are universal and inevitable, then any fair sized sample 
should allow their appearance. This assumption of universality 
is made by Piaget and he ignores all kinds of variables which 
might affect the child's apparent level of maturity of judge-
ment. This point will be returned to a little later on. 
Secondly, Piaget investigated three broad areas of moral 
judgement - children's attitudes'to the rules of a game, their 
opinions of rules laid down by adults and their concepts of 
justice and fairness (Piaget, 1932, p. vii). Further, it is 
possible to isolate eleven separate moral dimensions in The 
Moral Judgement of the Child, some of which appear to be 
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related although others are independent of the rest (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). Piaget implies a general code of 
morality which governs judgements along all the dimensions; 
in fact, the replication work indicates that only five 
dimensions have shown age trends sufficiently consistent 
to warrant their being called developmental, (see Chapter 3); 
the validity of such a dimension is shown in responses which 
become more mature at successive age levels irrespective of 
the nature of the situations about which the child is questioned 
and irrespective of any particular factors (e.e. intelligence, 
home background, social class, nationality, etc.) which will 
vary from subject to subject (Kohlberg, 1963b). 
These considerations are the ones which (as implied above) 
Piaget ignored; they have been controlled in subsequent studies 
and their precise effects noted (see Chapter 3). In fact, with 
regard to the developmental dimensions, the effect of these 
variables is to accelerate or,retard the child's progress 
through Piaget's scheme rather than suggesting the need for a 
different developmental sequence. 
Thirdly, we must consider Piaget's research technique. 
Piaget believes the child's spontaneous remarks to be the most 
important source of insight into his thought processes; but 
an awareness of the relevance and importance of these remarks 
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is often impossible to gain without some general frame of 
reference provided by the more formal procedures of question-
and-answer which typify any large scale investigation (Piaget, 
1932, p. viii). Even so, Piaget has not adopted the degree 
of standardi~ation present in most studies; he still uses a 
very free form of questioning without insisting on a fixed 
sequence, number or even structure of the questions asked. 
He talks with the child around the problem under consideration 
and later tries to pick out from verbatim reports the elements 
needed for analysis; indeed the typical 'statistics' which 
Piaget offers in support of his hypotheses are protocols 
selected from his verpatim reports. This is the only form 
of presentation he fully accepts since the conditions 
attaching to individual interviews were so different and 
quantification is therefore more difficult. 
Before any more detailed exposition of Piaget's method-
ology is given a major focussing of the present study should 
be mentioned. It was decided, because of limitations of time 
and because the study was to be carried out by only one worker, 
to limit the investigation to a single dimension of Piaget's 
work, namely objective responsibility. The author had already 
carried out a limited study of the development of rules in 
children (Lydiat, 1967). The dimension of objective respons-
ibility forms one aspect of moral realism in the child; moral 
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realism is the 'tendency which the child has to regard duty 
and the value attaching to is as self-subsistent and 
independent of the mind, as imposing~self regardless of 
the circumstances in which the individual finds himself' 
(Piaget, 1932, p." 106). Three important features of moral 
realism are the heteronomy of duty, the judgement of an 
act in terms of its exact conformity to a rule and the 
objectivity of the concept of responsibility. 
These features of moral realism are closely related. 
Duty is heteronomous and any act showing obedience to any 
adult rule is good; rules are accepted and cannot be 
elaborated or even judged - rules exist and must therefore 
be obeyed. From this attitude develops the notion that 
deviance from the rules is forbidden, no matter how slight 
this may be. Exact conformity is demanded and it is the 
letter rather than the spirit of the law which is observed. 
This feature in turn leads on to the child's judgement of 
an act in terms of its consequences and not the intentions 
of the actor. This aspect of the child's moral judgements 
Piaget termed objective responsibility and he contrasted it 
with a subjective responsibility in which the intentions of 
the actors assume paramount importance. 
Piaget believed that moral realism arose from the 
conjunction of two series of causes - the egocentric thought 
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of the young child and the relationship of constraint in 
which the young child typically finds himself vis-a-vis 
adults and even older children (Piaget, 1932, pp. 183 ff); 
therefore, the decline of moral realism is a function of 
declining egocentrism and increasing acceptance of the 
older child into relationships of equality by adults. 
2. Technique 
The technical problem is to distinguish between the 
two attitudes suegested by objective and subjective 
responsibility. Piaget's story situation approach does 
this in an amazingly simple fashion. He asked subjects 
to consider pairs of situations in which children mis-
behaved in a variety of ways. In one of each pair of 
stories a child misbehaves with quite serious consequences; 
in the second story the results of the misdeed are not as 
serious, but the intentions behind the act are much less 
noble. Some examples from Piaget's work should clarify 
the differences and hence the aim of the exercise: 
I.A. A little boy who is called John is in his 
room. He is called to dinner. He goes into the 
dining room. But behind the door there was a 
chair, and on the chair there was a tray with 
fifteen cups on it. John couldn't have known 
that there was all this behind the door. He 
goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bans 
go the fifteen cups and they all get broken! 
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B. Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry. 
One day when his mother was out he tried to get some 
jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up onto a chair 
and stretched out his arm. But the jam was too high up 
and he couldn't reach it and have any. But while he 
was trying to get it he knocked over a cup. The cup 
fell down and broke (Piaget, 1932, p. 118). 
IV.A. Alfred meets a little friend of his who is very 
poor. This friend tells him that he has had no dinner 
that day because there was nothing to eat in his home. 
Then Alfred goes into a baker's shop, and as he has no 
money~ he waits till the baker's back is turned and 
steals a roll. Then he runs out and gives the roll to 
his friend. 
B. Henriette goes into a shop. She 
piece of ribbon on a table and thinks 
it would look very nice on her dress. 
shop lady's back is turned ••• , she 
ribbon and runs away at once (Piaget, 
sees a pretty 
to herse1 f that 
So while the 
steals the 
1932 , p. 119). 
I. A. A little boy ••• eoes for a walk in the street 
and meets a big dog who frightens him very much. So 
then he goes home and tells his mother he has seen a 
dog that is as big as a cow. 
B. A child comes home from school and tells his 
mother that the teacher had given him good marks, but 
it was not true; the teacher had g~ven him no marks 
at all, good or bad. Then his mother was very pleased 
and rewarded him (Piaget, 1932, p. 145). 
Other stories posed situations where a boy caused a big 
ink blot while filling the inkwell to help his father and a 
girl cut a big hole in her dress whilst cutting out some 
'sewing to help her mother; these were contrasted with situ-
ations where a boy made a small ink blot while messing about 
with the inkwell and where a girl cut a small hole in her 
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dress while playing with a pair of scissors. In another pair, 
a girl who steals ana frees a caged bird for which she feels 
sorry is contrasted with another who steals. some sweets and 
hides and eats them all up (Piaget, 1932, p. 119); a boy who 
is a poor artist and who lies about doing a drawing is con-
trasted with another who loses a pair of scissors and then 
denies touching them; a boy unfamiliar with the geography of 
a town misdirects a man who gets lost, while a second boy, 
wh9 knows his way around, plays a trick and sends a man the 
wrong way although the man does manage to find the place he 
is looking for eventually; one boy pretends his feet hurt,him 
when asked to go a message for his mother, while a second 
boy pretended he had been for a ride in a car (Piaget~ 1932, 
pp. 145-46). 
These nine situations (plus some unspecified stories 
in which children cause damage and lie about their part in 
it) form the basis of Piaget' s inves'tiga tions· of the dimension 
of objective responsibility. In relation to each pair of 
stories he claims that two answers are possible to the question: 
"Which child is the worst?" Children subject to a morality 
of constraint tend to judge by consequences only (objective 
responsibility) and say that the boy who broke most -cups, the 
girl who stole the (more expensive) bird, the boy who made 
the biggest blot, the boy who told the least credible lie about 
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the dog as big as a cow, etc. - these are the worst children, 
these are naughtiest, these should be punished most. 
In contrast, children subject to a morality of co-
operation tend to judge by the intentions of the actors 
(subjective responsibility) and say that the naughtiest 
children are the boy who was stealing jam even though he 
only broke one cup, the girl who stole the sweets for 
herself, the boy who told the deceitful lie about his 
school marks (the other boy was only joking or showing off), 
etc. Piaget suggested that both objective and subjective 
responses could be seen in his data for children up to the 
age of ten years, but that none of the first type were 
found after this age. 
In fact, the story situation approach is an ideal way 
of separating the two moralities proposed by Piaget; 
stories may be easily constructed to oppose good and bad 
intentions coupled with great and little material damage 
respectively. However, the simplicity of these tests, both 
in construction and operation, limits their applicability 
to small age range, and particularly to children younger 
than thirteen or fourteen years. After this time the 
stories are too simple to allow any later developments to 
show. This criticism is made in retrospect and derives 
from the work of Kohlberg who had devised moral dilemmas 
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far more complex than those of Piaget which consequently 
allow more scope for discussion of the problem and suggest 
a more complicated six step pattern of moral development 
which extends into early adulthood (see Chapter 4). In 
fact the present study makes use of simple situations 
very similar to those of Piaget and so considers children 
up to twelve years of age only. 
It is apparent from the discussion of Piaget's story 
situations that he poses problems in three separate areas 
of moral behaviour - stealing, damage to property through 
clumsiness, and lying. Piaget's implication is that the 
child develops equally quickly with regard to all three 
areas and indeed displays similar attitudes to each at any 
. particular time. Piaget's failure to provide statistical 
data makes these correlations difficult to ascertain and 
the present study included items relevant to each area to 
test the hypothesis that children develop at different rates 
with regard to each area. In fact there were two tests, 
each comprising a pair of stories, in each of the areas of 
clumsiness, stealing and lies. 
If, as Piaget proposed, the sequence objective re-
sponsibility is invariant then it should be observable no 
matter what is the composition of the sample questioned and 
irrespective of the nature of the stories used. To check on 
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the extent to which Piaget's trends were dependent on the 
particular stories he used, it was decided to compose new 
situations for the present study. The pair of stories 
comprising each test was made similar except for the two 
variables concerned - the intentions of the actors and the 
consequences of their actions; in this way it was hoped 
that the child's attention could not be caught by irrele-
vant issues but that he would be forced to concentrate only 
on these two variables. These are the test items used: 
A. Clumsiness 
Test I story (a) One day, while his sister was 
out at work, John thought he would 
give her a surprise and clean her 
records for her. He started wiping 
them with a cloth but then he 
accidentally caught a pile with his 
elbow, knocked them on the floor and 
four records got broken. 
story (b) David had been told not to touch 
his sister's records. One day he was 
looking at them and he dropped one on 
the floor and it broke. 
Test II story (a) Susan liked to help her mother. 
One day while her mother was out 
shopping Susan decided to wash the 
breakfast plates. She had a pile of 
them in her hands and they were very 
slippy. She dropped them on the floor 
and six plates got broken. 
Story (b) Jennifer was often a nuisance. 
One day, after her mother had washed 
up the breakfast dishes, Jennifer 
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started to mess about and splash in 
the sink. She wasn't very careful 
though and she knocked one plate on 
the floor and broke it. 
B. Stealing 
Test III story (a) Carol wanted some sweets but she 
Test IV 
C. Lying 
Test V 
Test VI 
had spent all her pocket money. So she 
went into her mother's purse and took a 
shilling. She spent it on some chocolate 
and then ate all the chocolate herself. 
story (b) Pauline felt sorry for a friend who 
never got any pocket money from her parents. 
One day, Pauline went into her own mother's 
purse and she took half-a-crown. She spent 
it on some chocolate and then gave all the 
chocolate to this friend. 
story (a) Jean knew that the old lady next door 
was very poor and hungry, so one day she 
went into her mother's 'fridge and took some 
butter and eggs and cheese and she gave all 
these things to the old lady. 
story (b) Lynne took a small packet of sweets 
from her mother's bag and she hid behind a 
chair and ate them all up. 
story (a) Stephen didn't like the dog next door. 
One day he went and told his mother that it 
had chased him and it hadn't. 
story (b) Richard went to the circus. Among the 
things he saw were a clown juggling and an 
elephant. The next day he told his friends 
that he had seen an elephant jugg1ing. 
story (a) A boy was playing in the front room when 
he knockea over a china doll and broke it. 
He told his father that the cat had done it. 
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story (b) A boy and his young sister were playing 
in the front room when the girl knocked over 
a china doll and broke it. The boy did not 
want his sister to get into trouble so he 
told his father that he had seen the doll 
walk to the edge of the table and jump off 
all by itself. 
The rationale behind the first four tests (relating to 
clumsiness and stealing) is fairly straightforward: the child 
judging by objective responsibility wil indicate John, Susan. 
Pauline and Jean as the worse culprits since their actions had 
the most serious consequences; the child judging by.subjective 
responsibility will consider the motives of each of these four 
actors and conclude that David, Jennifer, Carol and Lynne are 
worse since their motives were inexcusable compared with those 
of the others. 
The situations for lies are slightly less obvious; here 
the variables are the credibility of the lie and its con-
sequences as well as the motives of the actors. Thus the child 
judging by objective responsibility would say that lies Vb and 
VIb were worse because they would not be believed; children 
judging by subjective responsibility would say that lie Va was 
worse because it was spiteful and because the other boy had 
made a mistake. while lie VIa was worse because it was selfish 
and because the other boy was only trying to protect his sister. 
These test items were not checked on a pilot sample 
because of the lack of time available. However, their usefulness 
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in distinguishing the two forms of moral judgement proposed 
by Piaget is demonstrated by the results obtained from the 
main sample and reported in Chapter 6. 
The adoption of Piaget's techniques for the investi-
gation of moral development, immediately restricts the scope 
of this empirical study. It was pointed out earlier that 
there could be distinguished perhaps three general aspects 
of morality which were behaviour, guilt feelings after trans-
gressions and knowledge of right and wrong (see Wright, 1968). 
Intercorre1ations among these three are rare and it has been 
suggested that they function independently. 
The present study focusses on the last of these three 
aspects of morality - the distinction of right and wrong, 
good and bad, better and worse, etc. in relation to somewhat 
artificial test situations. The child's verdict in such 
tests is not necessarily an indication of the way he would 
behave in similar circumstances; n~wou1d he necessarily feel 
guilty should he behave in a manner which he now denounces. 
The ability to decide relative culpability is very important 
however and it is impossible for guilt feelings to appear 
without the individual's knowledge of behaviour which is 
prescribed, or more particularly proscribed, by his society 
or subgroup. Only when the individual has this ability to 
judge the relative worth of various actions can his behaviour 
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be said to be immoral or even moral; before this time it should 
be regarded as amoral and the way in which the capacity to 
judge the actions of others (and consequently those of oneself) 
develops is an important area of study (see Chapter 4, Figure 4). 
3. Sample 
It was suggested earlier that if the trend in moral 
judgement from objective responsibility to subjective re-
sponsibility was universal and inevitable, as Piaget believed, 
then any large sample of children over the relevant age range 
should show this progression. However, completely random 
selection of subjects allows no control over variables which 
might affect the child's performance and which therefore 
would be worth checking. A large sample stratified to 
balance out the variables of interest would perform the 
double function of testing Piaget's proposed developmental 
trend whilst giving an indication of factors which might 
influence performance in these tests of moral judgement. 
In Chapter 3 we noted that such variables as social 
class, intelligence, sex, the nature of test items and the 
child's social relationships had all been related to per-
formance along the developmental dimensions of Piaget's 
analysis of moral judgement. The present sample was 
stratified by sex to include equal numbers of boys and 
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girls and by social class to give a manual/non-manual dichotomy 
of 70%/30%. The first control over sex was to allow the 
testing of the hypothesis that boys and girls develop at 
different rates with regard to Piaget's tests of moral judge-
ment; the equal distribution of boys and girls ~lso conformed 
to the population figures for Sheffield schools where the 
2 
sexes are more or less equally re~resented. 
The social class division Was made to afford a general-
ization from any trends discernable in the sample to the 
Sheffield school popUlation and to the general U.K. school 
population. 
The sample was, of course, stratified by age groups 
within the range 7-12 years inclusive to compare with 
Sheffield school population data3 and a 1 in 100 sample 
yielded a sample size of 368 children which was small 
enough to handle fairly comfortably and yet large enough 
to allow the appearance of any developmental trends. This 
age range was selected because the story situations used 
appeared too simple for children older than twelve years and 
communication difficulties were anticipated with children of 
five and six years or younger. The age range studied includes 
Piaget's figure of 9-10 years which marks the final change 
from moral judgements based on outcome to those based on 
intentions. 
The sample was selected from children in the two largest 
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comprehensive schools in Sheffield plus their respective 
4 feeder junior schools. Table VII reports the sample 
structure5 and the school population from which it was 
6 drawn at random. 
Table VII School Population And Sample Sizes By 
Age, Sex And Social Class 
SAMPLE POPULATION 
Age (yrs) Manual ~on-anual Total Manual ~on-anual 
7 Boys 24 10 34 157 35 
Girls 24 10 34 148 30 
8 Boys 22 10 32 191 40 Girls 22 10 32 193 46 
9 Boys 22 10 32 169 38 Girls 22 10 32 143 30 
Boys 20 10 30 171 31 10 Girls 20 10 30 167 33 
Boys 20 8 28 168 38 11 Girls 20 8 28 155 33 
Boys 20 8 28 231 57 12 Girls 20 8 28 225 40 
Totals Boys 256 112 368 2118 451 Girls , 
Total 
192 
178 
231 
239 
207 
173 
202 
200 
206 
188 
288 
265 
2569 
An important variable which was not controlled in the 
sampling is intelligence; this factor has, of course, been 
correlated with better performance on Piaget's tests of 
moral judgement and its complete ignoring would be a serious 
omission. Information on each child's intelligence was 
collected after the interviews had been completed and its 
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effects are discussed in Chapter 6. 
4. The Interview 
So far we have indicated the nature of the test materials 
and the composition of the sample for the present study. The 
technical problem is to make sure that the subjects under-
stand each pair of stories and have the chance to appreciate 
the difference in content. No matter how carefully a state-
ment is written down, different accentuation may alter the 
whole emphasis. It was therefore decided against having the 
children read the stories themselves; instead, the stories 
were read out in pairs by the author who was, with practice, 
able to repeat the desire emphases the same each time. Apart 
from using tape-recorded material, which might easily have 
detracted from any rapport which might be established, this 
was the nearest to identical reproduction which could be 
achieved. 
In fact, several factors contributed to a good rapport 
in the interview situation. First, the interviews were 
carried out in rooms with which the children were familiar; 
the actual situations varied from classrooms where available 
to changing rooms, teacher's rooms and even school foyers. 
All but the last afforded a degree of privacy and quiet 
essential to any interview. Second, the interviews were 
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carried out in lesson time; the children had no opportunity 
1 
to refuse although it seems unlikely that many would have 
done so had they been given the choice. Several of the 
younger children presented communication problems but only 
one subject - an eleven year old girl - was what'one could 
11 t · 8 G 1 ca uncoopera 1ve. enera 1y the interview was perhaps 
seen as a not unwelcome break in the school day. 
A final factor which helped establish a good rapport 
was the novelty of the situation. A genuine interest was 
shown in each child's opinions and the conversation which 
developed was more than the normal teacher-child relation-
ship might allow. In fact, the interest shown in the study 
was impressive, especially in the junior schools where one 
would be surrounded by a gang of children wanting to know 
the purpose of the study. Naturally, those children who 
were seen later on in any school had had the chance to hear 
about the study from their friends who had been interviewed 
earlier; however, it is unlikely that having previous know-
ledge of the study influenced the children's performance at 
all since they mostly knew the investigator as 'that man who 
asks you questions' without knowledge of the nature of the 
questions. 
As.the number of the interviews completed increased (to 
368 in all) it was found that the same introductions to the 
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stories and the same emphases within the stories were being 
used; it may be helpful if a verbatim report of the intro-
ductory 'patter- is given. Each child was seen individually 
and was sent for by name and so the investigator knew who 
to expect. As the interview proceded the investigator filled 
in the schedule outline in Figure 5. The child was able to 
Figure 5 Part of the Children's Interview Schedule 
(Tests II-VI were reported on the schedule 
in identical fashion to Test I). 
School • • • • • • • • • • Date •• • • Interview No. 
Name •• . . . . . . • Address • • • • • • • • • 
Age. • • • • • Date of Birth • • • • • • •• Form 
• • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
Father's Job. • • • • • •• Mother's Job. • • • • • • • • 
Test I 
Repeat O.K. 
Do you think one child is naughtier than the other? 
(i) If no : Why not? What did each child do? 
(ii) If yes: Which one? 
Why is he worse? 
What about the other child? 
Test II 
Repeat O.K. 
Do you think • • • 
see what was written down and was also able to see each story 
(which was read from a printed card) although they were upside-
down to him, of course. The interview would proceed as follows : 
You're John Smith, aren't you? Sit down there please 
John. Have you heard what I am doing from your friends? 
Well, I'm going to tell you a few stories and then ask 
you some questions about them. O.K.? 
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Right. First of all, you're nine years old aren't you? 
And when is your birthday? Do you know what your Dad 
does at work? And does your Mum go out to work or does 
she stay at home all day? 
Now, I'll tell you these stories two at a time. Then 
I'll ask you to tell me what happened in each story, 
and then I'll ask you some questions about them. O.K.? 
Here's the·first one. 
Some difficulties may be brought in at this point. It 
was already known from school records whether the child's 
father was a manual or a ~on-manual worker; the question 
included here was a check on this information and was also 
a lead-in to the question of maternal occupation about which 
nothing was known. It may be argued that personal information 
such as age, occupation, etc. is best left till later on in 
the interview; while this may be true for adults there was no 
difficulty in obtaining these details from the children and it 
was felt to be no disadvantage to have these questions right 
at the beginning. 9 
The next step in the children's interviews was to read 
out the first pair of stories; then the child was asked to 
repeat what had happened in each story. The aim here was to 
make sure that the child had understood each story; he was 
therefore helped by prompting where necessary and assisted 
through the story repeat. When it was thought that the child 
had in fact understood each situation the interview proceeded 
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as follows : 
Was one of those children worse than the other? Was 
one naughtier than the other? 
Which one? 
Why is that? tihat makes him worse? And what about 
the other child? Why isn't he as bad? 
Normally the child would answer 'first one' or 'second 
one'; rarely was there no answer at all or one of 'no·· 
difference'. Should one of these unproductive answers arise 
the child would be asked to repeat the two stories and again 
asked if one child was worse than the other. In less than half-
a-dozen cases was an answer distinguishing the relative naughti-
ness of the children in the stories notobtained.10 If no 
response was met at first the child would be asked ; 
Or: 
If you were the children's mother (or father) 
found out what each child had done, would you 
Which child would you be angriest with? Why? 
wouldn't you be as angry with the other child? 
and you 
be angry? 
Why 
Which child would you punish the most? Why? Why 
wouldn't you punish the other child as much? 
Following the distinction between the children, a tick 
was marked on the schedule opposite Test I and a figure 1 or 
2 was written down depending which child was thought to be 
worse. In fact, this tick indicated that the child had re-
peated the stories correctly but it probably acted as a 
psychological reinforcement for the child to justify his 
choice; he thought that the tick indicated that he had made 
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a correct choice and so was willing to support his view. 
The subjects were asked to explain why the child in the 
other story was less naughty in order to check that they had 
-
a relevant reason for this part of their choice. There is, 
in fact, no absolute answer to the question 'Which child is 
worse?'; there are two possible responses, one of which 
derives from a morality of constraint and objective re-
sponsibility and the other from a morality of co-operation and 
subjective responsibility. Piaget claims that the morality 
of constraint is more typical of younger children, while the 
older children judge according to a morality of cooperation. 
The answers pertaining to each type of morality are termed 
immature and mature respectively in the discussion below, 
although it is appar~nt that Piaget's second stage of moral 
development is not the final stage of moral maturity (see, 
for example, the work of Kohlberg outlined above in Chapter 4). 
Now, it is likely by the laws of probability that a child 
can guess the answers to the questions posed and come up with 
a seemingly mature ans~r in half the cases. For this reason 
the subject was asked to explain why the child he chose was 
worse than the other and why the other was not as bad. There 
are three possible categories of reply : 
(a) No answer - the child cannot explain why he chose as he did. 
(b) A 'correct' answer - the immature child judges by outcome 
J, 
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(e.g. the boy who broke four records is worse than the 
boy who broke one record because he broke more), while 
the mature child judges by intent (the boy who had been 
told not to touch the records was worse than the boy 
who was trying to surprise his sister). 
(e) An irrelevant answer - e.g. the boy who breaks four 
records is worse because you shouldn't clean people's 
records; the boy who told the lie about the cat is 
worse because you shouldn't tell lies about cats. 
In some cases an irrelevant answer to the first probe 
regarding the worse child may be obviated by a seorable 
answer to the second probe about the less naughty child. In 
order to eliminate as many irrelevant responses as possible 
the paired stories were made very similar; ideally, the only 
variables were the items on which the judgements were made 
(i.e. the intentions of the children and the results of the 
misbehaviour). 
Thus, both stories in Test I deal with breaking records, 
on Test II with breaking plates; Test III deals with stealing 
money, Test IV with stealing goods; Test VI considers the 
breakage of a china doll. Only Test V presents a difficulty, 
since one lie is about a dog and the other about an elephant. 
A possible irrelevant reason for considering the second lie 
to be worse might be that 'it is wrong to tell lies about 
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elephants' or 'he told the lie to a lot of people and not just 
to his mother (i.e. one person),.ll 
Piaget makes no mention of irrelevant answers although 
one presumes that he had some. In The Moral Judgement of the 
Child Piaget's stories about clumsiness and stealing are 
comparable in content and would therefore tend to eliminate 
irrelevancies (Piaget, 1932, pp. 118-19). However, the 
stories about lies are not as standardized (Piaget, 1932, 
pp. 145-46) and the possibility of irrelevant answers"must 
increase. 
5. Scoring 
After the interview each child's answers were scored on 
the interview schedule. Each interview lasted about fifteen 
to twenty minutes and about fourteen interviews were completed 
per school day. The scoring system used ranged from 1 to 7 
points; since a score of 1 point meant that the subject could 
make no distinction between the stories, and since these cases 
were very few, the minimum score per test was 2 points in 
practice and with six tests to score the total could range 
from 12 to 42 points. As explained abover there are three 
possible categories of answer; they were scored as shown in 
Figure 6. 
To achieve extreme scores the child had to give both 
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the appropriate answer and the appropriate reason for the 
answer. For example, a score of 2 points was awarded only 
Figure 6 Scoring Schedule for Children's Answers 
Mature Answer Immature Answer No Answer 
Correct No Incorrect Incorrect No Correct Both the 
Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason S~e 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
if the child said that an act was worse because it had the most 
serious consequences. The following examples, taken from actual 
answers given in the study, should help clarify the scoring system. 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
Typical Reply 
both children were equally naughty; they were 
both the same. 
Test I - John is worse because he broke four 
plates and David only broke one. 
often no reason given for a particular choice; 
or the subject may lapse into tautology saying, 
for example, that in Card IV Richard's is the 
worse lie 'because it is the biggest lie'. 
Test III - Jennifer is worse because if her 
friend's parents found out then the friend might 
have been accused of stealing. (This answer is 
based in the seriousness of the result of the 
act but relies on a much less obvious reason 
than is normal.) 
Test V - Stephen is worse because you shouldn't 
tell lies about dogs • 
. no reason given for a particular choice. 
Test II - Jennifer is worse because she was messing 
about; the other girl was trying to help. 
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In this manner scores were obtained for each of the 368 
subjects in the sample. It was expected that a positive 
correlation of age and score would be found; the extent to 
which this was realized is discussed in Chapter 6. 
6. Summuy 
The obscurities and omissions of Piaget's study of moral 
judgements were discussed in detail and it was acknowledged 
that replication work would be valuable in providing statistics 
to check Piaget's proposed developmental trends and to ascertain 
the effects of certain variables on the child's rate of develop-
mente 
Limitations of time precluded the investigation of all but 
one of Piaget's eleven dimensions (objective responsibility). 
The development of this dimension was considered in relation to 
three areas of moral conduct - clumsiness, stealing and lies -
and two tests, fashioned after those of Piaget, were devised 
for each area. 
Although it should be possible to see the trends suggested 
by Piaget in any large sample across the relevant age range, it 
was decided to stratify the present sample in order to afford 
comparability with the Sheffield and U.K. popUlations. The 
sample of 368 children aged 7-12 years represented 1% of the 
Sheffield schoolchildren in this age range. Equal numbers of 
boys and girls were included and a social class divi$ion (70% 
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manual - 30% non-manual) was made. 
A far more standardised form of questioning was adopted 
for the present study than that used by Piaget; ho~ever, this 
approach did allow a sensitive probing of the reasoning behind 
children's responses. A scoring system was devised which was 
based both in the child's judgements of particular actions as 
better or worse and in his reasons for this choice. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MORAL DEVELOPHENT - TRENDS AND INFLUENCES 
This chapter has two broad aims. First, the age trends 
obtained from the present tests of moral development in 
children are compared with those suggested by Piaget in 
The Moral Judgement of the Child (1932) to see the extent 
to which Piaget's ideas may be supported. Second, a much 
more detailed analysis of the present data is undertaken 
in order to check on a variety of factors (notably sex, 
intelligence, social class and the nature of specific test 
items) which might be expected to influence the child's 
performance in tests of moral judgement. The various 
graphs needed for the following discussion are contained 
in the wallet on the inside back cover of the thesis; these 
graphs are drawn on individual sheets of tracing paper to 
allow superimposition and comparison of trends from time 
to time. 
1. General Age Trends In Moral Judgement 
In his discussion of moral development Piaget isolated 
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eleven separate moral dimensions (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
The present investigation considered one of these 
dimensions - objective responsibility. In this area, 
Piaget tested subjects' responses to story situations 
in which children stole, told lies or caused damage to 
another's property. The nature of Piaget's stories and 
those used in the present study have already been dis-
cussed (see Chapters 2 and 5). 
In relation to this moral dimension Piaget proposed 
two forms of judgement, which he termed objective re-
sponsibility and subjective responsibility. The first 
was typified by reference to the consequences of an action 
as the only criterion for judgement as good or bad, better 
or worse, etc; the second form was typified by a consider-
ation of motives as the chief determinant of blame. Piaget 
suggested that both forms of judgement were present in 
children up to about ten years of age (perhaps even in an 
individual child from one time to another) while the 
subjective form of judgement dominated after this time; 
the average age of children showing objective judgements 
was seven years while that of children showing subjective 
judgements was nine years (Piaget, 1932, pp. 119-20). 
Unfortunately, this very brief indication of age 
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trends for each form of judgement is all that Piaget 
gives; he provides no breakdown of his data in table or 
graph form. Comparisons with Piaget's trends are there-
fore more difficult to make but even on a very broad 
level of analysis certain differences may be seen 
between the present data and that of Piaget. 
With the scoring system devised for the present 
study, a score of 2, 3 or 4 points was given to responses 
which showed evidence of objective responsibility; such 
responses were termed immature. A score of 5, 6 or 7 points 
was given to responses which showed evidence of subjective 
responsibility; such responses were termed mature. Full 
results indicating frequency of particular scores at each 
age level are given in Appendix A. 
Consider Table VIII which showB the number and per-
centage frequency of immature responses to all tests of 
TABLE VIII Freguencl of Immature ResEonses bl 
A~e - A~~re~ate Scores 
Age (years) 
12 11 10 9_ 8 7 
N 42 42 86 167 224 235 
% 12 12 24 43 58 58 
moral judgement, and also look at Graph la which is derived 
from these data~ Generally, it can be seen that the 
percentage frequency of immature answers declines with 
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increasing age. On a broad level this trend is predicted 
by Piaget but two points are worth noting. 
First, Piaget states that 'we did not come across a 
single case of objective responsibility after the age of 
10'(1932, p. 120). In the present study elements of 
objective responsibility were found in 24% of the moral 
judgements of children aged 10 years, and in 12% of 
children aged 11 and 12 years. 
Second, the tendency for illimature responses to decline 
with age is not perfect. Equal numbers (58%) of children 
aged 7 and 8 years showed evidence of immature moral 
judgements; similarly equal numbers (12%) of children aged 
11 and 12 years showed this evidence. Piaget suggests a 
constant decline in immature answers with age. 
A possible explanation of the greater frequency of 
immature ansers at the higher age levels compared with 
Piaget's data could lie in the different natures of the 
test situations used in each study; this point is discussed 
in more detail later on.. However, relative difficulty 
seems inadequate as a full explanation and in fact a 
better account is given by another approach. The frequency 
of immature answers from the younger children was reduced 
by the consistently mature responses of a small group of 
7 and 8 year olds; the frequency of immature answers from 
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the older children was similarly increased by the con-
sistent1y immature responses of a small group of 11 and 
12 year old children. 2 
The effect which the responses of these children 
had can be seen from Table IX and Graph 1b which ignore 
TABLE IX Freguenc~ of Immature ResEonses 
by Age - Ag&regate Scores (corrected) 
Age (years) 
12 11 10 9 8 7 
N 11 11 86 167 224 230 
4 4 24 43 63 67 
the data for the groups of exceptions. The frequencies of 
immature responses become more extreme, rising to 67% and 
63% for children aged 7 and 8 years respectively and 
falling to 4% for children aged 11 and 12 years. Even 
this correction does not allow the complete disappearance 
of immature modes of thought in older children, however, 
and the residual 4% of immature responses is scattered 
through the replies of the remaining children and across 
the six separate tests of moral judgement employed (see 
Appendix A). 
Piaget makes no mention of exceptional performances 
and it is possible that there were none, although the 
fairly high frequency of exceptional scores in the present 
data suggests that this is unlikely. Even when allowance 
is made for those few children whose responses were con-
sistently exceptional for their age then occasional 
anomalous scores were still encountered. 
The frequency of immature responses is less e~treme 
at the lower end of the age range studied than at the upper 
end. This indicates the mixture of mature and immature 
responses predicted by Piaget. It is only after about 
8~ years of age that more mature judgements begin to 
predominate. 
2. Age Trends For Three Areas Of Moral Judeement 
The trends reported above considered the child's 
performance aggregated over six tests of moral judgement. 
The present study was designed to provide a balance among 
three aspects of morality - clumsiness, lying and stealing -
in order to test the hypothesis that children develop at 
different rates with regard to each. Table X and Graphs 
2a, band c present the data for each separate area. 
The trends displayed in each area are fairly similar. 
Appendix B reports the results of a test of the sig-
nificance of the differences among the three areas and, 
in fact, only one significant difference was apparent -
between stealing and lying for children aged 7 years. 
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This would suggest a high comparability among the areas of 
moral judgement tested and would refute the hypothesis that 
children mature at significantly different rates in the 
separate areas. 
TABLE X 
Age 
(years) 
C: 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Frequency of Immature 
Responses by Age - Area Scores 
Number Percentage 
C S L C S L 
10 14 18 9 12 16 
10 12 20 9 11 18 
27 25 34 22 21 28 
57 47 63 ·45 37 49 
78 76 70 61 59 55 
77 88 70 57 65 52 
Clumsiness S: Stealing LI Lies 
Once again the effects of the two groups of 
exceptional children can be seen. This is most clearly 
demonstrated on Graph 2a where the expected downward 
trend of immature answers with age is modified at both 
ends of the age range; the same tendency may be seen in 
the younger children on Graph 2c and in the elder 
children on Graph 2b. Individual comparison of Graphs 
2a, band c with Graph lc (derived from Table XI) 
indicates the precise effect of the exceptional children 
for different areas of moral judgement; generally this 
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effect is to push the frequency of i~~ature responses 
nearer the extreme values, although only in the area of 
clumsiness do irrmature responses disappear altogether in 
children aged 11 years and over. 
TABLE XI Freguency of Immature 
Responses by Age - Area Scores (corrected) 
Age 
(years) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
C 
0 
0 
27 
57 
78 
76 
C: Clumsiness 
Number Percentage 
S L C S L 
3 8 0 3 8 
3 9 0 3 9 
25 34 22 21 28 
47 63 45 37 49 
76 70 66 64 59 
86 68 66 75 60 
S: Stealing L: Lies 
The general tendency of the data presented in Graphs 2at 
band c and lc is for the child's attitudes to stealing and 
clumsiness to mature more rapidly than his attitudes to lies, 
although these trends do not assume any statistical sig-
nificance. 
3. Age Trends For Individual Tests 
The discussion of the age trends for separate areas of 
moral judgement above showed that there were no significant 
differences in the child's rate of development with regard 
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to clumsiness, stealing or lying. This in turn argues in 
favour of a generalized level of maturity, at least in 
respect of the dimension of objective responsibility; also 
it argues against the specificity of moral judgements 
proposed by such workers as Durkin (e.g. 1959c) and Boehm 
(1963a) - children's moral judgements in the present study 
were not influenced by the general area of moral be-
haviour in question. 
However, there is a further, more detailed, level of 
analysis which can be pursued bearing in mind the problem 
of the specificity of moral jUdgements. This involves a 
consideratiQn of the age trends in maturity of response 
to individual test items, of which there were six in 
the present study. Table XII and Graphs 3a, band c 
present the relevant data. 
Comparison of Graphs 3a, band c with Graphs 2a, b 
and c respectively shows the extent of the variation from 
the average trends for each area produced by individual, 
tests. The age trends for clumsiness (Graphs 2a and 3a) 
are almost identical for each test, suggesting a high 
comparability between them. The trends for stealing 
show wiser variation than those for clumsiness although 
the differences are fairly constant for each age level. 
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Tne age trends for lying show great variation among younger 
children but very little difference is apparent in older 
children. 
TABLE XII 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age Test Scores 
Number 
C S L C 
I II III IV V VI I 
6 4 9 5 8 10 11 
5 5 8 4 9 11 9 
14 13 15 10· 16 18 22 
28 29 31 16 24 39 44 
39 39 42 34 28 42 61 
.38 39 51 31 28 42 56 
II 
7 
9 
20 
45 
61 
58 
C: Clumsiness s: Stealing L: Lies 
Percentage 
S 
III IV 
16 9 
14 7 
25 17 
48 26 
66 52 
75 54 
L 
V 
16 
16 
27 
38 
44 
42 
As these trends suggest there are only isolated statistically 
significant differences between pairs of tests comprising each 
area (see Appendix C). In fact, there are no significant 
differences to be found at any age level for clumsiness (Tests 
I and II); for stealing (Tests III and IV) significant differences 
were found at ages 7 and 9 years; for lying (Tests V and VI) they 
were found at ages 7. 8 and 9 years. Test V appears easier to 
answer than do any of the other tests, especially when younger 
children are concerned. 
Comparisons between tests in different categories of moral 
VI 
18 
20 
30 
60 
66 
62 
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behaviour also reveal isolated significant differences (see 
Appendix C). One feature of these differences (and of 
those noted above within the areas of clumsiness, stealing 
and lying) which is worth noting is that the highest age 
at which they achieve significance is 9 years. Only the 
younger children show significantly different rates of 
development (i.e. experience significantly greater difficulty) 
in their responses to individual tests. This finding is 
consistent with Piaget's contention that both forms of 
judgement (objective and subjective; immature and mature) 
can be found in children under 10 years of age (Piaget, 1932, 
p. 119). This does not deny the fact that, contrary to 
Piaget's suggestion (1932, p. 120), this mixture of levels 
of judgement was apparent in the present sample for children 
aged 10 years and over but the differences in this age 
group were of a much lower order, never achieving statis-
tical significance. 
It seems that younger children have a far less organized 
system of moral judgement and are influenced by the content 
of particular test items (see Appendix C) and, to less 
obvious extent, by the area of moral reasoning under in-
vestigation (see Appendix B). In contrast, the moral 
judgements of older children are generally more consistent 
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and less likely to fluctuation from one situation to another. 
The effects of the responses of the exceptional children 
are again reflected in the age trends for individual tests. 
This is clearly seen for the younger children's responses to 
both tests for clumsiness and lying (Graphs 3a and 3c) and 
for the older children's responses to both tests for stealing 
(Graph 3b). The precise effect of this influence can be 
gauged by comparing Graphs 3a, band c with the corrected 
data in Graphs Id i, ii and iii respectively (see also 
Table XIII). Once more the tendency for the corrected 
TABLE XIII Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age - Test Scores (corrected) 
Number Percentage 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
: 
I 
0 
0 
14 
28 
39 
38 
C S 
II III IV 
0 3 3 
0 3 0 
13 15 10 
29 31 16 
39 42 34 
38 49 35 
L C S 
V VI I II III IV 
4 4 0 0 6 6 
4 6 0 0 6 0 
16 18 22 20 25 17 
24 39 44 45 48 26 
28 42 65 65 70 60 
28 40 67 67 86 62 
V 
8 
8 
27 
38 
45 
49 
C: Clumsiness s: Stealing L: Lies 
frequencies to become more extreme can be picked out. 
L 
VI 
8 
12 
30 
60 
70 
70 
4. Sex Differences In Moral JUdgements 
Several studies have suggested that, in moral judgement 
tests fashioned after those of Piaget, girls perform better 
than boys at all age levels (e.g. Durkin, 1960; Porteous and 
Johnson, 1965; Bull, 1969; see Chapter 3). It is worth 
noting, however, that the many other studies which made use 
of mixed-sex samples do not report any differences in age 
trends for maturity of response between boys and girls. 
On the broadest level, no sex differences can be seen 
in the present data. Table XIV and Graph 4 show the age 
trends for immature responses for boys and girls. There 
TABLE XIV Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Sex - Aggregate Scores 
Number Percentage 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
12 18 23 11 13 
11 23 18 13 11 
10 44 42 24 23 
9 76 91 40 47 
8 107 118 56 61 
7 124 111 61 54 
are no significant differences between the two trends (see 
Appendix D). The effect of the two groups of exceptional 
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children noted earlier can be seen in the trend for the 
girls but not for that of the boys.3 
On a more detailed level of analysis Table XV and 
Graphs 5a, band c break down the more general trends into 
TABLE Xl 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Sex - Area Scores 
Number Percentage 
C S L C S 
B G B G B G B G B G B 
3 6 7 7 8 10 5 11 12 12 14 
5 3 6 6 12 9 10 5 11 11 21 
17 10 12 13 15 19 28 17 20 21 25 
24 33 23 24 29 34 38 52 36 38 45 
37 41 38 38 32 39 58 64 59 59 50 
38 39 48 42 38 32 56 58 70 62 56 
L 
G 
18 
16 
31 
53 
61 
48 
C: Clumsiness S: Stealing L: Lies B: Boys G: Girls 
separate areas of moral judgement. The trends are most 
similar for stealing although, once more t the differences 
observable between the sexes never assume any statistical 
significance (see Appendix D). 
The most detailed analysis (by individual test) is 
given in Table XVI and Graphs 6a i and ii, 6b i and ii, and 
6c i and ii. Again none of the differences achieve 
significance and in several cases the trends are almost 
identical (see Appendix D). 
TABLE XVI Frequency of Immature Responses b;r 
Age and Sex - Test Scores 
Age 
(yrs) 
Age 
eyrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
B 
2 
3 
9 
12 
19 
19 
B 
8 
11 
30 
38 
57 
I 
G 
4-
2 
5 
16 
20 
19 
I 
G 
16 
7 
17 
50 
62 
C 
II 
B G 
1 2 
2 1 
8 5 
12 17 
18 21 
19 20 
C 
II 
B G 
4 8 
7 4-
26 17 
38 53 
57 66 
\ Number 
S 
III IV 
B G B G B 
6 3 1 4- 4-
4 4- 2 2 4 
7 8 5 5 6 
17 14- 6 10 10 
21 21 17 17 11 
28 23 20 19 16 
Percentage 
S 
III IV 
B G B G B 
22 10 4- 14 14-
14 14- 7 7 14-
23 26 17 17 20 
51 44 20 32 31 
66 66 52 52 32 
V 
V 
7 .56 .56 56 59 82 68 59 56 49, 
.. 
VI 
G B G 
4 4 6 
5 8 4-
10 9 9 
14- 19 20 
18 21 21 
12 22 20 
L 
VI 
G B G 
14 14- 22 
18 28 ~4-
33 30 30 
44 58 62 
56 66 66 
37 64 59 
C: Clumsiness s: Stealing L: Lies B: Boys G: Girls 
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Aee trends in moral maturity for boys and girls never 
showed any significant differences. However, there is a 
definite impression given by the data, especially in its 
most detailed form, that girls perform worse than boys at 
the younger age levels but better than boys at the higher 
age levels; generally, the changeover took place between 
ages 9 and 10 years. These findings contrast with those 
of other studies in which a consistent female advantage 
has been noted (see Chapter 3). 
5. Intelligence And Moral Judgements 
It has been suggested that the child's performance 
on Piaget's tests of moral development is heavily dependent 
on cognitive abilities and is therefore related to in-
telligence. The relationship between higher intelligence 
and better performance has been demonstrated in several 
studies of objective responsibility and other dimensions 
of Piaget's scheme (see Chapter 3). 
Table XVII reports the age trends for immature 
answers aggregated over the six moral judgement tests 
for three intelligence groups: A - above average; 
B - average; C - below average; Appendix E reports the 
results of X2 tests carried out between the frequencies 
TABLE XVII 
Age 
(years) 
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Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Intelligence - Aggregate Scores 
Number Percentage 
A B C A B C 
12 13 15 11 9 18 11 
11 10 14 16 6 17 22 
10 19 34 32 21 17 48 
9 15 47 107 28 33 58 
8 23 105 92 38 56 67 
7 35 132 69 42 67 55 
A: above average I.Q. B: average I.Q. C: below average I.Q. 
TABLE XVIII Freguency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Intelligence - Area Scores 
Age 
(yrs) 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
C 
1 
0 
4 
4 
4 
12 
2 
0 
14 
22 
20 
43 
A 
S L 
5 7 
3 7 
6 9 
4 7 
7 12 
11 11 
10 14-
5 11 
2,0 30 
22 38 
35 60 
39 40 
Number 
B 
C S L C 
5 2 8 3 
4 3 7 5 
13 6 15 10 
16 14 17 37 
42 36 27 30 
43 50 39 22 
Percenta e 
19 8 31 3 
14 11 25 5 
19 9 22 10 
33 30 36 37 
70 58 44 30 
64 75 58 22 
C 
S L 
5 3 
5 6 
13 9 
31 39 
32 30 
27 20 
5 3 
5 6 
13 9 
31 39 
32 30 
27 20 
A: above aterage I.Q. B: average I.Q. C: below averageI.Q. 
C: Clumsiness S: Stealing L: Lies 
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of mature and immature answers in each intelligence group 
at each age level; tLese data show differences significant 
at the 0.001 level for age groups 7 to 10 years, at the 
0.01 level for the 11 year olds and at the 0.05 level for 
the 12 year olds. In other words at each age level there 
are highly significant variations present in the data which 
are caused by intelligence differences. 
In order to point out the precise effects of varying 
intelligence it is necessary to examine"the computation 
of X2 more closely. The three columns headed (fo - fe> 
in Appendix E indicate the difference between the observed 
(fo> and expected (fe ) frequencies at each age level for 
each intelligence group plus the direction of this 
difference. Since the data refer to immature answers, a 
negative figure, indicating fewer immature answers than 
would appear by chance, indicates that the performance 
is better than expected; a positive figure indicates a 
worse performance than that expected by chance. The size 
of the figures indicates the strength of the variation 
from the data expected by chance. 
Children of above average intelligence (group A) 
performed better than expected at all age levels; children 
of below average intelligence (group C) performed worse 
than expected at all age levels except for age 7 years, 
where they performed slightly better and age 12 years where 
they just about broke even. Children of average intelligence 
(sroup B) performed better than expected at three age levels 
and worse than expected at the other three. 
These trends are reflected in Graph 7 and are consistent 
with the findings of other studies which have indicated the 
advantages afforded in Piaget's tests by higher intelligence 
(see Chapter 3). Generally the line for group C is highest 
at each age level and that for group A is lowest, indicating 
their worse and better performances respectively. 
On a more detailed level of analysis Table XVIII presents 
the age trends of the three intelligence groups for the three 
area of moral conduct investigated in the present study -
clumsiness, stealing and lies. Appendix F reports the 
results of X2 tests evaluating the significance of the 
frequency differences between the intelligence groups at 
each age level; these results are neither as consistent nor 
as significant as those reported for aggregate scores 
(c.f. Appendix E). 
Generally, where significant differences appear, they 
support the finding that higher intelligence improves per-
formance on Piagetian tests of moral judgement. There is 
considerable variation between areas of judgement, however. 
The data reported in Appendix F suggest that varying 
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intelligence has its greatest effect when test items referring 
to clumsiness are considered since at four of the six age 
levels the differences between the intelligence groups were 
significant, in two cases (ages 8 and 9 years) beyond the 
0.01 level. All the results for clumsiness indicate the 
better performance of group A (above average intelligence) 
and the worse performance of group C (below average 
intelligence~. 
For stealing, results at two age levels (7 and 10 
years) were significantly different beyond the 0.01 level 
while those at two more levels (8 and 9 years) were 
slightly below significance at the 0.05 level. Again 
group A perform better than expected while group C perform 
worse. than expected. 
For lies, only one result (for 9 year old children) 
shows any significant difference among the intelligence 
groups. Therefore, although on aggregate intelligence 
variations produce significantly different performances 
at each age level, this variable has its greatest effect 
in tests relating to clumsiness and only isolated effects in 
tests relating to lies. 
This same pattern is reflected at the most detailed 
level of analysis when individual tests are considered 
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TABLE XIX Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Intelligence - Test Scores 
Number Percentage 
Age 
(yrs) 
Age 
(yrs) 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
I II 
0 1 
0 0 
2 2 
'2 2 
2 2 
6 6 
4 1 
2 2 
7 6 
8 8 
21 21 
21 22 
2 1 
3 2 
5 5 
18 19 
15 15 
11 11 
III IV V VI I II III IV 
Above Average Intelligence (A) 
3 2 4 3 0 4 12 6 
2 1 3 4 0 0 6 4 
4- 2 4 5 14- 14 27 14 
2 2 2 5 22 22 22 22 
5 2 6 6 20 20 50 20 
7 4 5 6 43 43 50 28 
Average Intelligence (B) 
2 0 3 5 30 8 15 0 
2 1 2 5 - 14 14- "14 7 
4 2 8 7 20 18 12 6 
9 5 7 10 33 33 37 22 
18 18 9 18 70 70 58 58 
29 21 17 22 63 66 87 63 
Below Average Intelligence (C) 
2 3 1 2 12 6 12 18 
3 2 3 3 25 16 25 16 
? 6 3 6 45 45 64 56 
20 11 16 23 58 61 64 33 
18 14 13 17 65 65 78 60 
15 12 7 13 54 54 73 58 
V VI 
16 12 
10 12 
27 33 
22 55 
60 60 
36 43 
24 39 
14 35 
24 20 
30 42 
29 58 
51 66 
6 12 
25 25 
28 56 
51 74 
56 74 
32 62 
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(see Table XIX and Graphs 9a i and ii, 9b i and ii and 
9c i and ii). With both tests for Clumsiness and the 
first test for Stealing there is a clear-cut tendency 
for group A to perform better than group B and for 
group B to perform better than group C; in other words 
the advantage gained from higher intelligence is once 
more demonstrated (see Graphs 9a i and ii, and 9b i). 
However, a much more confused pattern is presented 
by the remaining Graphs relating to the second test for 
stealing and both tests for lying: there is much more 
fluctuation from one age level to another for all 
intelligence groups; there are many modifications of 
the expected downward trend in immature answers with age; 
the effect of varying intelligence is far less obvious 
and is often inconsistent with the general patterns 
noted previously. This confusion is most obvious on 
Graphs 9b ii and 9c i, and intelligence groups A and C 
(above and below average respectively) show very similar 
trends on the tests relating to lies. 
The general tendency for higher intelligence to 
correlate with better performance on Piagetian moral 
judgement tests must be modified when tests relating 
to different areas of moral conduct are considered. 
It is not abso~utely clear, however, whether these 
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fluctuations are due to the peculiarities of the area being 
considered or to the peculiarities of individual test items. 
For example, it was suggested that performance on tests V 
and VI showed the little relationship with intelligence -
this implies that these tests were in some way easier than 
other tests since children of below average intelligence 
experienced no more difficulty with them than did children 
of above average intelligence. 
Now, it may be that both tests were easier because 
they relate to lies and because the child finds it easier 
to respond in mature fashion to stories about lies. 
Alternatively, it may be sheer coincidence that the two 
easiest tests relate to lies; there maybe some unknown 
factors in these two stories which render them easier 
than the other stories, independent of the area of moral 
conduct which they depict. In fact, test V is signifi-
cantly easier than test VI for ages 7, 8 and 9 and the 
age trend for test VI shows more similarity with those 
for other tests than does test V (see Graphs 3a, b and c). 
It appears, therefore, that test V is the 'odd man out', 
in relation to ~ the other tests rather than just to 
test VI - tb.at is, its anomo1ous position is not limited 
to the specific area of lying. It may be the child's 
attitude to test V rather than his attitude to lies which 
caused the apparent variations in age trends between 
; 
, j 
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areas which were noted above. 
The standardization of test materials is very difficult 
and little attention is given to it. Five of the six tests 
used in the present study appear to be of equal difficulty 
while the presence of the sixth, easier test was sufficient 
to impute all kinds of bias to other factors. At the present 
time it is by no means certain that the results obtained from 
a single te?t across several similar samples would be constant. 
This is a further aspect of the reliability and comparability 
of tests which could emerge from the more careful standardis-
ation of test materials which, it is suggested here, would be 
a useful contribution to the study of moral development in 
children. 4 
6. Social Class And Moral Judgements 
A final variable which we can examine from the present 
data is social class. It bas been suggested that Piaget's 
tests of moral judgement rely heavily on intellectual 
abilities, that middle class children have higher I.Q's than 
working class children and therefore that middle-class 
children perform better than do working class children in 
Piaget's tests (see Chapter 3). 
Table XX and Graph 10 present the overall trends for 
immature responses by social class. It can be seen clearly 
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that children from middle class homes (i.e. where the 
father follows a non-manual occupation - group B) show 
fewer immature responses than those from ~orking class 
homes (where the father follows a manual occupation -
group A) at all but one age level. The trends for these 
two groups show significant differences at only the two 
youngest age levels (significant beyond the 0.02 level 
of confidence) although the differences for two other 
age groups (10 and 11 years) approach significance 
(see Appendix G). 
TABLE XX Freguency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Social Class - Aggregate Scores 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Number 
A 
27 
35 
58 
118 
177 
177 
A: manual workers 
Percentage 
B A B 
13 11 14 
7 15 7 
19 24 16 
47 45 39 
51 67 42 
58 61 48 
B: non~manual workers 
These trends are repeated on a more detailed level of 
analysis (by area) where middle class children again 
return more mature answers at most age levels (see 
Table XXI and Graphs lla, b and c). This is most consistently 
demonstated in the replies to the tests relating to stealing 
(Graph lIb) although at only one age level (8 years) do the 
differences achieve significance (see Appendix G). For lies 
and clumsiness the biggest differences appear between the 
classes in the responses of the younger children, never 
achieving significance after the age of 9 years. 
TABLE XXI Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Social Class - Area Scores 
Number Percentage 
Age 
(yrs) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
C: Clumsiness 
A 
6 
8 
19 
39 
64 
60 
A: manual workers 
/ .' 
.. 
C S 
B A B 
3 11 2 
0 10 2 
8 22 4 
18 35 12 
16 60 18 
19 63 23 
s: Stealing 
B: 
L C S 
A B J!. B A B 
10 8 b 9 14 6 
17 5 10 0 12 6 
27 7 24 20 28 10 
44 17 44 45 40 30 
53 17 73 40 68 45 
54 16 62 48 66 58 
L: Lies 
non-manual workers 
The advantage of middle class children is reflected 
in the data for individual tests (see Table XXII and 
L 
A 
12 
21 
34 
50 
60 
56 
G~hs 12a 1 and 11, 12b 1 and il and 12c i and il); again 
the differences apparent between the classes rarely achieve 
significance and only do so at the youngest age levels 
B 
25 
16 
18 
42 
42 
40 
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TABLE XXII Frequency of Immature Responses by 
Age and Social Class - Test Scores 
Age 
(years) 
Age 
(years) 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Clumsiness 
I II 
A B A B 
4 2 2 1 
5 0 3 0 
9 5 10 3 
19 9 20 9 
31 9 33 7 
29 9 31 10 
10 12 5 7 
12 0 8 0 
22 25 25 15 
43 45 45 45 
71 45 75 35 
61 45 65 50 
Stealing 
III IV 
A B A B 
Number 
6 2 5 0 
7 1 3 1 
14 2 8 2 
22 9 13 3 
32 11 28 7 
35 14 28 9 
Percentage 
15 12 12 0 
18 7 8 7 
35 10 20 10 
50 45 29 15 
73 55 64 35 
73 70 59 45 
Lies 
V 
A B A 
5 3 5 
6 3 11 
13 3 14 
15 7 29 
22 6 31 
22 6 32 
12 21 12 
15 21 28 
34 15 35 
34 35 66 
50 30 71 
46 30 66 
A: manual workers B: non-manual workers 
VI 
.B 
5 
2 
4 
10 
11 
10 
3) 
14 
20 
50 
55 
50 
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see (Appendix G). The results for test V show the biggest 
fluctuations from one age group to another and at no age 
levels do immature answers constitute more than 50% of 
responses; in these two ways test V further contrasts with 
the other tests. 
Generally these results support previous findings 
of a middle class advantage in Piaget's tests of moral 
judgement. The differences between the classes achieved 
significance at only the two youngest age levels and even 
here there is no consistent significant difference across 
all tests. The general lack of significant differences 
might be explained in part by the fact that most of the 
fathers classified as middle class followed fairly routine 
non-manual occupations requiring few formal qualifications 
(salesmen, shopkeepers, policemen, clerical workers, etc). 
Had there been a bigger variation between the classes then 
this might have been reflected in bigger differences in 
the children's moral responses (c.f. Boehm and Nass 1962 
and Boehm 19~. 
7. Summary And Conclusions 
From his investigation of children's jUdgements of 
story situations in which people cause damage, steal or 
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lie, Piaget (1932) isolated two broad types of response. 
For the first, judgements were based solely on the 
consequences of each action - the greater the damage, 
the worse was the offence. For the second, the actors 
motives and intentions assumed greatest importance for 
any judgement of relative culpability. Piaget thought 
that both kinds of judgement (which he termed objective 
and subjective responsibility respectively) could be 
found in children up to the age of 10 years, but that 
after this time subjective responsibility completely 
dominated the child's moral reasoning. 
The present data supported Piaget's contention 
that the immature form of judgement (objective re-
sponsibility) are replaced in older children by the 
more mature (subjective responsibility); in other words, 
there is such a thing as moral development at least 
insofar as the dimension of objective responsibility is 
concerned. 
However, in contrast to Piaget's data objective 
responsibility could still be discerned in the present 
responses in children up to 12 years of age. Nor was 
the trend for a decline in objective responsibility at 
successively hi~her ages a perfect one; the frequency 
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distributions flattened out at the upper and lower ends 
of the age range. 
The residue of objective responsibility in the older 
children and the consequent levelling of the frequency 
distribution was explained by the presence of a small 
group of children (N=16) whose responses to the tests 
used were consistently immature (i.e. based in objective 
responsibility). Similarly, a small group of younger 
children (n:16) was isolated, whose responses showed 
consistent evidence of subjective responsibility. These 
two groups of children formed the basis of a more 
detailed investigation of the environmental factors 
which might correlate with advanced and retarded 
development of moral jUdgements. When these exceptional 
children were ignored the frequency distribution of 
immature answers approached extreme values more closely 
and, indeed, traces of objective responsibility dis-
appeared from the older children's responses to some, 
but not all, of the tests used. 
Within the dimension of objective responsibility 
Piaget used test situations which related to stealing, 
lies and daffiage caused through clumsiness. He implies 
that at any particular time a common level of maturity 
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of judgements obtains in the child with respect to all 
three areas. Two tests were included in the present 
study in each of the areas of clumsiness, stealing and 
lies in order to test the hypothesis that the child 
develops at different rates with regard to each. No 
consistent dUferences could be isolated among the three 
although occasional significance was obtained at specific 
age levels. A non-significant tendency for children's 
attitudes to lies to mature more slowly than those to 
clumsiness and stealing was noted. 
Similarly, occasional significant differe~ces were 
noted in the responses of children aged 7, 8 or 9 years 
to individual test items. This trend was interpreted 
as evidence of the less well organized system of moral 
judgements possessed by younger children and their greater 
susceptibility to specific situational cues in making 
judgements. In contrast, the older children appeared to 
have a much more stable and consistent system varying 
less from test to test. 
No sex differences in rate of maturity of moral 
judgements could be discerned in the present data at 
any level of analysis (aggregate scores, area or test). 
There was a slibht, though non-significant, tendency 
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for girls to be behind boys up to the age of 9 or 10 years 
and ahead of boys after this time. This finding contrasts 
with the consistent advantage noted in girls by other workers. 
On a broad level of analysis it was demonstrated that 
intelligence was a siE,nificant variable influencing per-
formance on the present tests. Children of above average 
intelligence performed best and children of below average 
intelligence performed worst at all age levels when scores 
were aggregated across the six tests used. However, closer 
examination revealed that intelligence was a most effectiv& 
variable when the tests relating to clumsiness were con-
sidered, that it was less effective for tests relating to 
stealing and that its effects were negligible for tests 
relating to lies. 
It was suggested that this confusion within the area 
of lies could be due as much to the relative ease with 
which children answered test V as to any actual differences 
in their attitude to lies. 
Certain social class differences were demonstrated 
which suggested the advantage that middle class children have 
in Piagetian tests of moral judgement. This trend was re-
flected in the aggregated data, in the data for each area 
and in the data for each test although test V once more 
appeared as an anomaly. 
CHAPTER 7 
SOCIAL FACTORS IN MORAL DEVELOPI1ENT 
L. Introduction 
We saw in Chapter 3 the way in which the replication 
studies of Piaget's work on moral development had suggested 
several modifications of Piaget's ideas; these modifications 
related especially to the manner in which the child's per-
formance on Piaget's tests of moral judgement was affected 
by such variables as intelligence, social class, sex, religious 
teaching and even the content of the test items used. In the 
present study it was found that better performance on Piagetian 
moral judgement tests correlated with higher I.Q. and with a 
middle class family background although no sex differences 
could be discerned. 
A factor which occupies a dominant position in Piaget's theory 
of moral development is adult constraint; Piaget believed that 
adult constraint combined with the egocentric thought of the young 
child to produce moral realism and several morally immature modes 
of thought and judgement. Piaget saw the impetus for the 
child's development of the more mature forms of judgement 
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in the decline of egocentric thought (a biological process 
largely unaffected by social or educational teaching) and in 
the increasingly equalitarian nature of adult-child re-
lationships as the child became older. 
Despite its crucial importance to Piaget's theory, 
adult constraint has received little attention in the 
replication literature. Of the twenty sets of studies noted 
only seven consider adult constraint at all and only two of 
these (MacRae, 1954; Johnson, 1962a) investigate this variable 
empirically (see Table IV, p. ). MacRae (1954) noted a 
negative correlation between parental strictness and the child's 
development along one of Piaget's moral dimensions (immanent 
justice) but not along others (objective responsibility or 
duty defined as obedience to authority); similarly, Johnson 
(1962a) correlated variations in parental strictness with 
different performances along the dimensions of immanent 
justice and communicable responsibility but not to performance 
along the dimensions of objective responsibility, retribution v. 
restitution or belief in the efficacy of severe punishment. 
There is a need for more information relating to the 
effects which varying home background has on the child's moral 
development. The two studies noted above considered only 
parental strictness although there are several other aspects 
of the parent-child relationship which have been investigated 
in relation to other areas of child development but which 
have implications for the development of moral judgements, 
for the development of guilt feelings and for the individ-
ual's ability to control his own behaviour~ 
There are obviously several aspects or dimensions of 
parental belief which might affect the child and some of 
these may be derived directly from Piaget'sdiscussion of 
the parent-child relationship as a factor influencing 
moral development. Piaget thought that a relationship of 
equality and co-operation between the child and the adult 
was more beneficial to the child's moral development than 
one of heteronomy and constraint. The problem is which 
dimensions of parental beliefs are implied by these two 
ideal type adult-child relationship and how might these 
dimensions best be estimated? 
Piaget suggests a partial solution to the first 
question - a relationship of equality and sharing should 
contribute to the child's quicker moral development; a 
relationship of strict parental control and ignoring any of 
the child's suggestions should lead to a retarded moral 
development. These simple statements imply several di-
mentions of parental attitudes and beliefs. 
Constraint implies the denial of autonomous thought; 
the child is not expected to think for himself but is 
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encouraged to submit to adult edicts. The Victorian maxim 
that children should be seen and not heard is a good example 
of this attitude. Parental control of the child's activities 
and restriction of the child's thought implies intrusiveness -
the parent will want to know what the child does and what he 
thinks. In turn, this implies strictness and, moreover, the 
belief that a strict upbringing is at the very least no 
detriment if not a positive advantage for the child in the 
long run. 
For the most part, co-operation implies the opposites of 
the parental attitudes mentioned above. It implies a demo-
cratic attitude in treating children as equal in importance 
to adults and may even go so far as to assign children equal 
weight in a 'voting' procedure to decide important family 
issues. Co-operation implies the fostering of independent 
thought and action in the child which itself suggests only 
limited parental control and strictness. 
There are at least two further groupings of parental 
attitudes which are not encompassed by the discussions above 
but which might have equally important affects on the child. 
The first is an atmosphere of babying or overprotection in 
which the child's every wish is catered for and he is not 
expected to undertake even minor responsibilities (household 
chores, say) in the family unit. This type of atmosphere 
contrasts with both relationships of co-operation and of 
constraint since the child is neither an equal nor is he a 
subordinate but in some respects he is a superior to the 
adult. 
A second contrast to the co-operation-constraint 
continuum is a relationship of unconcern where the child is 
ignored socially except insofar as his physical needs for 
food and shelter are met. Such a socially sterile atmosphere 
might include ignoring the child's questions or reducing 
answers to the briefest statements. This treatment might' 
have two broad effects; first, if the child is restricted 
to the house, his overall development will be severely 
retarded, as in the few cases of isolated children noted 
by Davis (1964, pp. 204 ff.) for example; secondly, if 
the child is not restricted in this extreme manner, he 
is likely to seek social interaction outside the home among 
his peers. In either case the effects of parental neglect 
on the child's emotional and personality development are 
obviously harmful (see Bowlby, et a1, 1956). The child's 
confinement to the house is an extreme form of the relation-
ship of constraint noted by Piaget. Total lack of concern 
contrasts both with co-operation and constraint implying the 
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parent's minimum interaction with the child and denying 
all control. 
The dimensions of parental attitudes which seem 
important for the child's moral development might be 
included under the five main headings of democracy, 
autonomy, overprotection, strictness and ignoring the 
child. From Piaget's ideas, it would be expected that 
variations in parental attitudes along these dimensions 
would affect the child's moral development in the 
following manner: democratic parents, those who en-
courage the child's autonomy, those who do not attempt 
to do every thine for the child nor control and protect 
him in everything he does, and those who therefore have 
no need to rely on strict measures to ensure the child's 
conformity, are likely to have children who are morally 
advanced; in contrast, strict parents, those who attempt 
to rule the child's life completely, who deny the child 
autonomy of thought and action, who overprotect him from 
the rough and tumble of everyday life, who do not listen 
to the child's suggestions are likely to have children 
who are morally retarded. 
2. The P.A.R.I. - Construction and Validity 
Schaeffer and Bell (1958) report the development of 
an attitude scale designed to test parental attitudes along 
a number of dimensions. Several dimensions of the Parental 
Attitude Research Instrument (PARI) reflect the same concerns 
discussed above, others do not; since each dimension was 
validated separately it is possible to isolate the relevant 
items and still be left with a useful scale. 
In fact fourteen dimensions were thought relevant to 
the present study and these were grouped under six major 
headings as is shown in Figure 7. The PARI seemed suitable 
Figure 7 PARI Items Grouped Into General Areas 
Item No. PARI Item General Area 
1,15,29 Encouraging Verbalization 
9,23,37 EqUalitarianism Democracy 
13,27,41 Comradeship and Sharing 
6,20,34 Excluding Outside Influences 
7,21,35 Deification Autonomy 
12,26,40 Intrusiveness 
2,16,30 Fostering Dependence 
4,l8,}2 Fear of Harming the Baby Overprotection 
8,22,36 Suppression of Aggression 
3,17,31 Breaking the Will 
5,19,33 Strictness Strictness 
11,25,39 Suppression of Sex 
10,24,38 Avoidance of Communication Verbalization 
14,28,42 Acceleration of Development Acceleration 
precisely bevause it was designed to test attitudes in areas 
almost identical to those suggested and implied in Piaget's 
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o 0 f t hOld 1 to h " 2 d~scuss~on 0 paren -c ~ re a ~ons ~ps. 
The PARI items were not grouped on the scale in the 
manner listed in Figure 7; they were arranged in random 
fashion and the original order was kept when items were 
selected for the present scale. The final form of the 
PARI for the present study comprised forty-two items, 
three items for each of.the fourteen dimensions. The 
left hand column in Figure 7 indicates the placing of in-
dividual items on the adopted form of the PARI which is 
given in full in Figure 8. 
The PARI dimension Encouraging Verbalization (items 
1, 15 and 29) suggests that the child's ideas and opinions 
should be considered in family decisions. The dimensions 
'Equalitarianism' (items 9, 23 and 37) is based on the 
assumption that children have equal rights with adults and 
that parents have no special weight in family decision 
making. The dimension 'Comradeship and Sharing' (items 13, 
27 and 41) implies that a happy family is one in which 
parents and children interact as friends. Taken together 
it was expected that these dimensions would reflect parental 
attitudes to co-operation with their children, and the gen-
eral area covered was termed democracy for the purposes of 
this study. Piaget imp]es that democratic, co-operative 
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Figure 8 The Parent Attitude Research Instrument 
CHILD DEVELOPHENT RESEARCH PROJECT 
CONFIDEETIAL 
Please read each of the statements below and then rate 
them as follows : 
Av 
Agree 
very much 
Aw 
Agree on 
the whole 
~ 
Agree a 
little 
Dv 
Disagree 
very much 
D 
w 
Disagree 
on the whole 
DL 
Disagree 
a little 
Indicate your opinion by drawing a circle round Av if you "agree 
very much" with what the statement says, round Aw if you "agree on 
the whole", round AL if you "agree a little"; circle Dv if you 
"disagree very much", Dw if you "disagree on the whole" and DL if 
you'llisagree a little". 
There are no right or wrong answers so answer according to your 
own opinion. It is very important to the study that all the questions 
be answered. l-iany of the statements 'rlill seem alike but all are 
necessary to show slight differences of opinion • 
• 1. Children should be encouraged to tell their parents about 
it whenever they feel family rules are unreasonable. 
Av Aw ~ 
2. Good parents should shelter their children from life's 
little difficulties 
3. It is frequently necessary to drive the mischief out of 
a child before he will behave. 
• 4. All new parents are afraid of their awkwardness in 
handling and holdine the baby. 
5. strict discipline develops a fine strong character. 
Dv Dw Dt 
A A w~ v 
D D DL v w 
Av A ~ w 
D D DL v w 
A Aw ~ v 
D Dw DL v 
A A ~ v w 
D Dw DL v 
6. A ~arent should never be made to look wrong in a 
chl.ld's eyes. 
Av Aw 
Dv Dw ~I j 
I 
I 
r 
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Figure ~8· (Continued) 
7. The child should be taught to revere his parents 
above all other grown-ups. 
* 8. A child should be taught to avoid fighting no 
matter what happens. 
* 9. Parents must earn the respect of their children by 
the way they act. 
10. Parents who start a cni1d talking about his worries 
don't realise that sometimes it's just better to 
leave well enough alone. 
.11. It is very important that young boys and girls not 
be allowed to see each other completely undressed. 
12. Parents should make it their business to know 
everything their children are thinking. 
*13. Laughing at children's jokes and telling children 
jokes m~ces things go more smoothly. 
14. The sooner a child learns to walk the better it is. 
*15. A child has a right to his own point of view and 
ought to be allowed to express it. 
16. A child should be protected from jobs which might 
be too:) hard or tiring for him. 
17. Some children are just so bed that they must be 
taught to fear adults for their own good. 
.l~. Parents never stop blaming themselves if their 
babies are injured in accidents. 
19. Children who are held to firm rules gro~ .up to 
be the best adults. 
20. Children should never learn things outside the home 
which make them doubt their parents' ideas. 
Av Aw ~ 
D D DL v w 
Ay Aw ~ 
Dy D w DL 
A A ...,~ v 
Dy Dw DL 
Ay A w~ 
Dv D..., DL 
Ay A wAx, 
D y D w DL 
Ay A ~ w 
D D DL y w 
A Aw Ax, y 
D y D w DL 
Av A w~ 
D D w DL v 
A vA wA L 
Dv Dw DL 
Ay Aw ~ 
D Dw DL v 
Ay A w AL 
D 
v 
D w DL 
Av Aw Ar. 
D Dw DL v 
Av A w~ 
D Dw DL v 
Ay A'll Ax. 
D D DL y 'II 
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Figure 8. (Continued) 
21. A child soon learns that there is no greater wisdom 
than that of his parents. 
~2. There is no good excuse for a child hitting another 
child. 
23. Children are too often asked to do all the com-
promising and adjustment, and that is not fair. 
24. Children pester you with their little upsets if 
you aren't careful from the start. 
25. A young child should be protected from hearing 
about sex. 
26. Alert parents should try to learn all their 
child's thoughts. 
~7. Children would be happier and better behaved if 
parents would show an interest in their affairs. 
28. Parents should not try to teach their children to 
read and write before they start school. 
~9. A child's ideas should be seriously considered in 
making family decisions. 
30. Parents should know better than to allow their 
children to be exposed to difficult situations. 
31. Children need some of the natural meanness taking 
out of them. 
*32. You must always keep tight hold of baby during his 
bath for in a careless moment he might slip. 
33. A child will be grateful later on for strict training. 
34. The child should not question the thinking of his 
parents. 
A A w~ y 
Dy D w DL 
A Aw "L y 
D D w DL y 
A Aw "L y 
D D w DL y 
Ay A w AL 
Dy D w DL 
A vA wA L 
D D w DL y 
A A Ar, y w 
Dv D DL w 
Ay A w~ 
Dy Dw DL 
Av Aw ~ 
Dy Dw ~ 
Av A ~ w 
Dv Dw DL 
AV A ~ w 
D D DL v w 
Ay Aw AL 
DV DW DL 
/Lv AW Ax, 
Dy D w DL 
Ay Aw Ax. 
Dv Dw DL 
Ay Aw Ax. 
D D DL y w 
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Figure ~8 (Continued) 
35. Parents deserve the highest esteem and regard of 
their children. 
*36. Children should not be encouraged to box or wrestle 
because it often leads to trouble or injury. 
*37. Parents should adjust to the children sometimes rather 
than always expecting the children to adjust to the 
parents. 
38. If you let children talk about their troubles they 
end up complaining even more. 
39. Sex is one of the greatest problems to be contended 
with in children. 
40. Parents have a right to know everything going on in 
their child's life because their child is part of them 
.41. If parents would have fun with their children the 
children would be more apt to take their advice. 
.42. Parents should make an effort to get their child toilet 
trained at the earliest possible moment. 
• those items marked with an asterisk failed to distinguish 
groups of high and low scorers. See discussion in the 
text (Chapter. 7 t .:.se·ct:LWl 6). 
Note The PARI was duplicated on University headed paper. 
-
A 
v 
A w~ 
D v D w DL 
A A v w Ar, 
D D DL v w 
A Aw ~ v 
D v D w DL 
Av A w~ 
Dv Dw DL 
A v Aw AL 
D v D w DL 
A 
v 
A w~ 
D Dw DL v 
Av Aw ~ 
D D DL v w 
A 
v Aw Ax, 
D 
v 
D w DL 
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nome atmosphere will accelerate the child's moral 
development. 
The PARI dimension 'Excluding Outside Influences' 
(items 6, 20 and 34) revolves around the extent to which 
parents encourage independent thought in their children 
or expect them to accept their parents' ideas as always 
being correct. This dimension is closely linked with 
that of 'Deification' (items 7, 21, and 35) which attempts 
to measure the extent to which parents believe that, 
through the mere fact of parenthood, they deserve the 
highest opinions of their children. 
The dimension 'Intrusiveness' (items 12, 26 and 40) 
approaches the problem of how much freedom of thought and 
action should be allowed the child. Taken together it was 
expected that these three dimensions (~xcluding Outside 
Influences', 'Deification' and 'Intrusiveness') would 
reflect parental attitudes within the general area of 
autonomy - the extent to which the child should be con-
trolled by the opinions of his parents or should be allowed 
freedom for independent functioning. Piaget implies that 
the child who is constrained in a heteronomous relationship 
with adults will be morally retarded. 
The PARI dimension 'Fostering Dependence' (items 2, 16 
and 30) was designed to measure one aspect of overprotectiveness 
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or overpossessivenessj the dimension 'Suppression of 
Aggression' (items 8, 22 and 36) measures another aspect 
of this same dimension. These two may also reflect 
parental control of the child and a denial of autonomy. 
The dimension 'Fear of Harming the Baby' (items 4, 18 
and 32) was included since it was expected that they 
would give a further indication of overprotectiveness. 
The overprotected, spoilt child would tend to mature 
more slowly in many areas, including his moral development. 
The PARI dimensions 'Breaking the Will' (items 3, 17 
and 31) and 'Strictness' (items 5,19 and 33) measure the 
extent to which parents believe that discipline and physical 
punishment are both necessary and beneficial in child 
rearing. It was expected that the dimension'Suppression of 
Sex' (items 11, 25 and 39) would form a part of the more 
general dimension of strictness. The strict parent is 
presumably less democratic and less likely to allow the 
child autonomy; a strict home background might therefore 
be expected to correlate with retarded moral development in 
the child. 
The dimension 'Avoidance of Communication' (items 10, 
24 and 38) attempts to estimate the extent to which the 
child is encouraged to discuss his problems with the parent 
and express his own opinions to parents. This is important 
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since the child who is ignored or answered inadequately 
may cease asking questions of his parents altogether. 
Parents who refuse this type of interaction with their 
children may be either ignoring (in which case they do 
not care what their children say) or they may be unduly 
strict (in which case they care very much that their 
children should hold the right - i.e. the parental -
opinions). In either case the discouragement of 
communication and verbalization is likely to result in 
retarded moral development. 
The dimension 'Acceleration of Development' (items 
14, 28 and 42) was designed to estimate the extent to 
which parents thought that their child's general develop-
ment should be helped as much as possible. It was 
expected that parents who thought that encouragement of 
the chil~'s performance in the areas approached was 
desireable would have children whose moral development 
was advanced. 
The final page of the PARI contained requests for 
personal details 'for research purposes' (see Figure 9). 
In this way it was proposed that correlations be sought 
between the child's performance on Piagetian tests and 
such variables as parental age, education and social 
class, as well as family size. 
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Figure -9· Classification Information 
This form was filled in by •••• (Write H for husband or W for wife) 
My age is •••• years. 
I was married in 19 •• and have •••• children :-
(Please list each child's age and sex. For example if you have a 
10 year old son and a 5 year old daughter you should put B.10, G.5). 
The name of the last school I attended was ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
and I left when I was •••• years old. 
Since leaving school I have attended the following: (please tick) 
A University degree course. 
-
A technical college full-time course. 
-
Night school/day release as part of my work. 
-
Night school for recreation purposes 
such as ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
A correspondence couse for •••••••••••••••••• 
-
other form of further education (please say which) 
............................................. 
-
No education received since leaving school 
-
Ny present occupation is •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
and the last job my father held was as a •••••••••••••••••••• 
I would like to make the following remarks: 
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3. The PARI - Administration And Scoring 
In Chapter 6 we noted the presence of two small groups 
of exceptional children within the main sample. One was a 
group of sixteen 7 and 8 year old children whose responses 
were consistently mature by Piaget's standards; the other 
was a group of sixteen 11 and 12 year olds whose responses 
were consistently immature by Piaget's standards. These 
thirty-two children form the base on which the parental 
sample used for the present study was built. These 
exceptional children were matched with sixteen 7 and 8 year 
old and sixteen 11 and 12 year old 'normal' children (i.e. 
those showing evidence of objective and subjective respons-
ibility respectively). 
Parents of each of the sixty-four children thus in-
volved were sent copies of the PARI - two copies were sent 
to each family, one for the husband and one for the wife, 
and so 128 parents were inyo1ved. An introductory letter 
was sent with each pair of PARI forms explaining the purpose 
of the study and explaining how the attitude scale should be 
completed (see Figure 10). A stamped addressed envelope was 
enclosed for returning the forms. 
Six weeks after the initial request a follow up letter 
was distributed through the schools via the individual 
280 
Introductory Letter • 
Dear }1r. & }irs. 
In co-operation with the education authorities I am studying 
what parents think about how children should be brought up. A 
lot is written on this subject in newspaper and magazine articles. 
Frequently these articles do not agree, so I thought it would be 
a good idea to find out what parents themselves think. You can 
help by passing on your own ideas. 
So as not to use up too much of your time I have prepared a 
list of ideas which other parents have contributed. All you do 
is circle one of the six letters by each statement, as explained 
on the form. It should only take you about fifteen minutes to 
complete. 
As you will notice there are two forms enclosed. One is for 
the husband and one for the wife. They are identical so choose 
which one you want but please indicate, in the space provided at 
the end, which form has been filled in by which parent. I would 
like you to fill in the forms without asking each other's opinions. 
It may be interesting to compare notes later on but please do not 
alter any of your replies. There are no right and wrong answers 
and it does not matter if your opinions do not agree. 
It would also be helpful if you could each complete the rest 
of the questions on the last page (age, education, etc.) for 
research purposes. All information will be treated as completely 
confidential - you will notice that there is no space for your 
name and address, 50 please do not include them. 
If you have 
them down at the 
have given their 
first reaction. 
be confusing. 
any ideas which you feel should be included, jot 
end. I would appreciate having them. Others who 
ideas say it is best to work quickly. Give your 
If you read and reread the statements it tends to 
Thank you for your co-operation. I enclose a stamped addressed 
envelope for the return of your forms. 
Yours sincerely, 
• This letter was duplicated on University headed paper. 
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children concerned (see Figure 11). This was the first 
indication to the parents th"at the project had anything to 
do with the schools and it was thought that official backing 
in this manner would encourage the co-operation of the 
parents. 
After a further six weeks~ personal visits were begun 
in an attempt to collect the remaining forms. Altogether 
85 PARI forms were returned from 128 distributed - a response 
rate of 66%. Each PARI form sent out was numbered in code 
50 that respondents could be identified without their being 
aware of it. This step was taken to give greater confidence 
in the claim for confidentiality while meeting the need to 
identify respondents as having morally normal, precocious or 
retarded childr~ Some parents did in fact add their names 
to the forms. Naturally, nowhere is there any direct 
reference to individual cases in any way which might permit 
their identifications. 
Opposite each statement on the PARI there were six 
categories of reply: A - agree very much; A - agree on the v w 
whole; ~ - agree a little; Dv - disagree very much; 
Dw - disagree on the whole; DL - disagree a little. These 
response categories were scored on a seven point scale which 
in most cases took the following form: 
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Figure 11 Reminder Letter • 
Dear Hr. & Mrs. 
I wrote to you recently to ask for your co-operation in a 
research project on which I am engaged. I sent you two 
questionnaires to complete regarding the ways you thought parents 
should bring up their children. I have not yet received a reply 
from you. 
Perhaps you have lost the forms I sent or forgotten about 
them. Perhaps you thought it was too late to send them back 
or you may not even have received them at all. Whatever the 
case I would still like to have your opinions and would be 
grateful if you could complete the slip below and return it to 
school as soon as possible. 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Please tick where appropriate : 
We shall complete and return the forms. 
We have lost our formsj if you send 2 more we will fill them in. 
We have not yet received your forms but are willing to help. 
We are unable to help you because .............................. 
N a.zne •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Address ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
•• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• This letter was duplicated on University headed paper. 
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In only fifteen cases (out of 3,570 individual respons~ was 
the 'no response' score of 4 points necessary~ The scoring 
was reversed on the dimensions Excluding Outside Influences 
(items 6, 20 and 34), Deification (items 7, 21 and 35) and 
Intrusiveness (items 12, 26 and 40); these dimensions form 
the eeneral area of autonomy and by this reversal a higher 
score could be interpreted as evidence of more encouragement 
of autonomy. Similarly, the sooring was reversed for items 
10, 24 and 38 comprising the dimension of Avoidance of 
Communication in order that a high score could be inter-
preted as evidence of the parents greater willingness to 
communicate with the child. Finally, the phrasing of item 
28 meant that the scoring had to be reversed so that dis-
agreement (i.e. encouragement of early literacy) was scored 
high. 
4. statistical Limitations Of The Study 
Parental attitudes within any family unit are not 
independent; each parent is likely to influence, and to 
be influenced by, the opinions of the partner. Furthermore, 
the effect on the child of the interaction of parental 
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attitudes is likely to be at least as important as the 
effect of either parent alone. 
For this reason it was decided to look at the 
combination of paternal and maternal attitudes rather 
than at each separately. This meant that the final sample 
had to be restricted to families where both parents re-
sponded and involved the deletion of eleven subjects. The 
distribution of the remaining 74 respondents is shown in 
Table XXIII. 3 
Responses within each family unit were allocated to 
one of three categories: HH, where both parents scored high 
TABLE XXIII 
Group 
C7 
E7 
°12 
E12 
Distribution of 
Respondent's by Group 
Families 
11 
7 
10 
9 
37 
Parents 
22 
14 
20 
18 
74 
(7, 6 or 5 points); LL, where both parents scored low (1, 2 
or 3 points); or M (mixed) where one parent scored high and 
the other scored low. Each of the fourteen PARI dimensions 
is considered separately, although they are grouped into 
six broader areas. Within each dimension parental attitudes 
are considered for individual PARI items; there were three 
items for each dimension and so the raw data for each family 
unit comprised 42 comparisons of paternal and maternal 
attitudes. The proportions of responses along each dimension 
appearing in the categories HH, LL and M are compared between 
the exception and control groups of parents at each age level, 
'and the implications of these distributions are noted. 
Testing for statistical significance raises two kinds of 
problems for the present sample; both stem from t~e small 
number of respondents involved. In the first place, since 
the refusal rate was very high in some groups, and since so 
little is known about the non-respondents, generalization 
from the present data to the larger population is invalid; 
In the second place, t~e application of X2 .to the present 
data revealed no significant differences; however this does 
not necessarily mean that differences do not exist; the 
small sample size might restrict the appearance of differ-
ences. Had significant differences been apparent in the 
present data it is likely that they would have been found 
in a larger sample as well; but the fact that no significant 
differences appeared form the present sample does not mean 
that none would appear in a larger sample. 
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Therefore, the distributions of high, low and mixed 
scores within individual family units is taken<as a very 
broad indication of the possible effects on the child's 
moral development of parental attitudes along various 
dimensions. The results presented below must be regarded 
as hypotheses derived from a pilot study of the relation-
ships between parental attitudes and moral development in 
the child; they indicate several important correlations, 
but these need validation on a larger sample before any 
implication of causal relationships which they suggest 
can be trusted. 
5. Parental Attitudes And The Child's Moral Development 
(a) Strictness 
The three PARI dimensions which deal with parental 
strictness approach the subject at different levels. The 
dimension Breaking the Will (items 3, 17 and 31 on the 
attitude scale) stresses parental domination of the child; 
the dimension Strictness (items 5, 19 and 33) considers 
the extent to which parents believe that a strict up-
bringing is good for. the child; the dimension SUppression 
of Sex (items 11, 25 ~nd 39) was interpreted as a special 
example of the more general area of parental strictness. 
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The distribution of responses along the dimension of 
Breaking the Hill is shown in Table XXIV; the data for the 
TABLE XXIV 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Breaking the \1ill 
C7 E7 C12 E:t.2 
HH 12 3 HH 10 14-
M 10 6 M 11 4-
LL 11 12 LL 9 9 
A B 
parents of younger children are shown in part A and those 
for parents of older children are shown in part B. 
The trends in Table XXIV, A suggest two things. First 
of all, morally normal younger children (group 07) are 
equally likely to come from homes where parental attitudes 
are strict, permissive or mixed; in contrast, morally mature 
younger children (group E7 ) are more likely to co~e from 
homes where parental attitudes are permissive. Secondly, 
these trends suggest: that where parental attitudes are 
permissive (category LL) the child's moral development is 
likely to be accelerated; that where parental attitudes are 
strict the child's moral development is far less likely to 
be accelerated; and that where parental attitudes are mixed 
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the chances are about even that the child's moral development 
will be accelerated. 
The same kind of assessment can be made of the trends 
in the :data for parents of older children given in 'l'able 
XXIV B. Morally normal older children have about equal 
chances of coming from homes where parental attitudes along 
the dimension Breaking the Will are strict, permissive or 
mixed; morally immature older children are more likely to 
come from homes in which both parents hold strict attitudes. 
Parents holdine permissive attitudes along this dimension 
are equally likely to have an immature or a normal child but 
parent who hold strict attitudes are more likely to have a 
morally immature child. 
Overall, these data suggest that more strict attitudes 
along the PARI dimension Breaking the vlill correlate wi tit 
slower moral development and that more permissive attitudes 
correlate with faster moral development. 
Table XXV presents the same breakdown of data for the 
dimension of Strictness. The data for the younger groups 
TABLE XXV 
C7 
HE 11 
M 14 
LL 8 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Strictness 
E7 
13 HH 
4 M 
4 LL 
C12 
20 
9 
1 
A B 
E12 
14 
7 
6 
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suggest that morally mature younger children (group E7) are 
more likely to come from a home where parental attitudes are 
strict; morally normal children are more likely to come from 
a home where parental attitudes are mixed or where the parents 
are strict. It seems that strict parents are more likely to 
have morally mature children and that permissive parents are 
more likely to have normal children (Table XXV, A). 
These trends do not support the hypothesis put forward 
for this dimension; it was expected that the correlation would 
be in the opposite direction. Moreover, this contradictory 
trend for the dimension of Strictness is supported by the data 
for the parents of older children (Table XXV, B). Both 
normal and immature children are more likely to have strict 
parents (this is particularly true of normal children); but 
strict parents are more likely to have a morally normal child 
and permissive parents are far more likely to have a morally 
immature child. 
The findings for the dimension of Strictness contradict 
the original hypothesis and also contrast with the trends 
observable in parental attitudes to Breaking the Will and 
suppression of Sex. The data for the final dimension is 
given in Table XXVI. 
Parents of morally normal and mature younger children 
are both more likely to be permissive than strict along 
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this dimension; however, all fourteen permissive responses 
from parents in group E7 were at the most extreme level 
4 (D D or D D) while only eight of the eighteen from v v v w 
group 07 were at this level. Parents of morally normal 
younger children make permissive responses no less 
frequently than do parents of mature children but they 
are not as extreme in their opinion. Strict parents are 
equally likely to have a morally mature or a morally 
normal child; however, permissive parents are more likely 
to have a mature child than they are to have a normal child. 
TABLE XXVI 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Suppression of Sex 
°7 E7 °12 ~2 
HE 5 3 HH 5 3 
M 10 4 M 9 7 
LL 18 14 LL 16 17 
A B 
I 
The trends are less clear for parents of older children 
(Table XXVI, B). Parents are generally more permissive 
than Strict; parental strictness correlated about equally 
with normal and retarded moral development; permissiveness 
correlated more with moral immaturity than with normal 
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development. Moreover the level of parental permissiveness 
along this dimension was much more extreme for parents of 
immature children - thirteen of the seventeen responses in 
category LL for group El2 showed the combinations Dv Dv or 
D D; the corresponding figures for STOUp 07 are 5 in 16. 
v w 
In other words, not only are parents of morally immature 
older children more likely to be permissive in their 
attitudes toward sex, they are likely to be so in a far 
more extreme manner. 
Attitudes to sex were more permissive than strict; 
extreme permissiveness correlated with faster development 
in younger children but with retarded development in 
older children. 
Overall, the data for the three dimensions dealing 
with aspects of parental strictness suggest three things: 
parental belief that domination of the child is necessary, 
that he should be taught that the parent is the boss, 
correlates with slower moral development; parental belief 
in the efficacy of a strict upbringing correlates with 
quicker moral development; and an extremely permissiveness 
attitude towards sex correlates with moral maturity in 
younger children but with moral backwardness in older 
children. 
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(b) Autonomy 
Two of the three PARI dimensions which relate to the 
autonomy allowed the child, refer to the opinions which 
the child should have of his parents: the dimension 
Excluding Outside Influences (items 6, 20 and 34) suggests 
that the child should be encouraged to subor~inate his own 
powers of thought and judgement to those of his parents, 
that he should not question parental reasoning;, the dimension 
Deification (items 7, 21 and 35) alters the emphasis of 
childish reverence and awe from parental opinions to 
parents themselves, suggesting that they need nothing more 
than the fact of parenthood to justify the child's respect. 
The final dimension in the general areaof autonomy is 
Intrusiveness (items 12, 26 and 40) which emphasizes the 
parent's right to pry into his child's life. 
The phrasing of the PARI items relating to autonomy 
meant that agreement with the statements indicated a denial 
of the child's autonomy; such responses were scored low, 
and a high score for these items indicates disagreement with 
the PARI statements and implies the encouragement of the 
child's autonomy. Table XXVII shows the distribution of 
combined scores within each family unit for the dimension 
Excluding Outside Influences. 
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Part A of Table XXVII shows the data for parents of 
younger children. While morally normal children appear 
slightly more likely to come from families where both 
TABLE XXVII 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Excluding Outside Influences 
C7 E7 C12 E12 
HH 14 12 HH 10 14 
M 8 6 M 12 8 
LL 11 3 LL 8 5 
A B 
parents encourage autonomy, (group C7 , category HH) this 
trend is much more noticeable for mature children. Parents 
who appeared willing to exclude outside influences from 
influencing their children (category LL) were much more 
likely to have a normal than a mature child; parents who 
rejected these ideas were more likely to have a mature child. 
These trends support the original hypotheses for 
autonomy although they do not find support at the higher age 
level (see Table XXVII, B). Parents of older children tend 
to be less willing to isolate the child from opinions other 
than their own but this is most marked for parents of 
immature children. Parents showing encouragement of 
autonomy along this dimension appear more likely to have 
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morally immature children. 
Table XXVIII presents the distribution of responses 
along the dimension of Deification. The broad patterns 
are the same as those noted for the previous dimension, 
TABLE XXVIII 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Deification 
C7 E7 ~2 ~2 
HH 10 9 HH 7 11 
M 9 8 M 9 3 
LL 14 4 LL 14 13 
A B 
although parents generally show less encouragement of 
autonomy in their attitudes to Deification (compare the 
frequencies in categories HH and LL for each group in 
Tables XXVII and XXVIII). 
For the younger children, those in group E7 were 
more likely to come from homes encouraging autonomy 
along this dimension; this trend was reversed for 
children in group C7- In other words, morally mature 
younger children appeared more likely to have parents 
who encouraged their autonomy (discouraged deification) 
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than who discouraged it; parents of normal children 
appeared more discouraging of autonomy. 
From these findings it follows that parents who 
encourage the child's autonomy along this dimension 
are more likely to have a morally mature than a normal 
child; parents who discourage autonomy are more likely 
to have a normal child than a mature one. 
Again these trends support the original hypotheses, 
but again they find no support at the older age level 
(see Table XXVIII, B). Parents of both groups of older 
children appeared more likely to discourage than encourage 
the child's autonomy. However, while those parents who 
discouraged autonomy appeared equally likely to have a 
normal or an immature child, those who encouraged autonomy 
seemed more likely to have an immature child. These 
findings support the trends noted in parents of older 
children along the dimension Excluding Outside Influences. 
Table XXIX presents the data for the final dimension 
in the area of autonomy - Intrusiveness. The trends 
observable here are in the opposite direction to that 
noted for the previous dimensions at both age levels. 
At the younger level, morally mature children are 
equally likely to come from homes showing autonomous, 
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intrusive or mixed attitudes while normal children are 
far more likely to come from homes where parents value 
the child's privacy. 
Parents encouraging the child's autonomy appeared 
more likely to have normal than mature children; those 
stressing intrusiveness and a denial of the child's 
autonomy appeared slightly more likely to have a mature 
child (Table XXIX, A). 
TABLE XXIX 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Intrusiveness 
C7 E7 ~2 E12 
HH 19 7 HH 14 13 
M 8 7 M 7 4 
LL 6 7 LL 9 10 
A B 
At the higher age level (Table XXIX, B), children in 
both groups were more likely to come from homes encouraging 
autonomy (discouraging intrusiveness); this tendency was 
more marked for normal children (group~. Parents 
encouraging autonomy seemed equally likely to have a normal 
or an immature child; but parents discouraging autonomy 
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were more likely to have. an immature child. 
Overall, parental attitudes along the three PARI 
dimensions in the general area of autonomy suggest that 
they might operate on the child in different ways at 
different age levels. Parental encouragement of autonomy 
along the dimensions Excluding Outside Influences and 
Deification correlated with faster moral development in 
younger children; it also correlated with slower moral 
development in older children. In contrast, parental 
encouragement of autonomy along the dimension Intrusiveness 
correlated with slower moral development in younger children 
while discouragement of autonomy correlated with slower 
development in older children. 
(c) Overprotection 
The PARI dimensions in the general area of over-
protection related to parental anxiety for their child's 
safety and exertions in the rough and tumble of everyday 
life. The dimension Fostering Dependence (items 2, 16 
and 30) implies that a good parent will make sure that 
his child is not exposed to any situation which might be 
too difficult for him to handle; the dimension Suppression 
of Aggression (items 8, 22 and 36) implies a high level of 
parental concern that the child should not get involved in 
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fights; the dimension Fear of Harming the Baby (items 4, 18 
and 32) implies a high level of parental anxiety during the 
normal handling of the young child. 
Table XXX presents the data for responses along the 
dimension Fostering Dependence. A striking feature of 
these distributions is the high frequency of mixed responses 
TABLE XXX 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Fostering Dependence 
°7 E7 S2 E12 
HH 7 5 HH 11 6 
M 12 12 M 13 9 
LL 14 4 LL 6 12 
A B 
Morally mature younger children were far more likely 
to come from homes in which parental attitudes were mixed; 
they were also more likely to come from homes in which 
parental attitudes were overprotective than from those where 
attitudes were not. Normal younger children were equally 
likely to come from homes where parental attitudes were 
mixed or underprotective and were much less likely to come 
from overprotective homes. 
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Overprotective parents were equally likely to have 
morally mature or normal children; underprotective parents 
were much less likely to have a morally mature child 
Table XXX, A). 
For the older age group (~able XXX, B), morally 
immature children were more likely to come from homes 
emphasizing underprotection than from those emphasizing 
overprotection. Normal children were roost likely to come 
from homes in which parental attitudes were mixed; they 
were more likely to come from overprotective than from 
underprotective homes. 
Overprotective parents were more likely to have a 
normal child; underprotective parents were more likely to 
have a morally immature child. 
The results for the parents of older and younger 
children are consistent in suggesting that overprotection 
correlates with faster moral development and that under-
protection correlates with slower moral development for 
the dimension of Fostering Dependence. 
The dat~ for the PARI dimension Suppression of 
Aigression are presented, in Table XXXI. All groups are 
heavily weighted away from overprotection of the child 
along this dimension; attention will therefore be focussed 
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primarily on the proportions of responses in category LL 
for all groups. 
TABLE XXXI 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Suppression of Aggression 
C7 E7 C12 ~2 
HE 1 0 HH 1 4 
M 11 5 M 5 2 
LL 21 16 LL 24 21 
A B 
Parents who scored low along this dimension (indicating 
an unwillingness to overprotect the child or encourage him 
to avoid fighting) were more likely to have a morally mature 
younger child but were equally likely to have a morally 
normal or immature older child. Parents who scored high on 
this dimension were equally likely to have a morally normal 
or mature younger child but were much more likely to have a 
morally immature older child. 
The trends for parents of children in both age groups 
along the dimension Suppression of Aggression are consistent 
in suggesting that an overprotective attitude correlates 
with slower moral development while an opposite attitude 
correlates with faster moral development. These trends are 
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in the opposite direction to those noted for the dimension 
of Fostering Dependence. 
The data for the final dimension in the general area of 
overprotection, Fear of Harming the Baby, given in Table XXXII. 
TABLE XXXII 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Fear of Harming the Baby 
C7 E7 °12 E12 
HH 22 15 HH 21 19 
M 10 4- M 8 4 
LL 1 2 LL 1 4 
A B 
In contrast to the previous dimension these data are 
weighted heavily towards overprotection in each group. 
Parents who display an overprotective attitude appeared 
slightly more likely to have a morally mature younger child 
than a normal one; they were equally likely to have a 
normal or an immature older child. 
Parents who display little concern along this dimension 
appeared more likely to have a morally mature younger child 
and also more likely to have an immature older child. 
These trends are not at all clear: faster moral 
development in younger children correlates both with high 
and low soores along this dimension; slower moral development 
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in older children correlates with low scores only. 
In fact, more clearly defined trends can be picked 
out if we consider the extremeness of parental attitudes 
at each age level: for the younger age group, parents 
in group C7 were much more extreme in their over-
protectiveness than parents in group E7 (occurence of 
A A or A A was 13 out of 16 high-score responses for 
v v v w 
group C7 and only 12 out of 2~ responses for group E7 ); 
for the older age group this trend is reversed - parents 
in group E12 are more extreme in their overprotectiveness 
(12 responses in 21) than are parents in group C12 (11 
responses in 24). In other words, more extreme over-
protection along this dimension correlates with slower 
moral development. 
Overall, the data for parental attitudes in the 
general area of overprotection suggest no consistent 
relationship with moral development in the child. A 
lower score along the dimension Fostering Dependence 
correlated with slower moral development at both age 
levels while a higher score correlated with faster moral 
development; in contrast a higher score along the 
dlllension Suppression of Aggression correlates with 
slower moral development and a lower score correlates 
with faster development; finally, more extreme anxiety along 
the dimension Fear of Harming the Baby correlates with slower 
moral development. 
(d) Democracy 
The PARI dimensions in the general area of democracy 
approach the problem of the extent to which parents think 
that children should be treated as equals. The dimension 
Encouraging Verbalization (items 1, 15 and 29) suggest that 
the child's opinion about family rules is a valid one and 
should be recognized in making family decisions; the 
dimension Equalitarianism (items 9, 23 and 37) implies that 
, it is wrong for the adult always to dominate the situation 
and that adjustments by parents are as important as those 
expected of children; the dimension Comradeship and Sharing 
(items 13, 27 and 41» proposes that a friendly relationship 
between parent and child is preferable to one of heteronomy. 
The data for the dimension Encouraging Verbalization 
are presented in Table XXXIII. There is a very noticeable 
weighting of all groups towards a democratic attitude along 
this dimension; this is slightly more marked for parents of 
younger children (Table XXXIII, A). This strong bias in the 
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data towards democratic attitudes mak.es the important trends 
more difficult to see and it is an advantage to consider the 
extremeness of parental attitudes as well as their general 
distribution. 
It appears from Table XXXIII, A that a democratic 
attitude correlates more strongly with normal development 
TABLE XXXIII 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Encouraging Verbalization 
C7 E7 C12 El2 
HH 32 18 HH 23 24 
M 1 3 M 5 2 
LL 0 0 LL 2 1 
A B 
than with quicker development in younger children. However, 
responses from parents in group E7 were extreme (Av Av or 
A A) more often than those from parents in group C7 v w 
(12 times in 18 for group E7 ; 15 times in 32 for group C7 ). 
Similarly, among the parents of older children, the 
frequency of extreme responses was greater for parents in 
group C12 (16 times in 23) than for parents in group Ei2 
(11 ti~es in 24). This tendency modifies the general 
trend observable in Table XXXIII, B for democratic parents 
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to be more likely to have a morally immature child than a 
normal one. 
Consideration of extreme responses reinforces the 
general trends observable along the dimension Equalitarianism 
(Table XXXIV). The distributions in all groups are weighted 
slightly less towards democratic attitudes than for the 
previous dimension. 
TABLE XXXIV 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Equalitarianism 
°7 E7 °12 ~2 
HH 27 17 HH 21 16 
M 3 3 M 8 8 
LL 3 1 LL 1 3 
A B 
Democratic parents of younger children are ~qua1ly 
likely to have a morally mature or normal child; non-
democratic parents are more likely to have a normal child. 
In fact, parents in group 07 showed extreme democratic 
responses much more often (16 times in 27) than parents 
in group E7 (6 times in 17); they also showed extreme non-
democratic responses in 2 of the 3 contributions to 
category LL. 
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For the older groups, the data in Table XXXIV, B 
suggest that democratic attitudes are more typical of 
parents of normal children, than of parents of immature 
children, and that non-democratic attitudes are more 
typical of parents of immature children than those of 
normal children. This trend is supported by the dis-
tribution of extreme scores where parents of normal 
children are more democratic (12 times in 21) those of 
immature children (8 times in 16). 
The data for the final dimension in the general 
area of democracy, Comradeship and Sharing, are presented 
in Table XXXV. These distributions suggest the strongest 
bias towards democratic attitudes seen so far, and again 
consideration of extreme responses is a useful supplement 
to the general indication of democracy. 
TABLE XXXV 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Comradeship and Sharing 
C7 E7 °12 ~2 
HH 32 21 HB 27 24 
M 1 0 M 3 2 
LL 0 0 LL 0 1 
A B 
There is no real difference between the distributions 
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of responses for parents of younger children in Table XXV, A; 
only one parent (from a total of 36 in groups C7 and E7) 
showed a non-democratic response to one of the three items 
comprising this dimension. However, the distribution of 
extreme scores reveals that parents in group E7 are more 
extreme (16 times in 21) than are parents in group C7 
(21 times in 32). 
Similarly, the distributions of high and low democratic 
attitudes for parents of older children suggest no differences 
between the groups (Table XXXV, B); but parents in group C12 
have more extreme responses (21 times in 27) than parents in 
group E12 (17 times in 24). 
Overall, the three PARI dimensions in the area of 
democracy suggest that the fact of democratic attitudes in 
itself generally admits little correlation with the child's 
moral development. However, the strength of parental 
attitudes does appear important and a more extreme democratic 
atmosphere within the home correlat~d with quicker moral 
development at both aee levels. One exception to this trend 
was noted in the attitudes of parents of younger children 
along the dimension Equalitarianism, where extreme democratic 
attitudes correlated with slower moral development. 
(e) Verbalization 
The items comprising the PARI dimension of Avoidance of 
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Communication (items 10, 24 and 38) imply that it is best if 
children are discouraged from complaining to parents about 
his troubles. Agreement with these statements was scored 
low and a higher score indicates the encouragement of 
verbalization. The data for this dimension are presentea 
in Table XXXVI. Both younger groups show a bias towards 
encouragement of verbalization; the older groups show a 
much more even distribution across the high, low and mixed 
categories. 
TABLE XXXVI 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Avoidance of Communication 
C7 E7 ~2 E12 
HH 14 13 HB 11 10 
M 11 7 M 9 8 
LL 8 1 LL 10 9 
A B 
Parents of younger children who scored high along this 
dimension were more likely to have a mature than a normal 
child; parents who scored low were more likely to have a 
normal child. 
The distributions for parents of both groups of older 
children are identical; there appears to be no correlation 
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between parental encouragement of verbalization and the child's 
moral development._. Consideration of extreme scores in each of 
the older groups reveals, in fact, that parents of morally 
immature children appear to be more encouraging of verba1-
ization (Av Av or Av Aw occurs 7 times in 10 responses) than 
parents of normal children (6 times in 11). This finding is 
inconsistent with the trend for younger children and argues 
against the original hypothesis. 
Greater parental encouragement of verbalization correlated 
with quicker moral development in younger children but with 
slower development in older children. 
(f) Acceleration 
The PARI dimension Acceleration of Development (items 
14, 28 and 42) suggests that the parent should attempt to 
improve his child's performance in several areas. The data 
for this dimension are presented in Table XXXVII. The 
distributions for all groups show a strong bias in favour 
TABLE XXXVII 
Parental Attitudes 
by Group - Acceleration of Development 
°7 E7 °12 
HH 18 11 HH 17 
M 9 7 M 4 
LL 6 3 LL 9 
A B 
16 
5 
6 
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of the encouragement of the child's development. 
The data for the younger groups suggests that parents 
encouraging the acceleration of their child's development 
are equally likely to have morally normal or mature children; 
parental discouragement of acceleration was rare but 
correlated more strongly with slower moral development. 
Examination of the frequency of extreme responses for 
the younger groups reveals that parents of normal children 
were more often extreme in their responses (15 times in 18) 
than were parents of morally mature children (6 times in 11). 
For the older groups, parents encouraging acceleration 
were equally likely to have normal or immature children; 
those discouraging acceleration were more likely to have 
normal children. Additionally, parents of morally immature 
children were more often extreme in their encouragement of 
acceleration (14 times in 16) than were parents of normal 
children (13 times in 17). 
Overall, these data suggest that extreme encouragement 
of acceleration correlates with slower moral development. 
6. The PARI - A Word Of Caution 
The data discussed in detail above suggest several 
important correlations between parental attitudes along 
selected dimensions and the child's rate of moral~velopment. 
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These implications need testing with a larger sample before 
they can be accepted with confidence. 
Despite the appearance of these trends there were 
several features of the data obtained which were disturbing 
and suggested the possibility that the Parent Attitude 
Research Instrument might be insufficiently sensitive in 
some areas to allow an accurate distinction of direction 
and intensity of belief. 
First of all, the distribution of scores along all the 
dimensions in the general area of democracy (items 1, 9, 13, 
15, 23, 27, 29, 37 and 41) were heavily biassed towards 
democratic attitudes; it was necessary to consider the 
frequency of extreme scores in order to distinguish 
between parents of normal and exceptional children. 
Secondly, individual PARI dimensions which appeared 
to relate to the same general area of parental opinion 
occasionally suggested opposing relationships with the 
child's moral development. Three dimensions stand out 
prominently in this respect; that of Strictness within 
the general area of Strictness; that of Fear of Harming 
the Baby within the general area of overprotection; and 
that of Intrusiveness in the general area of autonomy. 
Thirdly, interpreting the dimension Acceleration is more 
312 
difficult than that of the others since this dimension 
above all, approaches a 'social approval' scale. It is 
more difficult to know what a high score along this 
dimension really measures. Is it really parental belief 
in and practice of acceleratory techniques which is 
measured? Or is it parental approval of such techniques, 
perhaps divorced from practical concerns, which is 
approached. 
Of course, the problem of discrepancy between what 
parents actually believe, what attitudes they will admit 
to in public and what they will in fact do in practise 
is very difficult to resolve; a useful and valid attitude 
scale will reduce the discrepancy. It is possible that 
the PARI is not a very good attitude scale for use on a 
British sample - it was validated on samples of American 
mothers. No warning is given that the PARI should be 
restricted to a sample of mothers, although several 
dimensions omitted from the original for use in the 
present study did relate specifically to women. 
There are four points to be borne in mind in the 
assessment of the value for future research of the 
preceding discussions of parental attitudes and the child's 
moral development; two relate to the PARI itself and two 
to the sample involved. First, is the PARI a more valid 
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test of American than British attitudes? Second is the 
PARI a valid test of attitudes at all? Third, might the 
absence of significant differences in the data for 
separate groups in the present study be attributed to the 
small sample size alone? Finally, might the trends noted 
tentatively (due to the small sample size) reflect actual 
and important differences in parental attitudes which do, 
in fact, correlate with and even contribute towards 
different rates of moral development in the child? 
The first point is difficult to assess. A useful 
attitude scale should distingUish groups of high and low 
scores in a sample; apparently the PARI dimensions did 
so with the samples used in validation work. Several 
PARI dimensions allowed such a distinction with the 
present sample as well although others, notably those 
relating to democracy, did not. 
The second point is also difficult to assess without 
more experimental work. It was suggested earlier that 
dimensions apparently approaching the same general area 
might evoke attitudes different in intensity and, more 
important, different in direction (see the data for the 
areas of strictness and autonomy). The PARI items had 
been validated within each dimension but the dimensions 
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had not been validated as forming the general areas under 
which they were grouped in the present study. The present 
data suggest the need to give consideration to the inter-
relationship of dimensions forming particular attitude 
clusters. 
The third point sets limitations on the usefulness 
of the present data but, in contrast to the first two, 
not its validity. It is possible that no more clear cut 
trends could be seen in the data because too few re-
spondents were involved. This is particularly true where 
the highest refusal rates were encountered (especially 
in groups E7 and E12 ), and means that the trends observable 
must be given the status of implications and hypotheses 
rather than that of facts. 
The final point is obviously very important and 
justifies the investigation of the relationships between 
parental attitudes and the child's moral development in 
more. detail, The trends noted in the present data were 
often sufficiently consistent between dimensions in the 
same area and between age groups to imply important 
correlations between certain parental attitudes and the 
child's quicker or slower moral development. 
There is a need for further study of these 
correlations in respect of the theories of moral development 
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of both Piaget and Kohlberg; both emphasize the cognitive 
aspects of moral judgement and there has been a distinct 
reluctance for psychologists to attempt explanations of 
development in this area which take accouDt of the parent-
child relationship. This type of explanation has been 
attempted successfully in relation to the other aspects 
of conscience, particularly the appearance of guilt feelings 
and the child's willingness to confess after transgressions; 
it is a serious omission in the study of the cognitive 
aspect of conscience. 
7. other Aspects Of The Family 
The discussion so far has dealt at length with the 
correlations noted in the present data between the child's 
rate of moral development and parental attitudes along 
various dimensions. Information relating to other aspects 
of the child's family was requested on the final sheet of 
the PARI (see Figure 9 above) and the major suggestions 
of these data are discussed briefly now. Again these 
trends are only suggestive that their further consideration 
with a larger sample would be useful. The distributions 
refer to data collected from all 85 respondents since the 
effect of the interaction of husband and wife is not 
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important in the areas discussed. 
(a) Social class 
We already noted in the results of the tests of moral 
judgement given to children that middle class children had 
an advantage over working class children, and that this 
advantage was more marked in the younger age groups (see 
Chapter 6, section 6). The distribution of exceptio~al and 
normal children at both age levels between middle and 
working class families supports tbese trends (see Table 
XXXVIII). 
TABLE XXXVIII 
A 
B 
Distribution of Families 
8y Social Class· and GrouE 
C7 E7 C12 
9 6 A 10 
4- 4- B 3· 
• A manual workers B non-manual workers 
E12 
10 
2 
Middle class parents have an equal numerical con-
tribution to mru{e in groups 07 and E7 but they are 
proportionately overrepresented in group E7 and under-
represented in group C7 • In other words a middle class 
family background seems to correlate with faster moral 
development in younger children. 
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The distributions for parents of older children is 
almost identical although middle class parents are 
slightly overrepresented in group C12 ' that is they 
appear slightly more likely to have a normal than an 
immature child. 
(b) Family size 
It was expected that increasing family size would 
correlate with slower moral development mainly because 
of the expected correlation between larger family size 
and a working class home. Table XXXIX suggests that the 
second assumption is correct; working class families 
were far more likely than middle class families to have 
TABLE XXXIX 
A 
B 
Distribution of Families by 
Social Clas~and Family Size 
No. of children 
1 2 & 3 4+ 
3 19 13 
2 9 2 
• A manual workers B non-manual workers 
more than four children. 
Table XL suggests that the first assumption is also 
correct. Parents in group E7 were far less likely than parents 
in group C7 to have more than four children; parents in group 
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C12 were similarly far less likely than parents in group E12 
to have more than four children. In other words, increasing 
family size (especially when four or more children per family 
are involved) appears to correlate with slower moral develop-
ment in children at both age levels considered. 
TABLE XL 
No. of 
children 2 
Distribution of Families 
by Family Size and Group 
C7 E7 
1 0 0 
& 3 8 8 2 
4+ 5 2 
(c) Parental education 
C12 ~2 
1 2 3 
& 3 10 2 
4+ 1 7 
It was expected that longer parental education would 
correlate with faster moral development in the child. Again 
this derived from an expected link between longer education 
and a non-manual occupation being followed by the father. 
Table XLI suggest that the second assumption is correct. 
Middle class fathers were more likely to stay on at school 
until age 16 or 17 years, than were working class fathers. 
The tendency was even more marked for the mother~ with middle 
class mothers claiming some form of full time education up 
to age 18 years far more often than working class mothers. 
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TABLE XLI Distribution of Parents by 
Social Class· and Length of Education 
School-leaving age (years) 
Husbands Wives Both 
18+ 16 Be 17 l~ 18+ 16 Be 17 1ti 18+ 16 Be 17 15 
A 0 2 23 0 5 29 0 7 52 
B 0 2 11 2 4 7 2 6 18 
• A manual workers B non-manual workers 
Table XLII suggests some support for the first assumption. 
Parents of children in group E7 were more likely than those of 
children in group C7 to have stayed at school beyond their 
sixteenth birthday; parents in group Ei2 were slightly less 
likely than those in group C12 to have stayed on beyond their 
sixteenth birthday. In other words, longer parental education 
appears to correlate with faster moral development. 
TABLE XLII Distribution of Parents by 
Length of Education and Group 
. C7 E7 C12 E12 
School-leaving 
age (years) 
d. Summary 
18+ 
16 & 17 
l~· 
1 
2 
21 
1 18+ 0 
5 16 & 17 4 
11 16 19 
It is suggested that several features of the child's 
0 
2 
19 
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family background correlate with each other. Correlations 
were noticed: between a middle class background and quicker 
moral development; among a middle class background, smaller 
family size and quicker moral development; and among a 
middle class background, longer parental education and 
quicker moral develop~ent. In themselves, these trends are 
not conclusive since they are based on data collected from 
a small sample of parents; but they do suggest that further 
investigation of these relationships would be useful. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
:.' 
A modified version of the Parental Attitude Research 
Instrument (Schaeffer and Bell, 1956) was sent to both parents 
of 64 children. These children were split into four groups: 
sixteen morally mature 7 and 8 year olds, sixteen 'normal' 
7 and 8 year aIds, sixteen morally i~lature 11 and 12 year 
olds and sixteen 'normal' 11 and 12 year olds. 
From the 128 PARI forms distributed, 85 were completed and 
returned. The major part of the data analysis centres on the 
37 families where both husband and wife returned their forms. 
For each of the 42 PARI items, the responses of the parents from 
these families were assigned to one of three categories: high, 
where both parents scored high; low, where both scored low; or 
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mixed, where one parent scored high and the other scored low. 
The distributions of high and low scores along each of the PARI 
dimensions was compared between groups of parents of exceptional 
and control children at bo th age levels. 
The success of the attempt made in this chapter to link the 
child's rate of moral development with certain parental attitudes 
may be judged from Table XLIII which reports the correlations 
noted between these two variables. At each age level 28 com-
parisons were made - between the child's moral maturity and both 
high and low scores alone; each of 14 dimensions of parental attitudes. 
For the younger children correlations were suggested in 21 of the 28 
comparisons: 14 of these correlations were in the expected direction, 
7 reversed the predicted trend; 7 comparisons allowed no correlation 
between parental attitudes and the child's moral development. For the 
older children, 18 correlations were suggested, but 11 of these were 
opposite to the predicted direction; 10 comparisons allowed no 
correlation with the child's rate of moral development. 
On the basis of these results it was proposed that parental 
attitudes are a more effective influence on the child's development 
when he is young. The younger child, with his less well organized 
and more unstable systems of thousht and moral judgement, appeared 
more sensitive and suceptible to variations in parental attitude 
than did the older child. 
Within the broader areas of parental attitudes some particular 
dimensions appeared to be most effective at different age levels. 
TABLE XLIII 
Key: 
Young 
Old 
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Correlations between Parental Attitudes and the 
Child's Horal Development at Two ACf'e Levels 
( ) expected correlation reversed: S - correlated with 
slower moral developmen t. F - correIa ted with faster 
moral develo'Oment N - no correl",tioI'! noted 
High Dimension Low 
S Breaking the Will F 
F (Strictness) S 
N Suppression of Sex F 
F Excluding Outside Influences S 
F Deification S 
S (Intrusiveness) F 
N (Fostering Dependence) S 
N Suppression of Aggression F 
S Fear of Harming the Baby F 
F Encouraging Verbalization N 
S (Equalitarianism) N 
F Comradeship and Sharing N 
F Avoidance of Co~uunication S 
S (Acceleration) N 
S Breaking the Will N 
F (Strictness) S 
N (Suppression of Sex) S 
S (Excluding Outside Influences) N 
S (Deification) N 
N Intrusiveness S 
F (Fostering Dependence) S 
S Suppression of Aggression N 
S Fear of Harming the Baby S 
F Encouraging Verbalization N 
F Equalitarianism N 
F Comradeship and Sharing N 
S (Avoidance of Communication) N 
S (Acceleration) F 
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Thus within the area Autonomy, the dimensions Excluding Outside 
Influences, and Deification had most influence on the rate of 
development of younger children while that of Intrusiveness 
seemed an important influence on older children. Also, within 
the broader area of Democracy, the dimension Equalitarianism 
showed a stronger relationship to moral development in older 
children. 
On a broader level, correlations were noted among a middle 
class background and smaller family size, longer parental 
education and quicker moral development, 
Overall, these results suggest that further research might 
usefully consider certain aspects of parental opinion (especially 
in relation to the child's autonomy, democracy in the home, 
strictness and babying) as an important group of social factors 
influencing the rate of moral development in the child. This 
approach to causality in moral development has been wrongly 
neglected in favour of psychological explanations of the process. 
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CHAPTER 8 
REAPPRAISAL 
It is difficult to'assess three years' work in a manner 
which is detailed enough to indicate the development of ideas 
and yet brief enough to avoid needless repetition of what has 
gone before. The purpose of this final chapter is to attempt 
a summary of the scope of the present thesis and to indicate 
some lines of inquiry which might be usefully pursued in the 
future. The original aim of the present study was a straight-
forward testing of Piaget's theory of moral development; the 
simplicity of this aim was soon confounded in three main ways. 
In the first place, moral development is not a unitary 
phenomenon; Piaget's own investigations resulted in the 
isolation of eleven separate moral dimensions. Although Piaget 
regarded all these dimensions as developmental, follow-up work 
has shown that only six are developmental in the strict sense 
of the word. 
Secondly, Piaget's thesis on moral development can be 
properly understood only when it is located in his more general 
theory of intellectual development. Piaget emphasizes the 
\ 
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cognitive aspects of morality (what the child knows about right 
and wrong, good and bad, better and worse). The ability to 
make distinctions of the type required by Piaget's tests of 
moral judgement is largely intellectual; the factors which 
contribute to cognitive development in Piaget's scheme (es-
pecially those involved in the decline of egocentric thought) 
also contribute to the development of the more mature levels 
of moral judgement. Piaget's cognitive theory is now a massive 
structure based on a half-century of work; aspects of the theory 
are still being extended by Piaget and by other workers through-
out the world. 
Thirdly, Piagetts theory of moral development is only one 
among several such theories; since he emphasizes the cognitive 
aspects of morality he ignores other equally important aspects 
such as deviant behaviour and the factors which contribute to 
self-control (e.g. guilt). Additionally, there have been some 
recent developmen~even within the cognitive approach to 
morality which supersede Piaget's work to a great extent and 
there has, of course, been a formidable amount of research 
carried out in attempts to test and modify Piaget's original 
ideas. 
A major aim of the present study therefore, became an 
understanding of Piagetts theory of intellectual development. 
Because of its diverse and extremely complex nature there are 
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.many different ways in which this theory might be approached; 
the two selected for this study are Piaget's chronological 
account of the stae;es of the child's development and a 
terminological approach which explains the major items in 
Piaget's technical vocabulary. 
The first approach to Piaget's work is perhaps the most 
simple of all. Piaget has outlined four main periods of develop-
ment in the child's life and has assigned rough age levels to each; 
the sensori-motor period lasts up to about 2 years of age, the pre-
operational period from 2 to 7 years of age, the concrete operational 
period from 7 to 11 years of ace, and the formal operation period 
begins after about 11 years of age and continues throughout the 
remainder of the individual's life. This neat packaging of the child's 
developmen t belie s the true complexity of Piaget' s s::heme and it is 
unfortunately true that many of Piaget's tests of development have 
been applied without regard for the deeper theoretical implications 
of his work; they have become little more than interesting 'party 
games' • 
For this reason it was felt the. t the terminological approach 
to Piaget's cognitive theory was needed to emphasize what is, in 
fact, his major contribution to the field - an indication of the 
processes which contribute to the child's intellectual development. 
Piaget's technical vocabulary is highly specialized and often 
uique; many crucial aspects of his theory receive only cursory 
_ ... ; 
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acknowledgement durinG a chronological account of the child's 
development. In the present study separate consideration \<Jas 
e~ven to the functional invariants of Piaget's scheme (adaptation, 
accommodation and assimilation), to the general aspects of 
structure, criteria for stages of development and equilibration 
theory, and finally, to the several i~portant features of 
egocentric thought (reversibility, centering, transduction etc). 
Inevitably the cognitive and termino~gical approaches are 
complementary; it is impossible to adopt one without some dis-
cussion or implication of the other. However, their separate 
detailed consideration obviously allows each to be developed 
more fully and their slight difference in emphasis allows a 
much clearer understanding of Piaget's work and theoretical 
orientations to be gained. These important ideas were dis-
cussed in Chapter I. 
Piaget's theory of moral development was linked to his 
more general theory of cognitive development insofar as the 
appearance of certain intellectual abilities (especially the 
features of non-egocentric thought) facilitated the child's 
progress from decisions limited by a morality of constraint 
to those deriving from a morality of co-operation. In his 
discussion of moral development Piaget indicated two ideal 
types of social relationship into which the child could enter. 
The first was one of heteronomy in which the child was 
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restricted in his actions and thought by adult commands; the 
type of judgement deriving from this form of relationship 
Piaget termed objective; the child was subject to a morality 
of constraint. In contrast, the second type of social 
relationship was based in equality and co-operation; this 
relationship comllionly obtains among peers and in the inter-
action of adults and older children; it is rarely encountered 
between adults and younger children. Piaget believed that 
these relationships of equality gave rise to the more mature 
forms of moral judgement which he termed subjective; the child 
showed evidence of a morality of co-operation. Piaget applied 
this constraint/co-operation dichotomy in his discussion of 
moral development proposing that it was an important influence 
on the child's development. 
In fact, it is possible to isolate eleven moral dimensions 
from Piaget's work although it seems unlikely that Piaget was 
aware of their separate existence; his account of them is too 
confused and he concentrates his efforts towards demonstrating 
the importance of the nature of the child's social relationships 
for his moral development in general. A comparison of the stages 
of development along the moral dimension reveals that the change 
from less mature to more mature forms of judgement occurs at 
roughly the same age level for each. In fact, these changes 
occur at about 8 years of age; this is the same time that 
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egocentric thought shows its most rapid decline. The correlation 
between the disappearance of egocentric thought and the appearance 
of mature forms of moral judgement is the major link between 
Piaget's theories of cognitive and moral development. 
It is now apparent that adult constraint has only a minor 
contribution to make to the child's development, although Piaget 
laid great emphasis on this factor. More important (in cognitive 
or moral development) are the opportunities for the process of 
accommodation through equilibration; these opportunities are 
influenced by many factors including the child's age, the 
'richness' of his enviro~ent, and, of course, the extent to 
which he is dominated by adult restrictions or is free to 
interact with his peers. The variety of the factors which 
affect the child's rate of moral development has become clear 
through the many replication studies to which Piaget's ideas 
gave impetus. Piaget's main concern has always been with 
the sequence of stages of development; he has shown remarkably 
little interest in factors which might alter the child's rate 
of development from stage to stage. This was one of the 
earliest criticisms of Piaget's work and the first modifications 
to his theory or moral development suggested by the replication 
studies indicated the effects which intelligence, socia-economic 
background, nationality, etc. played in influencing the child's 
test performance. 
Perh~ps the most important fact to appear from the follow-up 
work is that not all of Piaget's eleven dimensions are develop-
mental in the strict sense of the word; while the content and 
sequence of stages for six dimensions has been validated, the 
results of the studies of the other five have been inconsistent. 
The six developmental dimensions are objective responsibility, 
Lnmanent justice, expiation v. restitution, absolutism of value, 
wrong defined as punished and fixity of rules; the results of 
the replication studies have been consistent in correlating 
increasing age with a greater maturity of response along these 
dimensions. The remaining dimensions (duty defined as obedience 
to authority, reciprocity in the definition of rights, punishment 
by authority v. retaliation, individual and collective respons- . 
ibility and favouritism in the distribution of rewards and punish-
ment) have been studied far less intensively but the results have 
shown less consistency than those of the developmental dimensions; 
the most important difference has been a lack of any correlation 
between maturity of response and age. 
The twenty sets of studies which were carried out to test 
Piaget's ideas on moral development considered a variety of 
variables other than age which were expected to influence the 
child's performance. Correlations have been most easily 
established between performance on the developmental dimensions 
and such items as intelligence, social class and explicit 
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training as in religious teaching; attempts to link these variables 
with performance on the non-developmental dimensions have largely 
failed. Some of the correlations established are not unexpected -
such as that between higher I.Q. and better performance on Piaget's 
tests - others are less obvious: the actual content of the test 
situations may affect the child's level of response; while middle 
class children tend to do better than working class children the 
latter have an advantage if the test situations are less cognitive 
in content and more easy for the child to identify with; few 
differences in performance have been established between the sexes; 
religious participation is of itself no guarantee of greater moral 
maturity. As a result of these studies Piaget's original hypotheses 
have been modified to allow for the affects of particular variables. 
A second set of studies has been concerned with the mechanism 
of moral development rather than with the variables affecting per-
formance on Piage~'s tests. On the basis of these experiments it 
is suggested in the present study that equilibration theory can be 
extended from the field of cognitive development into the field of 
moral development as an explanation of change between levels of 
judgement. 
The eleven dimensions of Piaget's scheme of moral development 
were discussed in Chapter 2; the variables considered in the 
replication work and the clarification of the mechanism of moral 
development were discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Piaget's emphasis on the cognitive aspects of morality means 
that he ignores other important aspects which have been discussed 
by other workers. Freud's writings on the super ego and the 
processes of identification and the conditioned response arguments 
of the learning theorists are both attempts to explain the guilt 
aspects of conscience. These discussions indicate the ways in 
which the child's conscience might influence his behaviour in 
situations where he is tempted to steal, cheat or lie, say; Piaget's 
theory allows none of this sort of prediction since it is possible 
for the individual to act in a deviant manner even if he is fully 
aware that what he is doing contravenes the social or legal codes. 
Even within the cognitive approach to moral development Piaget's 
work has severe limitations. The tests he used to assess the 
maturity of judgements are very simple affairs and are not suff-
iciently sensitive to highlight shades of opinion other than the 
broad dichotomies which typify his eleven moral dimensions. Kohlberg 
is a psychologist working within the cognitive approach to moral 
development whose ideas have largely superseded those of Piaget. 
Kohlberg's scheme of moral development comprises twenty-five aspects 
of morality each of which has six levels of maturity; these 150 
categories of judgement subsume Piaget's eleven dimensions while 
allowing a much more sensitive assessment of moral development. 
The greater flexibility of Koh1berg's scheme derives from his use 
of test items which pose moral dilemmas far more complicated than 
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those of Piaget. These important ideas of Kohlberg and also 
the contributions of Freud and learning theory to moral 
development were discussed in Chapter 4. 
The result of the theoretical discussions of the first 
four chapters was a much better perspective on Piaget's theory 
of ~oral development. The several modifications of Piaget's 
original thesis. suggested by replication studies were noted; 
approaches other than Piaget's cognitive one were discussed; 
and Piaget's theory of moral development was shown to bear some 
similarity to his theory of cognitive development. One major 
omission of the replication stUdies was noted: Piaget laid great 
emphasis on the nature of the adult-child relationship as a factor 
influencing the moral jUdgements of the Child; this factor has 
received little empirical attention in the replication work. The 
present study goes some way towards filling this gap by suggesting 
correlations between parental attitudes in six broad areas and the 
rate of moral development in the child. 
Generally, responses to the six tests of moral judgement used 
in the present study became more mature in older children. No 
consistent sex differences could be seen in the present data 
although higher intelligence and a middle class home background 
did accelerate the child's rate of development. Also, groups of 
exceptional children were isolated at either end of the age range 
studied. First was a group of 11 and 12 year olds whose responses 
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were consistently much less mature than those of their peers; 
second was a group of 7 and 8 year olds whose responses were 
more mature than both their peers and the other eroup of 
exceptions. The parents of these two groups of children 
formed the basis for the second part of the present empirical 
work - an investigation of parental attitudes to various aspects 
of child rearing. Attitudes were assessed along fourteen 
dimensions grouped in six broader areas by means of the Parental 
Attitude Research Instrument (Schaeffer and Bell, 1958). The 
family was taken as the basic unit and various combinations of 
maternal and paternal attitudes were noted. Comparisons were 
made at two age levels: first, between parents of morally mature 
younger children and those of morally normal younger children; 
and second, between parents of morally immature older children and 
those of morally normal older children. The several correlations 
noted between parental attitudes and the child's rate of moral 
development have important implications but they do need checking 
out on a larger sample. 
First, slower moral development at both age levels correlated 
with a greater belief in the subservience of the child to the 
adult but not with a greater belief in the benefits of a strict 
upbringing for the child; permissive attitudes to sex correlated 
with faster development in younger children but with slower 
development in older children. 
Second, it appears that certain aspects of the child's 
autonomy might be more effective at particular age levels than 
at others. Parental discouragement of the child's isolation 
from opinions other than those of his parents correlated with 
faster moral development in younger children; the same 
correlation was noted for discouragement of the child's tendency 
towards extreme reverence for his parents. Parental attitudes 
to the child's right to privacy assumed greatest importance for 
older children and parental intrusiveness correlated with slower 
moral development here. 
Third, while the fact of democratic attitudes towards the 
child's involvement in family affairs did not correlate with 
different rates of moral development, extreme attitudes along 
this dimension did; more extreme democratic attitudes correlated 
with quicker moral development at both age levels. 
Fourth, parents of the morally more advanced children at 
both age levels seemed less inclined to worry about their 
children when they were very young or about their being involved 
in' fights; however, these parents also seemed more likely to 
protect their children from the rough-and-tumble and difficulties 
of everyday life. 
Finally, parental discouragement of discussion with the 
child and of attempts to accelerate the child's development 
correlated with slower moral development in younger children. 
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The opposite trend appeared in the responses of parents of 
older children with encouragement of verbalization and 
acceleration correlating with slower moral development. 
Certain other aspects of family life showed correlations 
with different rates of moral development and these could be 
traced back in part to the effects of a middle class background 
in promoting moral development; this tendency was first noted 
in the data for the original sample of children and was reflected 
in the subsample of exceptional children and their controls. Two 
factors in particular appeared to correlate with both a middle 
class background and faster moral development in the child -
these were smaller family size and lengthier parental education. 
All the trends and correlations noted between parental 
attitudes and the child's moral judgements are tentative con-
clusions; they are derived from a small sample and need checking. 
They do indicate support for several of the implications of 
Piaget's discussion of the parent-child relationship as an 
influential factor in moral development and they suggest that 
more research in this area would be useful. 
The indications noted above of the several factors which 
influence the child's rate of development are further evidence 
of the inadequacy of Piaget's original thesis as an account and 
explanation of moral development. It is also further evidence 
of the complexity of the field of morality and suggests the need 
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to give separate consideration to the several aspects of moral 
development. It is likely that Kohlberg's recent work will 
provide the impetus for a renewed interest in moral development and 
should supersede that of Piaget since it is far more complex and 
sophisticated and since it encompasses Piaget's eleven moral 
dimensions; however, there would still appear to be the need to 
investigate parental attitudes in relation to Kohlberg's work. 
Since Kohlberg also adopts a cognitive approach to moral judge-
ments it seems likely that the correlations suggested from the 
present study between parental attitudes and moral development 
would have relevance to the refinement of Kohlberg's scheme. 
There is an increasing interest in the practical aspects of 
theories of moral development; the emphasis is more on the uses 
to which the theories can be put in the field of moral education 
rather than on their existence as areas of study per se (witness 
Wilson et aI, 1967, for the Farmington Trust and Kohlberg, 1967). 
The theories discussed in this thesis were not developed to assist 
in the task of moral education; they were developed in an attempt 
to gain a better understanding of a particular aspect of human 
behaviour. This is not to say that their findings have not been 
applied in attempts to influence this development. Kohlbergts 
theory in particular has had practical significance because he has 
discussed the problem of moral education and has suggested ways in 
which his own scheme could assist this process (Kohlberg, 1967). 
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The fact that his theory of moral development is now 
superseded is really of little importance to Piaget's position 
in the field of developmental psychology. Piaget's study of 
moral development is only a very small part of his total work 
and he wrote only one book in this particular area; in view of 
his industrious and detailed approach to intellectual development 
it seems likely that he would have extended his original work on 
moral development had his efforts been applied there. However, 
it is in the field of intellectual development that Piaget's 
position is most strong; there is now a formidable body of data 
amassed by Piaget and others throughout the world to support his 
thesis on the stages of mental growth through childhood and 
adolescence and the process of development from stage to stage. 
It is in this area, and especially in relation to the process of 
development (equilibration theory, factors contributing to the 
decline of egocentric thought, etc.) that much work needs to be 
done. It is in these areas, no doubt, that most research 
derived from Piaget's ideas will stem in the future. 
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Exm:OTES 
340 
Chapter 1 
1. l-!ore recent comment by Piaget and Inhelder on their general 
theoretical approach is given in Tanner and Inhelder (1956-60) 
especially volumes I and IV. Lovell (1968), Beard (1969), 
Boyle (1969), Phillips (1969) and Richmond (1970) also give 
fairly concise accounts of Piaget's theoretical orientation. 
2. Four types of assimilation are distinguished by Piaget. These 
types - functional, generalizing, recognitory and reciprocal -
refer to slightly different interpretations of the term and 
are explained later on. 
3. Schemas - sometimes referred to as schemata - in Piaget's 
theory are the individual behavioural units with which the 
child operates on his environment. They are the frameworks 
which combine to form the structure of the child's thoueht; 
in restricting the child's interaction with his environment, 
they limit his organization, and hence his understanding of 
events in the world. 
4. See Flavell, 1963, 1'1'. 55-58; and Boyle, 1969, pp~ 32-34. 
5. In this context 'situation' would be given a very broad inter-
pretation to include new objects or activities with which the 
child might be faced. 
6. Later on (Chapter 4) we shall see .that equilibration theory 
has been used in Kohlberg's explanation of moral development. 
7. See Piaget, 1960b, for an expansion of the arguments outlined 
here. 
8. This is the term which Piaget uses in preference to stace which 
he applies to the component parts of each period. 
9. The first stage of the sensori-motor period, in which the 
child's behaviour is purely reflex in nature, is unique since 
it bas no preceding stage (other than the foetal period) for 
which it can be regarded as an equilibrium level. 
10. The foetus can kick for example, and some babies delivered by 
Caesarian operation have been found sucking their thumbs. 
11. Although Piaget's main concern in the sensori-motor period has 
been the genesis and slow development of mental. representation, 
he has also described physical behaviour in detail. These 
observations are reported at greater length elsewhere and the 
interested reader is referred to Flavell, 1963, p. 122-50, 
where consideration is given to imitation, play, the child's 
conception of objects, space, causality and time, and the 
development of each through Piaget's six stages in the sensori-
motor period is traced. See also Phillips, 1969, pp. 39 ff, 
and especially Table II, pp. 48-49. 
12. Certain sensori-motor activities such as facial and bodily 
gesturing remain additional forms of communication. 
13. These and otlier related aspects of Piaget's model of the 
child's intellectual processes are discussed in detail later 
on - see PI'. 5"2. ff • 
14. The effects of each of these aspects of the child's thought 
are given clear explanation in Phillips, 1969, pp. 58-67 and 
in Richmond, 1970, pp. 14-30, where there is given an outline 
of several of Piaget's conservation tests. See also below, 
section 6, pp.5l. ff. 
15. He may maintain that there is more water because the second 
column is taller; alternatively, he may maintain that there 
is less water' because the column is thinner. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
In fact, the child is asked 'If all the brown beads were 
removed would there be any beads left?' Answer: 'Yes, the 
white ones'; and 'If all the wooden beads were removed would 
there be any left?' Answer: 'No'. 
Apart from irreversibility, two further related restrictions 
on the child's thought are operating here. One is the child's 
centering on the colour dimension which happens in' this case 
to be irrelevant though perceptually difficult to ignore; the 
other is his use of transductive reasoning, moving from part 
to part and ignoring part-whole relationships. In fact all 
three restrictions form parts of the more general disability 
of ee;'ocentric thought and all tend to disappear together, as 
is explained later on (see pp. '5'1. ff). All these restrictions 
are very closely interrelated and changes in one aspect reflect 
and are reflected by changes in the others. 
An interesting and important series of studies related to 
egocentric thought is reported by Flavell et aI, 1968. These 
studies clarify the restrictions imposed by egocentric thought 
and sive an indication of the factors which promote its decline. 
19. A somewhat similar argument is applied by Piaget to explain the 
child's moral development, a point to which we return later on 
(see Chapters 2 and 3). 
20. For example, the four-group and the equilibrium of a set of 
scales - see Flavell, 1963, pp. 212 ff, and Boyle, 1969, 
pp. 73 ff. 
21. These groupings are at times quite abstract and the interested 
reader is referred to Flavell, 1963, pp. 172-87 and pp. 190-95, 
where they are discussed at length. See also Boyle, 1969, 
pp. 52-88. 
22. In baking, for example, the actions set out in a recipe must be 
followed exactly; changing the order in which ingredients are 
added would produce a mixture unsuitable for optimum results. 
23. It might be interesting to apply Piaget's tests of mental 
functioning at a much higher age level to see if any pattern 
of decline is apparent in senility and to compare any such 
pattern ~ith the development of intellectual structures in 
childhood. 
24. See also Phillips, 1969, pp. 58 ff. 
25. 'Transcribers' here refers to those writers who have attempted 
to phrase the translations of Piaget's books into more under-
standable English. 
26. <See Kessen and Kuhlman, 1962, p. 165. 
27. For even greater accuracy other considerations such as the 
time of day, is the water being run by }Iummy or Daddy?, has 
the water run long enough to fill a bath?, etc. must be taken 
into account. 
28. The system will, of course, be internally dynamic. 
29. Except perhaps in cases of mental retardation where biological 
factors set severe limitations on the child's ability to , 
accommodate. 
Chapter 2 
1. In fact, Piaget makes usa of data collected from at least 
fourteen separate samples in his study of moral development. 
These samples may be distinguished after only the most care-
ful scrutiny of The Noral Judgement of the Child and this 
obscurity typifies Piaget's methodoloGical approach. The 
samples are these: one of twenty boys aged 12-13 years 
-
0(1932, p. 13); one of a 'hundred odd subjects' (1932, p. 17); 
one of at least 9 girls (1932, pp. 69 ft); two samples of 
indeter~inate size used for the investigation of objective 
responsibility and lies (1932, pp. 116ff and pp. 136 ff); 
Piaget's own children (1932, e.g. p. 177); a sample of 65 
children aged 6-12 years, plus 'some 30 myself' (1932, p. 207); 
one of 100 children which could possibly be those included in 
the second sample above (1932, p. 219); one of about 60 subjects 
aced 6-14 years (1932, p. 232); one of 40 children aged 5-13 
. years (1932, p. 244); one of 167 children aged 6-9 years inter-
viewed by }llle. Hambert (1932, pp. 251, 263 and 268); one of an 
indeterminate number of children from Neuchatel (1932, p. 251); 
one of about 150 children aeed 6-12 years also interviewed by 
Hlle. Rambert (1932, p. 276); and finally, a sample of in-
determinate size comprising children aged 5-12 years. (1932, p.277). 
2. The ~etter performance by girls in Bull's sample is attributable 
in part to their higher I.Q. at all age levels. 
, •. Piaget did not question children under 6 years of age since they 
had difficulty remembering the paired stories and so could not 
compare them. See Piaget, 1932, p. 120. 
4. It is perhaps presumptious of Piaget to relate early development 
to the nature of the parent-child relationship without evidence; 
one of the aims of the present study ~s to provide some data 
relevant to this problem - see Chapter 7. 
5. The validity of the variables of peer group participation and 
adult constraint as factors contributing to th~ child's faster 
progress alone Piaget's moral dimensions is discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
6. c.f. Kohlberg's moral dilenwas in Chapter 4. 
7. This, in essence, is the stimulus-response argument of classical 
learning theory. 
8. These situations figured in Piaget's investigation. See Piaget, 
1932, pp. 200-01. 
9. See Piaget's data, 1932, p. 297, and Table III. 
10. In fact, the importance of peer group co-operation as a factor 
influencing the child's moral development is doubtful, See 
Chapter 3. 
11. See especially the Nuffield Foundation pUblication Beginnings 
(1968) which reports the attempt to combine Pia~et's general 
views on co-operation with his specific experiments on con-
servation as a new approach to teaching. See also the 
approach of the Farmington Trust to moral education as in 
\'Iilson et al (1967). 
Chapter 3 
1. See Johnson, 1962b, and Edwards, 1965a. 
2. For discussions of social class in relation to Piaget's work, 
see for example, Harrower (1934), Boehm (1957-62), Boehm and 
Nass (1962), Lerner (1937), MacRae (1954) and Johnson (1962a). 
3. See Jacques (1968) for a detailed account of this work. 
4. The two tests devised Hacau1ey and Watkins have also been 
applied more recently by Edwards (1965; Edwards and Pringle, 
1964) and Bull (1969). 
5. Some of these ideas are elaborated by Kohlberg (e.g. 1963b) 
but his theory differs in that it has more stages which appear 
at different aGe levels. See Chapter 4. 
6. The development dimensions are objective responsibility, immanent 
justice, expiation v. restitution, absolutism of value, wrong 
defined as punished and fixity of rules - see Table V. The non-
developmental dimensions are duty defined as obedience to 
authority , reciprocity in rights, punishment by authority v. 
retaliation, individual and collective responsibility and 
favouritism in the distribution of rewards and punishments -
see Table VI. 
7. These studies comprise all the validation work deriving from 
Piaget's theory of moral development except for Lerner (1937) 
and l'1cCord and HcCord (1960) to which access could not be gained. 
8. The tendency for rule fixity to decline in older children has 
also been noted in a minor research project. See Lydiat, 1967. 
9. The dimension of absolutism of value has been shown to be 
developmental although the relevant stUdies do not appear in' 
Table IV. The supporting data in this case are taken from 
Kohlberg, 1963a, Table 5, p. 318, and derive from the work of 
Lerner (1937) and HcCord and HcCord (1960). Also the work 
of Flavell et al (1968), has thrown considerable light on 
the problem of egocentric thought as a general cognitive defect 
.and, by implication, it has supported the developmental nature 
of the dimension of absolutism of value in the field of moral 
development. 
10. Although not reported in TablesIV and V, the work of Flavell 
et al, 1968, has shown higher intelligence to correlate with 
the quicker decline of egocentric thought (implied in the 
dimension of absolutism of value). The relationship between 
intelligence and egocentric thought is circular to some extent, 
the one influencing the other; it is the less egocentric and 
more intelligent children who are able to empathize, to consider 
points of view other than their own, and so take a more decentered 
view of the situation. 
11. The results of two of these three must be treated with caution. 
Abel's (1941) measure of constraint was not very accurate or 
objective, and Johnson's (1962a) findings related to the 
cognitive aspects of morality. See Appendix H and the later 
sub-section on situational differences for an expansion of these 
points. 
12. This finding may also be related to the cOGnitive and affective 
aspects of the dilemmas. See the later sUb-section on 
situational differences. 
13~ In the discussion of the results of the present study it is 
suggested that the effects of social class are filtered through 
a variety of parental attitudes to child rearing before they 
have any influence on the child. See Chapter 7. 
14. Discrete categories of judgement have been provided by both 
Piaget and Koh1berg. 
15. There was no control group in this experiment. 
16. The reader is referred to Chapter 1, p.4t, if he is not clear 
about the concept of conservation. 
1~. The situations which Crowley used in the pretest and posttest 
were 'complex' by his standards. 
18. The control group was given only the pre- and posttests and 
any change in response in the control group was used as the 
standard against weich changes in each of the other four groups 
were compared. 
19. Although it is not immediately apparent why the young child 
should so consistently center on consequences rather than 
intentions. 
20. Crowley (1968) had established a maintained higher level 
response over an 18. day period, which was longer than Bandura 
and McDonald had achieved but was relatively limited nonetheless. 
21. See Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
22. See Chapter 1 and Smedslund, 1961c. 
23,. See, for example, tvilson et ai, 1967, for the Farmington Trust 
and Koh1berg, 1967. 
Chapter 4 
1 •. tlright (1968) argues that the several aspects of the concept 
of conscience may be considered as independent variables since 
intercorrelations among them are so rare. 
2. Greater comparability is afforded among these different studies 
by the-fact that they all made use of Koh1bergts original 
dilemmas. This contrasts with the replication work deriving 
from Piagetts theory where many workers have been content to 
make up their own test situations. 
3. The interested reader is referred to Kohlberg, 1967, Table 2, 
pp. 172-73, where all 25 aspects and 7 codes are listed. 
4. Several of these aspects may be seen to derive directly from 
Piagetts work, especially the first three. All· of Piagetts 
eleven dimensions find expression in Kohlbergts scheme although 
there are obviously extra aspects as well. Several of these 
aspects are vague and are not elaborated by ICoh1berg in any of 
the expositions currently available; he may do this in his book 
due for publication soon. 
5 •. These aspects are extra to Piagetts scheme and are needed to allow 
for the more sophisticated arguments which ensue from Koh1berg t s 
more complex di1enuuas. 
6. The more sophisticated dilemmas used by Kohlberg allowed this 
level of interpretation which is denied Piagetts more naive 
. situations. 
This cultural influence on the rate and final stage of moral 
development was also noted by Piaget (see, for example, Piage t, 
1932, p. 340) and by Mead (in Tanner and Inhelder , 1956, p. 92) 
in connection with Piagetts scheme of cognitive development. 
According to Piaget's interpretation, the intense unilateral 
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. respect which 'primitive' man has for the group constrains 
him in similar fashion to Piaset's ideal-type heteronomous 
adult-child relationship, and with similarly retarding effects. 
Kohlberg does not explain the cultural differences, although 
he would presumably reject the constraint/respect-for-authority 
explanation of Piaget in this respect as he does with regard 
to Piaget's theory of moral development in general. 
8. See, for example, Kohlberg's scoring of the statements made 
by Adolph Eichmann during his trial (Kohlberg, 196,(" Table 4, 
p. 177). 
9. Turiel says that this advice represents a +1 treat~ent for a 
subject in Staee 2 (1966, p. 613); presumably it is also a 
-1 treatment for stage 4, Subjects although he does not make 
this clear. Similarly, advice phrased on a Stage 4 level of 
reasoning could be a +1 treatment for Stage 3 subjects or a 
+2.treatment for Stage 2 subjects. 
10. The criteria of developlllen tal stages as distinct from General 
changehas already been dealt with above (see Chapter 1, pp23~) 
and is also discussed in detail in Kohlberg and Kraliler, 1969, 
pp. 98-99. 
11. This generalization of Stase 6 reasoning is not inevitable; 
Kohlberg thinks it likely that most adults function at Stages 
3 and 4 only. See, for example, Kohlberg, 1967, p. 173. 
12. This does not deny Piaget's opinion that a certain neurological 
development is necessary before learning can occur. See Boyle 
1969, pp. 113-14. 
13: The authors did not consider Stages 5 and 6 since their 
experimental exposure to +2 influences meant a limitation to 
subjects in staGe 4 who could be given Stage 6 reasoning as 
their +2 condition; similarly, Stage 1 subjects were ignored 
since they could not be Given a -1 treatment. 
14. See Bronfenbrenner, 1960, for a discussion of identification. 
15. A notable exception to this rule is the Action Han model 
which is, in effect, a doll designed specifically for boys. 
Eowever, the context in which this doll is used is definitely 
masculine (the arn:ed services, war, exploration and space 
travel) and is opposite to the feminine activities of washing, 
dressing and comforting the 'babies'. 
16. See, forexample, Hartshorne and Hay's studies and Durkin, 1'959-61 • 
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17. We have already seen that the classic S-R paradigm appears 
less successful in this respect than do Freud's processes 
of identification. 
Chapter 5 
1. See Turiel (1970) for an account of the replication work 
which has been carried out and is at present under 
execution. 
2. The relevant data is presented in the accompanying table 
4. 
Sex Distribution of Children Aged 7 to 12 years in 
Sheffield Schools - September 1967 
Junior Classes Boys Girls Difference 
(B - G) 
Junior I 3828 3683 - 145 
Junior II 3715 3739 - 14 
Junior III 3747 3456 289 
Junior IV 3593 3452 141 
Secondar~ Classes 
First Year 3676 3364 312 
Second Year 3405 3231 174 
Percenta5e 
Difference 
4.0 
0.3 
7.5 
4.0 
8.0 
5.0 
(Source: Sheffield Department of Education) 
The distribution of children aged 7-12 years in Sheffield 
Schools on 31.12.66 is given in the accompanying table : 
Age (yrs) Number 
7 6572 
8 6415 
9 6302 
10 5938 
11 5595 
12 5643 
Eight of the eleven junior schools which fed Westfield 
Comprehe~sive were in Derbyshire and were ignored to 
maintain comparability with data based in the Sheffield 
Education Department area. 
. 
The sample figures were rounded slightly where necessary 
to allow an equal distribution between the two sets of 
schools. 
6. Certain children were excluded from the list of school 
populations; the list did not include : 
(a) Children whose father or mother was dead, or 
whose parents were separated (legally, deserted or by 
imprisonment). This exclusion was made in anticipation 
of the second part of this study where it was proposed 
to approach both parents of some of the children in an 
attempt to gauge their attitudes to certain areas of 
childrearing. Obviously there is a case for considering 
these broken families as a special form of influence on 
the child and an alternate research design might validly 
compare the moral development of children from complete 
and broken homes. 
(b) children whose school records were incomplete; this 
was most often with regard to father's occupation and 
meant that the social class stratification of the sample 
could not accurately include these children. This group 
formed only a small minority of the total exclusions. 
(c) children aged 10 years at comprehensive school, 
children aged 11 years at junior school and children aged 
7 years at infant school. These few children were ex-
cluded by accident; they are exceptional cases and their 
presence out of the hormal age levels which typifies 
British educational streaming was not realized suffi-
ciently early to allow their inclusion. 
(d) a few children who entered the schools between the 
compilation of the sample and the completion of the study. 
7. Unfortunately this was not the case with the parentsl 
8. This attitude apparently extended to her· schoolwork 
as well. 
10. 
11. 
In the parent questionnaire, all personal information 
was requested on the final sheet and was given in full 
on each returned schedule. See Appendix G. 
This was out of a total of 2320 situations presented. 
This last reason could be interpreted as evidence of 
an immature response since the judgement is based on 
the number of people to whom each lie is told. 
Chapter 6 
1. All tables and graphs show the data for immature responses 
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only. The trends for the mature answers would show a 
mirror image of those indicated since the frequencies 
of mature and immature responses are interdependent. 
The percentage of mature answers can easily be deter-
mined in each case should this be necessary. 
2. The parents of children in both of these groups of 
exceptions formed the basis of the second empirical 
investigation of this study which is reported in 
Chapter 7. 
3. This implies that the exceptional children might all 
be girls; in fact, this is not the case. Among the 
older children there were 7 boys and 9 girls who 
showed consistently immature responses; among the 
younger children there were 8 boys and 8 girls who 
showed consistently mature responses. 
4. It is worth noting in this respect that the replication 
studies of Kohlberg's ideas on moral development, 
which have superseded Pia.get's to a large extent, have 
all used the same battery of test situations. 
Chapter 7 
1. See Wright (1968) for a discussion of ,the empirical 
data relating to these separate aspects of conscience 
and an argument that, in fact, each functions 
relatively independently of the others. 
2. The PARI contained a further 9 dimensions which were 
not thought directly relevant to the present study and 
which were ignored. These were called martyrdom, 
seclusion of the mother, dependence of the mother, 
marital conflict, irritability, rejection of the 
homemaking role, ascendency of the mother, in con-
siderateness of the husband and approval of activity. 
Most of these were designed to estimate the mother's 
satisfactio~ of her role and her opinions her husband 
and marriage in general. 
3. The following abbreviations are used throughout the 
discussion of the results : 
- children aged 7 and 8 years in the control group 
of 'normal' scorers in Piaget's moral judgement tests. 
4. 
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- the group of children aged 7 and 8 years who 
performed exceptionally well on Piaget's tests. 
- the group of children aged 11 and 12 years who 
performed exceptionally badly on Piaget's tests. 
- children aged 11 and 12 years in the control 
group of 'normal' scorers 
That is, husband and wife both ringed D on the PARI 
v 
schedule or that one parent ringed D while the 
other:: ringed D • 
w 
v 
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APPENDICES 
CARD I 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
·10 
9 
8 
7 
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APPENDIX A 
RAW DISTRIBUTIONS OF SCORES 
BY CARD, AGE, SEX AND SCHOOL. 
Hyers Grove - Boys Westfield - Boye 
1 1 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 14-
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 0 2 0 0 0 0 12 
0 3 0 0 0 0 12 0 6 0 0 0 0 9 
0 9 0 0 0 0 7 0 3 0 0 0 0 13 
0 10 0 0 0 0 6 0 9 0 0 0 0 7 
0 9 0 0 0 0 8 0 10 0 0 0 0 7 
1 234 5 6 7 1234567 
Score 
Hyers Grove - Girls t'iestfie1d - Girls 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 0 3 0 0 0 0 11 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0 4 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 14 
0 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 8 
0 11 0 0 0 0 5 0 9 0 0 0 0 7 
0 7 0 0 0 0 10 0 12 0 0 0 0 5 
1234-567 1234-567 
Score 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
CARD II 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
~~ers Grove - Boys \vestfield - Boys 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 0 0 0 13 0 6 0 0 0 0 
0 9 0 0 0 0 7 0 3 0 0 0 0 
0 9 0 0 0 0 7 0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 9 0 0 0 0 8 0 10 0 0 0 0 
1234567 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Score 
Myers Grove - Girls Westfield - Girls 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 12 0 0 0 0 4 0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 5 2 0 0 0 10 0 13 0 0 0 0 
1234-567 1 2 3 4- 5 6 
Score 
13 
13 
9 
13 
7 
7 
7 
12 
13 
14-
7 
7 
4 
7 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
CARD III 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Myers Grove - Boys Westfield - Boys 
0 2 1 1 0 0 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 0 3 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 14 0 6 0 0 0 0 
0 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 10 1 0 1 0 4 0 10 0 0 0 0 
0 14 0 0 0 0 3 0 14 0 0 0 0 
123 456 7 1_ 2 3 4 5 6 
Score 
Myers Grove - Girls Westfield - Girls 
0 2 0 0 0 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 2 1 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 11 0 4 0 0 0 0 
0 8 0 0 0 0 8 0 6 0 0 0 0 
0 12 0 0 0 0 4 0 9 0 0 0 0 
1 10 0 0 0 0 6 0 11 1 0 0 0 
1234567 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Score 
12 
11 
9 
7 
6 
3 
7 
13 
13 
11 
10 
7 
5 
7 
... 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
CARD IV 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
}trers Grove - Boys \'lestfie1d - Boys 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 l} 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 5 0 0 0 0 
0 3 0 0 0 0 13 0 3 0 0 0 0 
0 8 0 0 0 1 7 0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 9 0 0 0 1 7 0 11 0 0 0 0 
1 2 } 4 5 6 7 12345 6 
Score 
Myers Grove - Girls Westfield - Girls 
0 2 0 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 12 0 6 0 0 0 0 
0 11 0 0 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 0 0 
0 8 1 0 0 1 7 0 8 0 0 0 0 
1234567 12345 6 
Score 
13 
13 
10 
13 
7 
6 
7 
12 
13 
14 
10 
10 
9 
7 
___ J 
CARD V 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
Hyers Grove - Boys Westfield - Boys 
0 2 1 0 1 2 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 1 2 0 0 0 0 
0 4 2 0 0 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 4 
1 4 1 0 1 4 5 0 4 0 0 0 1 
0 5 3 0 2 3 3 0 2 0 0 0 5 
0 6 2 0 0 5 4 0 6 2 0 0 _5 
1234567 1 2 .3 4 5 6 
Score 
}~ers Grove - Girls Westfield - Girls 
0 0 0 0 0 .3 11 0 4 0 0 0 0 
1 0 2 0 0 0 11 1 0 1 0 0 1 
0 2 .3 0 0 3 7 0 4 0 1 0 0 
0 5 2 0 0 .3 6 0 6 1 0 0 2 
1 5 4 0 0 4 2 0 8 0 0 0 1 
1 2 .3 0 0 5 6 0 6 0 0 0 5 
12.3 4 5 6 7 12.3 456 
Score 
13 
11 
11 
11 
9 
4 
7 
10 
11 
10 
7 
7 
6 
7 
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APPENDIX A (Continued) 
CARD VI 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
.Hyers Grove - Boys 
0 3 0 0 0 0 11 
1 3 0 0 0 0 10 
0 6 0 0 0 0 9 
0 10 0 0 0 0 6 
0 10 1 1 0 0 4 
0 10 1 0 0 ·2 4 
1234567 
Score 
Myers Grove - Girls 
0 1 0 0 0 1 12 
0 1 0 0 0 0 13 
0 4 1 0 0 1 9 
0 7 2 0 0 0 7 
1 8 2 0 0 1 4 
0 8 1 0 1_ 1 6 
123 ~ 5 6 7 
Score 
\aJ'estfie1d - Boys 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 3 1 0 0 1 
0 3 0 0 0 1 
0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 9 0 0 1 0 
0 7 3 1 0 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Westfield - Girls 
0 5 0 0 0 0 
0 2 1 0 0 0 
0 4 0 0 0 0 
0 10 1 0 0 0 
0 9 0 1 1 0 
0 11 0 0 0 0 
12345 6 
13 
9 
11 
7 
6 
5 
7 
9 
11 
11 
5 
5 
6 
7 
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CARD VII 
12 
11 
.10 
9 
8 
7 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
Myers Grove - Boys 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
0 0 0 1 0 0 15 
0 2 0 0 0 0 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
1234567 
Score 
Nyers Grove - Girls 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
0 0 0 1 0 0 15 
1 0 0 0 0 0 15 
0 1 0 0 0 1 15 
1234567 
Score 
APPENDIX B 
Results of a Test of Significance of the Differences in 
the Frequency of Immature Responses to :Noral Judgement 
Tests by Age and Area 
Note: The formula used for this test and for those in 
Appendices C and D is : 
-
z = PI - P2 
f2p;q; 
JNi 
for samples of equal size (Guilford, 1964, p. 186, formula 
9.9) where : 
P1 = proportion of immature responses in 
P2 = proportion of immature responses in 
Pe = PI + P2 
2 
qe = 1 - Pe 
and Ni = size of each sample 
The results are significant at the 0.05 level 
if Z' = 
12 
11 
Age 10 
(years) 9 
8 
7 
1.96 
C - s 
0.75 
0.75 
0.19 
1.30 
0.33 
1.35 
s - L C - L 
0.86 1.56 
1.95 1.94 
1.27 1.07 
1.94 0.64 
0.65 0.97 
2.17 0.69 
Sample 
Sample 
C - S: comparison between data for clumsiness and stealing 
S L: comparison between data for stealing and lies 
C - L: comparison between data for clumsiness and lies. 
1. 
2. 
APPENDIX C 
Results of a Test of Significance of the Differences in 
the Frequency of Immature Responses to Noral Judgement 
Tests by Age and Test 
Note: See Appendix B for the formula for this test. 
The data showed significant differences if 
z = 1.96. In the table below a dash (-) in-
dicates that no significant differences were 
found at any age levels; a number indicates 
at which age level any significant difference 
was found. 
I 
I x 
II 
- X 
Test III 7 7 >< 
Number IV 9 9 7,9 >< 
V 
- -
?,8 
- X 
VI 
- - -
9 7,8,9 X 
I II III IV V VI 
Test Number 
APPENDIX D 
Results of a Test of Significance of the Differences in 
the Frequency of Immature Responses to Moral Judgement 
Tests by Age and Sex 
Note: 
Age 
(years) 
See Appendix B for the formula for this test; 
the results show significant differences at 
the 0.05 level if z = 1.96. The test was 
carried out on the largest difference ob-
servable at each of the age levels indicated. 
None of those differences proved to be 
significant; since the sample sizes remain 
constant for each comparison, and since all 
other differences were smaller than those 
tested, no significant values of % would 
appear if these data were tested. 
12,11· 
10 
9.8 •• 
7 
Aggregate 
0.56 
0.22 
1.38 
1.90 
Area Test 
1.04- 1.29 
1.19 1.18 
1.59 1.20 
1.34- 1.32 
• the samples at these ages were of equal size 
•• the samples at these ages were of equal size 
APPENDIX E 
Results of X2 Test of the Sicnificance of the Differences in 
the Frequency of Immature Responses to Moral Judgement Tests 
by Intelligence Group and Age - A~gregate Scores 
(f 
0 - f ) e 
Age X2 A B C 
12 6.02 
- 5.1 5,,9 - 0.8 
11 9.81 -11.4 4.0 7.4 
10 28.34 - 2.2 -14.2 16.4 
9 27.25 - 8.8 -16.4 25.2 
8 13.83 -14.7 - 2.6 12.1 
7 15.87 -13.6 16.5 - 3.9 
significant at the 0.05 level if -2. 5.99 
significant at the 0.01 level if X2 = 9.21 
significant at the O.OO11eve1 if X2 = 13.82 
A: above average I.Q. B: average I.Q. C: below average I.Q. 
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APPENDIX F 
2 Resu~ts of X Test of the Significance of the Differences in 
the Frequency of Immature Responses to Moral Judgement Tests 
by Intelligence Group and Age - Area Scores 
(f -
'n ff) 
Age X2 A -, B C 
12 4.91 
- - -
11 8.97 -4.3 1.3 2.6 
10 6.47 
-2.3 -1.8 4.5 
Clumsiness 9 "10.35 -;.5 -5.4 8.9 
8 
7 , 
12 
11 
10 
stealing 
'9 
8 " 
7 
12 
11 
. 
10 
Lies 9 
8 
7 
A: above average I.Q. 
Significant at the: 
13.57 
-7.5 4.7 2.2 
3.51 
- - -
0.27 
- - -
3.14 
- - -
22.52 0.7 -7.7 7.9 
5.95 (-2.5) (-3.9) (6.8) 
5.50 (-4.2) (~0.8) (4.5 ) 
11.87 -6.6 . 6.8 0.6 
3.97 
- - -
2.52 
- - -
2.20 
- - -
7.02 -1.3 -5.6 8.0 
4.28 
- - -
2.55 
- - -
B: average I.Q. c: below average I.Q. 
0.05 level if X2 = 5.99 
0.01 level if X2 = 9.21 
0.001 level if X2 = 13.82 
APPENDIX G 
Results of X2 Test for the Significance of the Differences in the 
Freauency of Immature Responses to Moral Judeement Tests by Social 
Class and Age - Aggregate, Area and Test Scores 
Area Test 
Age Aggregate C S L I II III IV V VI 
12 0.58 0.001 0.63 1~80 - - - - - -
11 3.20 3.02 0.39 0.17 - - - - - -
10 3.74 0.12 3.66 1.66 - - - - - -
9 1.02 0.01 0.74 0.36 - - - - - -
8 20.59 7.32 5.27 4.24 - 7.75 - - - -
7 5.94 2.53 0.64 3.68 - - - - - 5.61 
c: clumsiness s: stealing L: lies 
significant at the 0.05 level if x2 = 3.84-
significant at the 0.01 level if -t! = 5.41 
significant at the 0.001 level if Y!- = 6.64 
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APPENDIX H 
THE REPLICATION LITERATURE 
T:.e purpose of this Appendix is to present in fairly brief 
form the aims and findings of the twenty or so stUdies carried 
out in the validation and testing of Piaget's ideas on moral 
development as put forward in The 1"Iora1 Judgement of the Child 
(1932). These studies are presented in chronological order 
except when a series of investigations has been executed by a 
single author when they are considered as a whole. Details of 
sample size and structure are given in order to indicate the 
validity of the follow-up studies in suggesting modifications of 
Piaget's hypotheses. 
Harrower (1934) 
Sample: 112 children aged 5 to 11 years in two contrasting groups-
one working class from L.C.C. schools and 'the poorer parts of 
London' and the second middle class ('of cultured parents') 
presumably from a private school. Two types of comparison were 
attempted: 
i) between working class group and Piaget's subjects 
~from the very poor districts' (1932, p. 129»; a 
cross-cultural comparison. 
ii) between working and middle class groups in this study. 
Technique: one Piaget-type situation was used to assess the child's 
attitude to punishment and there was also adopted a very free form 
of questioning in relation to cheating. The scope of this 
investigation was therefore very limited. 
Results: age progressions in any group are difficult to establish 
from Harrower's data since he compares two age groups (5-7 years 
and 8-10 years) without any internal breakdown. Harrower shows 
that his experimental group (from a more favourable social back-
ground) displayed more mature forms of judgement much earlier than 
the disadvantaged group for both the dimensions investigated. The 
control group showed stages of development similar to those 
suggested by Piaget. Harrower concludes that either Piaget's 
scheme is applicable to only a specific environment (very poor 
home background) or that there are factors present in certain 
other environments which may accelerate the child's development 
through Piagetts stages so quickly that the highest level of 
reasoning can be found in some very young children. 
Abel (1941) 
Sample: 94 girls with two main sub-samples of mentally retarded 
girls. In one, 20 girls housed in an institution were compared 
with 20 girls housed in the community; in the other, 15 girls who 
had been in the institution more than six years were compared with 
15 girls who had been in the institution less th~n one year. 
Technique: seven Piagetian stories were used in all; there was 
one concerned with the definition of wrong as being caught and" 
punished and two stories in each of the areas of objective re-
sponsibility, inillllment justice and expiation v. restitution. 
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Results: four main conclusions were reached. These were : 
i) in all areas the girls housed in the institution performed 
worse than those housed in the community. 
ii) in all areas the girls who had been in the institution 
more than six years performed worse than those who had 
been there for less than one year. 
iii) then mental age of the girls proved to be a significant 
influence in only one area (expiation v. restitution) 
al though there was a tendency for less able girls (H.A. 
6-8 years) to perform worse in the objective responsibility 
dimension than slightly more able girls (N.A. 9-11 years). 
iv) the obedience of the girls within the institution to the 
demands of the staff was a significant factor in the 
dimension of objective responsibility. The more trouble-
some girls (i.e. those who were less socially competent) 
did better on this test than the obedient girls. 
The first two results were interpreted as evidence of the 
detrimental effects of institutionalization especially insofar as 
the staff relied on the threat of immanent justice and on retributive 
punishment as forms of control. 
Dennis (1943) 
Sample: 95 Hopi children aged 12 to 14 years. 
Technique: a single dimension (immanent justice) investigated usinG 
stories similar to those of Piaget taken·from Lerner's (1937a) .study. 
Results: Bopi children showed greater belief in animism and immanent 
justice than that found by Lerner a~ong white American subjects 
of the same ages. These differences were attributed to certain 
unknown cultural factors although Dennis noted a uniformity in 
the responses of the younger children in his own and Lerner's 
studies which he proposed were due to universal childhood 
experiences and mental immaturity. 
Liu (1950) 
Sample: uncertain - this summary is taken from secondary sources 
notably Bloom (1959) and Hediullus (1959); but the main comparisons 
are between Chinese and American-born children both raised in the 
U.S.A.. 
Technique: investigation of immanent justice and objective 
responsibility. 
Results: native born American children showed greater severity 
of judgement, greater belief in imwanent justice and much less 
subtlety of analysis than the Chinese born children. These trends 
are linked with two features of the Chinese family life - the 
greater intimacy of the Chinese family and the child's exposure 
to Confucian philosophy which encourages a consideration of moral 
questions (c.f. Boehm, 1962 and 1963a and b). 
Ugurel-Semin (1952) 
Sample: 291 Turkish children aged 4 to 16 years. 
Technique: a more practical approach to morality. Poses a 
situation where an odd number of nuts has to be shared out between 
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two children. The behaviour of the child and the reasoning by 
which he justified his actions showed certain developmental trends. 
Results: it was found that a decline in selfishness (keepinG the 
odd nut) and an increase in generosity (giving the odd nut to the 
partner) was associated with age, socio-economic position and family 
size but not with respondent's sex. Ugurel-Semin isolated seven 
aspects of moral jUdgement, each of which he says dominates the 
child's thinking at successively later ages. These are egocentrism, 
sociocentrism, awareness of social reaction, superficial reCiprocity, 
enlarged co-operative reciprocity, altruism and justice; these are 
very similar to the stages proposed by Kohlberg in his scheme of 
moral development - see Chapter 4 of the text. On the theoretical 
aspect of Piaget's work, Ugurel-Semin suggests a process of 
decentration as the mechanism in declining egocentrism and movement 
towards more mature forms of thought. 
Hac Rae (1954) 
Sample: 244 boys aged 5 to 14 years. 
Technique: two tests of objective responsibility taken fronl Piaget 
(1932); some items from Lerner's (1937a) study; some items of his 
own design relating to expiative and imn~nent justice_ MacRae also 
devised a questionnaire to estimate parental,strictness in some 
areas of control over the child and&tempted to link these estimates 
wi th the child' 6 moral development. 
Results: i) MacRae demonstrated three clusters of correlations among 
371 
the aspects of morality he studied rather than a single 
cluster as could be expected if there were a general 
trait of morality. These correlations were found only 
within particular dimensions and not between any of them. 
ii) the characteristics of a morality of co-operation (which 
is Piaget's more mature form of judgement) is not 
necessarily linked with a decrease in parental control 
as measured by HacRae's questionnaire. There was the 
expected negative correlation of parental strictness 
and moral development in some areas but net in others. 
iii) high status children (ie. those from better home back-
grounds) return more mature answers at each age level 
than low status children; this was thought to be due 
to the greater intellectual maturity of the former group. 
iv) MacRae distinguishes two major forms of moral judgement -
those based on cognitive factors (a knowledge of cultural 
expectations with regard to the question asked) and those 
based on emotional factors (the extent to which the child 
can identify with the situation and bring to bear his 
personal attitudes to deviance). This is an important 
distinction since the better performance of high status 
children on Piaget's tests may be due to the intell.ectual 
advantage of these children and the cognitive nature of 
the tests; on the other hand low status children who tend 
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to encounter peer group interaction at an earlier age and 
for more prolonged periods may mature more quickly with 
regard to 'emotional' situations (c.f. Boehm, 1962a). 
Norris (1958) 
Sample: 94 children by school class placings. 
Technique: 14 situations in which individual and parental wishes 
were opposed; asked the subjects what the individual should do and 
what in fact he would do. 
Results: answers became more complex with age, dependence on 
authority declined in favour of independent judgement and there 
was a slow decline of judgements based on self-interest. There 
were marked discrepancies between what the individual should and 
would do - and there were important situational differences in the 
level of moral judgement. These findings support NacRae' s in-
dication of situational differences and they are extended by 
Durkin (1959-61). 
Nedinnus (1959) 
Sample: 240 children at four age leve1s- 6,8, 10 and 12 years. 
Technique: 18 stories relating to immanent justice similar to 
those of Piaget. 
Results: Medinnus notes that previous studies have pointed out the 
need to consider intelligence, social class and culture as factors 
which might influence the child's rate of development with regard 
to immanent justice. Generally belief in im.;nanent justice declines 
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with age although Havighurst and Neugarten (1955) note an exception 
to this trend which they interpret as being a result of very strong 
cultural patterns which place different emphases than do the white 
communities on the nature of man and his environment. 
From his own study Hedinnus notes the situational variations 
in level of jUdgement especially insofar as the child might have 
experienced the situation in real life (when there was a tendency 
to reject immanent justice) and as explanations using or implying 
imwanent justice appear in the situations (when there is a greater 
tendency to accept the dimension). Medinnus hypothesizes that 
parental teaching can affect the child's level of thought with 
regard to immanent justice. 
Durkin (1959-61) 
Two of the five reports by Durkin are summaries of the trends 
shown in the three experimental studies she carried out_ The 
summaries are given in the 1960 and 1961 reports and the discussion 
below concentrates on the other three studies. 
Samples: 1959a, c; 1960; 1961 - 101 middle class children aged 
7. 10 and 13 years. 1959b - 101 middle class children + 89 lower 
class children aged 7. 10 and 13 years. 
Techniques: related to Piaget's dimensions of punishment by 
authority v. retaliation and reciprocity in the definition of rights. 
For the first the subjects were questioned about acts of aggression 
and for the second situations were used which involved justice in 
other areas. 
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Results: generally Piaget's proposed trends were not supported 
in middle class children (l959a) or in lower class children (1959b); 
in both cases a curvilinear age progression was established such 
that older and younger children sought restitution by an adult. 
For the non-aggressive stories, Durkin found that the specific 
situations were important influences on the child's apparent level 
of development and that, contrary to Piaget's suggestions, reciprocity 
was favoured most by the younger children (1959c). Durkin was unable 
to distinguish any sex variations in her data although she does note 
that middle class girls tended to show more variety in their choice 
of non-reciprocal punishments than did middle class boys who con-
sistently chose telling an authority figure (1960). In general, 
Durkin concludes that Piaget's approach to reciprocity is in-
sufficiently sensitive to use as a classification (1961, p. 12) and 
that at the very least Piaget's theory 'minimizes the influence 
of the environment on a child's understanding of what is just' 
(1959c, p. 294). 
Johnson (1962a) 
Sample: 307 children in Hawaii; school grades 5, 7, 9 and 11 
(approximate ages 10, 12, 14 and 16 years). Sub-sample of 167 
children were given the Gorham Proverbs Test (Gorham, 1956) to 
estimate the abstractness of their thought; questionnaire sent 
to the parents of 128 of these children (and 96 pairs of forma 
were returned) to estimate attitudes in a number of areas. 
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Techni~ue: 20 Piaget-type situations in the areas of immanent 
justice, objective responsibility, expiation v. restitution, the 
efficacy of severe punishment and communicable responsibility. 
Aiming to check the intercorrelations within and between the 
areas of moral judgement and to consider the effects of various 
antecedent conditions (adult constraint, 'egocentricity', age, 
I.Q. and parental occupation). 
Results: correlations were established within each of the areas 
investigated but they were of a lower order than Piaget's work 
would suggest. In contrast to other studies, Johnson also found 
close relationships &nong some areas of moral judgement (objective 
responsibility, retribution v. restitution, and efficacy of severe 
punishment) although the other two (immanent justice and communicable 
responsibility) were less closely related. Parental attitudes were 
found to relate to the last two areas only and egocentricity 
(measured somewhat crudely by the Gorham test) allowed only slight 
correlations with moral judgement. Intelligence and parental 
occupation were related positively to mature moral judgement in 
all areas. Johnson's general conclusion is that most findings 
were in the direction predicted by Piaget but at a lower level 
than he suggests. 
Boeho (1957-64) 
Samples: 1957 - 29 Swiss and 40 American children aeed 6 - 15 years 
1962a,b 1963a - 237 children aged 9+ years who could be formed into 
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various sub-groups for considerations of differences in socio-
economic status, intelligence and religious belief (Catholics 
and Jews). 
1963b - 51 children aged 3 - 5 years 
~oehm and Nass) 1962 - 160 children aged 6 - 12 years. 
Techniques: two situations each for objective responsibility and 
reliance on adults to administer punishments were used in all but 
the first study. 
Results: 1957 - the quicker maturation of American pre-school 
children in certain areas of social development (particularly 
in the reliance on adults to adminster punishments) was attributed 
to a less ebocentric mode of thought in the American child as a 
result of an earlier transference from adult dependence to peer 
group dependence and consequent freedom of thought and judgement. 
Boehm and Nass (1962) - this study failed to show social 
class as an important variable in affecting the rate of moral 
development, but this could be due to the small variation in the 
occupations considered; another examination of bigger sotial class 
differences (Boehm, 1962b) was able to point to some class 
variations. Boehm and Nass note the importance of specific 
situational cues and age in moral judgements; since they found a 
marked change in the maturity of responses after the age of 9 years 
the subsequent studies concentrated on children younger than nine 
to minimize the effects of age and concentrate on other variables. 
1962a - academically gifted children mature earlier with 
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regard to objective responsibility as do upper middle class children. 
Working class children show earlier peer group reciprocity and 
independence from adults than do upper nliddle class children (c.f. 
NacRae t 1954). 
1962b - children in Catholic ~chools show earlier mature 
moral judgements than children in Public schools in relation to 
objective responsibility and adult-independent behaviour. This 
is apparently expla~ned by the necessity of the Catholic child to 
be prepared for confession at the age of 7 years and his consequent 
earlier consideration of intentions in actions. 
1963a - Jewish children proved to be more peer related than 
children in either the Catholic or Public schools when situations 
involving an injured peer are considered but also more reliant on 
adult authority in situations where no such injury was considered. 
This is another -example of the situational specificity of moral 
judgement,.. 
1963b - 20 (or 39%) of these very young children showed 
responses to Pia£:,et's story about the man who loses his way as 
a result of a trick played by a boy (1932, p. 145-46) which were 
mature by Piaget's interpretation. The fact that only this one 
story was used allows no estimate of the generality of this level 
of maturity and it may well be that this perticular situation is 
easier to answer in mature fashion than others (see the discussion 
in the text in Chapter 5). 
These findings point as a whole to the need for a consideration 
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of environmental factors and specific situational variations as 
important influences on the process of moral development. 
Porteous and Johnson (1965) 
Sample: 235 ninth grade (approximately 14 year old) children in 
Honolulu. 
Technique: Piaeetian situations assessing the cognitive aspects 
of conscience were contrasted with an affective approach which 
allowed the subjects to complete a story in which a child has 
just committed or is about to commit an undetected offence. I.Q. 
considered as a possible influence and was not controlled - the 
emphasis in this study is on mental age rather than chronological 
age. 
Results: intelligence did in fact prove to be a most important 
influence in both sorts of test. Girls showed a greater maturity 
than boys on both measures of morality although there was less 
correlation for the girls between the scores on both tests; there 
was a significant though small relationship between scores on each 
test for the boyse 
Breznitz and Kugelmass (1967) 
Sample: 1,014 Israeli adolescents. 
Technique: a questionnaire designed to test three aspects of the 
development of the principle of intentionality (as opposed to 
reliance on consequences).in judgement. These principles were 
the ability to use intentionality in jUdgements, the ability to 
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phrase spontaneously the principle of intentionality, and the 
ability to verbalize a general principle of inte~tionality. 
Results: it is suggested that there are four stages in the use 
of intentionality in moral jUdgements. The first stage (of 
Pre-verbalized Usage) is typified by the child's ability to 
apply the principle of intentionality without being able to 
specify the criteria he uses. In the second stage (Verbalization 
of the PrinCiple) the subject can apply the principle and also 
explain the criteria he uses. In a third stage (of Recall of the 
Principle) the subject can now explain the principle without 
specific external cues such as the story situations which were 
needed for subjects in the previous stage. In the final stage 
(Refined Application of the Principle) there occurs an increasing 
differentiation of the dimension of intentionality. These trends 
are remarkably similar to the process of cognitive development 
proposed by Piaget (see Chapter 1 of the text) and lend support 
to those critics who point out that Piaget is investigating only 
a limited part of the whole of moral development (see, for eX~lple, 
\'lright, 1968, or Kohlberg, 1963a). 
All the studies reported so far have accepted the validity 
of Piaget's framework of moral development and have attempted to 
isolate factors which might alter the child's rate of development 
through the stages outlined. A more serious modification of 
Piaget's theory has been suggested by Kohlberg (see Chapter 4 of 
the text) who believes that Piaget' s scheme is insufficient to 
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account for moral development through adolescence and into adult-
hood. The E-ame weakness of the Piagetian theory of moral develop-
ment is noted by the final author in this review: 
Bull (1969) 
Sample: 360 children with equal numbers of boys and girls at each 
of six age levels (7, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 17 years). The girls were 
of higher intelligence than the boys and this casts some doubt on 
the validity of sex differences which Bull notes. 
Technique: 6 written tests and 4 verbal teets. Some of the teste 
designed to allow classification of answers into one offuur stages 
of moral development - which Bull terms anomy, heteronomy, socionomy 
and autonomy - although it appears that these stages were drawn up 
before the investigation rather than being determined by the data. 
The variables investigated were age, sex, socioeconomic class, I.Q 
and religious participation. Bull also suggests that the home 
background of the child (especially parental adoption of psycho-
logical measures of control) might help the internalization of 
conscience although he collected no data relevant to this hypothesis. 
Results: PiaLet's final stage of moral development is insufficiently 
mature to account for moral judgements made by some adults and 
adolescents; it was therefore necessary to develop an alternative 
scheme of moral development. Working within his proposed four stage 
schewe of moral development Bull showe that a spurt in development 
is apparent during the period 9 - 11 years; during this time anomy 
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and heteronomy (the more immature forms of judgement) decline 
most rapidly alongwiili socionomy while autonomy (the highest 
level of judgement) generally increases. 
Intelligence appeared to be an important influence as does 
socioeconomic class; apparently girls achieved their developmental 
spurt some two years before boys but this may be accounted for 
in part by the higher I.~. of the girls. Relieious participation 
(as measured by church affiliation) did not relate to moral 
judgements in any strong way; Bull suggests tt~t what little 
evidence there was to connect moral development and religious 
attendance was linked more to the general home atmosphere rather 
than church attendance in itself. 
Bull's work, along with that of Kohlberg, points to the 
severely limited applicability which Fiaget's scheme of moral 
development has for adults and even young adolescents. The 
extension'of Piaget's theory to allow the inclusion of more 
sophisticated forms of thought is at least as important as the 
previous research which has been carried out on the variables 
effective in differential rates of moral development. 
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. SUMl'1ARY 
1. Aim - a better perspective on Piaget's theory of moral development 
through :-
(a) comparison with Piaget's theory of cognitive development (Chapters 
1 and 2). 
<b) ~~~~u~Gion of the replication studies deriving from Piaget's work 
on moral development (Chapter 3). 
(c) comparison of Piaget' s theory of moral development with those of 
other theorists, especially Freud, Koh1berg and S.-H. theorists. 
A model of conscience involving 3 dimensions (Knowledge, guilt and 
action) is developed (Chapter 4). 
(d) the clarification of the relationships between the child's rate of 
moral development (as measured by Piaget's tests) and parental 
attitudes in various areas (see Section 2). 
2. Original Work 
(a) A study of the moral judgements of 368 Sheffield school children 
aged 7-12 years inclusive. 
(t) Technique - six specially constructed tests after the fashion of 
Piaget; two tests in each of 3 areas of behaviour -
clumsiness, stealing and lying. All tests relate to 
'It,' 
(ii) Results 
Piaget's moral dimension of objective responsibility. 
(Chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 - moral judgements tended to become more mature 
with increasing a~e but two groups of exceptional children 
were isolated - a group of sixteen 7 and 8 year olds whose 
moral judgements were consistently mature by Piaget's 
standards, and a group of sixteen 11 and 12 year oles whose 
responses were consistently immature. The parents of these 
children formed the basis of the second empirical in-
vestiGation of this study (see section 2b). 
Children's responses showed little variation in 
maturity between the broader moral areas (clumsiness, lies 
and stealing) but more marked fluctuation between tests, 
particularly those tests relating to lies, was noted. 
There was a correlation between greater moral maturity 
in the child and both a higher intelligence and a middle 
class family background. There were no differences in rate 
of moral development between boys and gir1s. 
(b) A study of parental attitudes and their relationship with the child's 
rate of moral development (Chapter 7). 
(i) Sample - both patents of 32 exceptional children noted in the first 
part of the study plus a control group of both parents of 
32 'normal' children. Of 128 parents approached, 85 
returned the completed attitude scale. I. 
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(ii) Technique: 14 dimensions of the Parental Attitude Research In-
strument (Schaeffer and Bell, 1958) were incorporated 
as a separate attitude scale. The dimensions selected 
were Breaking the Will, Strictness, Suppression of Sex, 
Excluding Outside Influences, Deification, Intrusiveness, 
Fostering Dependance, Suppression of Aggression, Fear of 
Harming the Baby, Encouraging Verbalization, Equali-
tarianism, Comradeship and Sharing, AvOidance of 
Communication and Acceleration. Scores for busband and 
wife in each family unit were compared and the family 
was assigned to one of three categories - high scorers, 
where both parents scored high along the particular 
dimension, low scorers, where both scored low, and 
mixed where one was high and one was low. 
(iii) Results - The effect of different parental attitudes along the 
dimensions studied varied with the age of the child, 
but generally it was the younger child who was most 
influenced by parental opinion. It was suggested 
that the younger child, with his less well organized 
and more unstable systems of thought and moral 
judgement, was more sensitive and susceptible than 
the older child to variations in parental attitudes 
(both acceleratory and retardatory). 
The correlations suggested by the present data 
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indicated that parental attitudes have been wrongly 
neglected in the past whenever the child's moral 
development has been studied. These results suggest 
that further research should consider certain aspects 
of parental opinion (particularly in relation to the 
child's autonomy, democracy in the home, strictness 
and overprotection) as an important group of social 
factors influencing the rate of moral development in 
the child. 
KEY TO GRAPHS 
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2a, b & c 
Idi, ii & iii 
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A - Aggregate scores 
C - Clumsiness 
S - Stealine 
L - Lies 
Test Numbers - I, II, III, 
IV, V & VI 
Sex: B - Boys 
G - Girls 
Intelligence Group: 
A - Above average 
B - Average 
C - Below average 
Social Class: 
A - manual 
B - non-manual 
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